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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the informativeness of book-tax differences (BTD). It 
examines the usefulness of BTD in evaluating the extent of accounting-tax 
nonconformity and proxying firms’ earnings management and tax management, and 
investigates the value relevance of BTD in a Chinese context.
Motivated by the potential but largely overlooked usefulness of BTD in indicating 
unobservable earnings management and tax management and earnings quality, three 
research questions are addressed: (1) Can observable BTD proxy earnings 
management and tax management after controlling for accounting-tax misalignment? 
(2) To what extent is variation in BTD associated with earnings management and tax 
management incentives? (3) Is the information embedded in BTD sufficient to make 
BTD value relevant?
A conceptual framework is developed, identifying BTD as a function of 
accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management and tax management. Therefore, 
BTD is argued to be a measure of EM and TM after controlling for the effect of 
accounting-tax misalignment and so signifies the earnings quality. It is expected to be 
value relevant because it provides the policy-related information about different 
requirements in book and tax reporting and the earnings-quality-related information 
regarding managerial manipulations to the capital markets. Both of information may aid 
investors to precisely evaluate and forecast firms’ future performance and so may 
affect share returns.
An important methodological and conceptual contribution is the division of BTD 
into normal BTD (NBTD) and abnormal BTD (ABTD). NBTD is attributed to the
V
mechanical differences arising from divergent income reporting rules for book and tax
r
purposes, signalling the extent of accounting-tax misalignment. ABTD is attributed to 
managerial choices in accounting and tax reporting, thus proxying the level of 
management manipulations. These latent components of BTD are estimated by 
regressing BTD on factors associated with normal BTD. When the resultant model is 
used to forecast normal BTD, the unpredicted BTD is abnormal (ABTD).
Accounting data from Chinese B-shares listed companies’ financial statements 
are used to test this framework. This is particularly advantageous because the 
disclosure requirements for these companies reveal particular aspects of BTD not 
readily observable in other settings.
The variables of incentives for EM and TM explain a large portion of the 
estimated ABTD. The magnitude of ABTD appears to indicate the existence and level 
of management manipulations, suggesting that it is a useful metric for EM and TM. A 
naive proxy for ABTD is aiso used to evaluate the robustness of the conceptual design, 
with similar but slightly weaker results.
The evidence also supports the prediction that the BTD and its components are 
value-relevant, consistent with that the information embedded in BTD informs the 
market on different institutional arrangements in accounting and tax rules and the 
levels of noise in reported financial information (i.e. earnings quality). BTD is 
incrementally informative for future earnings and stock returns beyond current-year 
earnings.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis explores the informativeness of book-tax differences (BTD). It 
examines the potential for BTD in evaluating the extent of accounting-tax misalignment 
and proxying firms’ earnings management (EM) and tax management (TM), and 
investigates the value relevance of BTD in a Chinese context.
This thesis attempts to enrich and deepen the understanding of BTD in terms of 
epistemology and methodology. Three broad research questions addressed in this 
thesis are:
(1) Can observable BTD proxy earnings management and tax management after 
controlling for accounting-tax misalignment?
(2) To what extent is variation in BTD associated with earnings management and 
tax management incentives?
(3) Is the information embedded in BTD sufficient to make BTD value relevant?
To answer these questions, this study firstly constructs a theoretical framework, in 
which BTD is interpreted as a function of accounting-tax misalignment, earnings 
management and tax management. Therefore, it is argued that BTD may be used to 
proxy EM and TM after controlling for accounting-tax misalignment. BTD is expected to 
be informative for share prices because it can provide the policy-related information 
about the divergent accounting and tax reporting requirements and the quality-related 
information about management manipulations. This two different information
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impounded in BTD may aid investors to precisely evaluate and forecast firms’ future 
performance and so may affect stock returns.
Next, this thesis develops a methodology to decompose BTD into normal and 
abnormal components. Normal BTD (NBTD) is defined as the mechanical differences 
due to the divergent reporting rules for book and tax purposes, addressing the extent of 
accounting-tax misalignment. Abnormal BTD (ABTD) refers to the potentially 
opportunistic differences due to the managerial choices in accounting and tax reporting, 
thus quantifying the level of management manipulations. Because both NBTD and 
ABTD are not observed directly, indicator measures are developed by regressing BTD 
on factors associated with normal BTD. When the resultant model is used to forecast 
normal BTD, the unpredicted BTD is abnormal (ABTD).
Accounting data from Chinese B-shares listed companies’ financial statements 
are used to test the relevant research questions. This is particularly advantageous 
because the disclosure requirements for these companies reveal particular aspects of 
BTD not readily observable in other settings. The empirical study provides evidence 
that the estimated ABTD is positively related to most EM and TM incentives, 
suggesting it is a useful metric for EM and TM. BTD and its components are value 
relevant in the Chinese capital markets.
1.2 Important Concepts and Definitions in the Thesis
This section explains four important concepts that underlie the research questions 
in this study.
2
Book-Tax Differences
In the definition used most commonly in the literature, book-tax differences refer 
to the gap between pre-tax income reported in a company’s published financial 
statement (thereafter book income) and taxable income reported to tax authorities. 
BTD originates from different reporting rules for financial reporting (including 
accounting principles, standards, regulations) compared to income tax laws (including 
income tax legislations, judicial precedents, administrative ruling) (e.g. Smith and 
Butters 1949, Beresford et al. 1983, Tran 1997).1
The objective of financial reporting as set in accounting rules is to provide 
information about the financial position, performance and changes in financial position 
of an enterprise that is useful to accounting information users in making economic 
decisions. However, the objectives of tax laws typically are to raise revenue for 
governmental operations and to control the economy to achieve social, economic and 
political goals. These conflicting objectives guiding different development of rules for 
financial reporting and tax reporting raise the issue of BTD.
In this study, BTD not only reflects the mechanical differences due to the 
divergent reporting rules for book and tax purposes, but also reflects the opportunistic 
differences due to the managerial choices in accounting and tax reporting.
Earnings Management
Based on existent literature, there are various definitions of earnings 
management. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) define earnings management as occurring 
when managers exercise their discretion over the accounting numbers with or without
1 In China, income tax laws include income tax legislations, administrative regulations, bylaws and 
departmental ruling.
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restrictions. This study follows the definition of earnings management suggested by 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) in which earnings management refers to “managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
(p368).
Tax Management
Like earnings management, tax management, or tax planning or tax avoidance or 
tax shelter has various definitions. 2 Generally, it is defined as taxpayers taking 
advantage of the provision of the tax laws to legally reduce or defer their tax liability 
(e.g. Scholes et al. 2002, Tresch 2002). In this study, tax management refers to 
taxpayers exploiting the uncertainty of tax laws to choose the advantageous provision 
in tax reporting and in structuring tax-favoured activities to legally influence their tax 
liabilities.
Value Relevance
In the value relevance literature, a potential information item is defined as value 
relevant if it exhibits the significant association with a measure of equity market value 
or stock prices (Barth et al. 2001, Barth 2000, Ohlson 1995, Beaver 1998). Some 
studies also regard an item as value relevant if it affects stock prices, stock prices 
variability, or trading volumes (Beaver 1968, Bauman 1996). In this study, an 
accounting variable is regarded as value relevant if it is informative for evaluating firms’ 
performance and estimating future earnings and this information can be reflected in
2 They are interchangeably used in the tax planning literature.
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stock prices as suggested in Ou (1990), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell 
and Bushee (1997).
1.3 Why Research BTD?
To date, the intricate business activities and managerial practice have 
complicated the informativeness of BTD. While aggressive book and tax reporting 
appear to be pervasive, BTD has become more and more meaningful due to its 
potential for interpreting this unobserved managerial practice. However, as will be 
illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, prior research on BTD is relatively limited. This leads to 
the informativeness of BTD has not been adequately demonstrated and utilised.
1.3.1 The Potential Informativeness and Usefulness of BTD
Based on the definition, BTD is the gap between book income and taxable 
income underlying different accounting and tax rules. However, these two sets of rules 
can not specify accounting and/or tax treatment for each detail of business transaction 
because business activities are complex and changing. This necessarily leaves 
considerable uncertainty in applying accounting standards and tax laws. If managers 
manage their earnings reported to investors and tax authorities by opportunistically 
implementing the accounting and tax rules, can BTD reflect additional information other 
than the accounting-tax misalignment per se?
As will be indicated in Chapter 2, accounting information is subject to 
manipulation. Nowadays, the growth in use of tax shelters has led to the financial 
statement-based measures of income being less representative of firms’ taxable 
income (Dhaliwal et. al 2004, Manzon and Plesko 2002). “It is almost impossible to 
know a firm’s tax bill by looking at its financial statements and thus it is impossible to
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figure out what actual profits are” (The Wall Street Journal, 2003). The massive 
earnings management and accounting scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom) have 
threatened the value of accounting information and its role in providing useful 
information for share pricing and economic decisions. As a result, how to detect 
earnings management and tax management or assess the reliability of accounting 
information is an empirical issue.
If BTD is also reflective of these opportunistic behaviours, how this information 
can be discriminated from that about institutional arrangements? What is the 
implication of the mechanical differences for evaluating the extent of accounting-tax 
misalignment in a specific country? Can the opportunistic differences be used to 
measure the unobserved EM and TM? If yes, tax authorities and audit firms may focus 
on firms with larger opportunistic differences to perform an efficient and effective 
auditing. Researchers may use a new proxy to estimate or detect the forms and 
incidence of the unobservable EM and TM. Investors and financial analysts may 
assess the reliability of accounting reports. Further, if BTD can inform the market of 
extra information about unobservable managerial manipulation, is it possibly a good 
supplement of accounting measures and incrementally informative for stock prices? 
This thesis is motivated by these concerns and potential implications of BTD for 
explaining and predicting some accounting phenomena.
1.3.2 Research Gaps in Prior Literature
The study is also motivated by the deficiency in extant BTD literature, the 
challenges in detecting EM and TM and remained concerns about earnings quality in 
the value relevance research.
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Incomplete Research on BTD
Two research lines make up the existing BTD literature: the first line studies BTD 
from the perspective of institutional arrangements, emphasising that BTD is a product 
of the discrepancy between accounting rules and tax laws. This line either implicitly 
studies BTD by analysing the relationship between accounting and taxation, which 
explains the mechanical sources of BTD or studies the relationship between 
accounting and taxation in a selected country by using BTD to explain the divergent 
rules (e g. Porcano and Tran 1998, Tran 1998).
The second line concentrates on managerial incentives and opportunistic choices, 
arguing that BTD is influenced by managerial practice in increasing/smoothing 
accounting earnings or reducing/deferring tax payment to serve management interests 
(e.g. Mills 1998, Mills and Newberry 2001, Phillips et al. 2003, Plesko 2004, McGill and 
Outslay 2004, Desai and Dharmapala 2004). This line posits that distinct incentives of 
financial statement preparers likely lead to different amounts of income reported to 
investors and tax authorities that may generate the opportunistic variation in BTD. 
These studies extend the implications of BTD for interpreting management 
manipulations, though no much empirical evidence supports the proposition that BTD 
may be a proxy for tax planning.
However, these two lines of research are conducted in a split focus. Most of 
studies either ignore mechanical differences or ignore opportunistic differences. This 
drawback makes their inferential results difficult to interpret. Even when the 
researchers have realised that, the difficulty in discriminating the institutional factors 
from opportunistic factors appears to have hindered their further empirical testing and 
the advances in BTD research (A detailed analysis is presented in Chapter 2).
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Research Challenges in the EM and TM Literature
A major challenge in recent EM and TM research is the unobservability of 
managerial actions or the lack of an appropriate measurement for EM and TM (Beneish 
2001, Hofmann 2002). Although, in the earnings management literature, the 
measurements of total accruals and discretionary accruals have been widely used as 
proxies for EM (e.g. Healy 1985, DeAngelo 1986, Jones 1991, Dechow et al. 1995, 
Dechow and Sloan 1991, Guenther 1994a), they have been subject to significant 
criticism due to measurement imprecision and misspecification (e.g. Beneish 1999, 
Phillips et al. 2003, Guay et al. 1996, Bernard and Skinner 1996, McNichols 2000).
Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate the power and specification of five discretionary 
accruals models, such as Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones model and the 
Industry Model, they conclude that “the models all generate tests of low power for 
earnings management of economically plausible magnitude” (p193). More importantly, 
accruals measurement per se can not detect some EM if earnings are managed by real 
transactions which create both cash flows and earnings (Roychowdhury 2004, Jian and 
Wong 2003).
As with detecting earnings management, measuring tax planning is not easy, due 
mainly to the confidentiality of tax data and lack of an appropriate proxy for TM. In 
current tax research, effective tax rate (ETR) is commonly used to measure TM (e.g. 
Mills et al. 1998, Petroni and Shackelford 1999, Gupta and Mills 2002, Rego 2003, 
Phillips 2003).3 Shevlin (1999) and Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) suggest that ETR, 
measured as current tax expense as a percent of pre-tax book income, provides an
3 ETR, being a ratio o f taxes to pre-tax book income, can be measured in different ways. For example, the 
numerator can be income tax expense, current tax expense, current tax expense plus foreign tax expense, 
total tax expense minus the change in deferred tax liabilities, total tax expense minus the deferred tax 
expense or deferred tax expense. Similarly, the denominator may take many forms, such as taxable 
income, pre-tax income, operating cash flow, gross margin or working capital from operation (See W ilkie 
and Limberg 1993, Callihan 1994).
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appropriate measure for tax planning effectiveness (and also tax aggressiveness) 
because effective tax planning results in a low ETR.
However, some argue that ETR’s ability may be weakened due to measurement 
error and its exclusion of implicit tax (Wilkie 1992, Wilkie and Limberg 1993, Scholes et 
al. 2002, Plesko 2003). For example, Wilkie (1992) argues that ETR is noisy when a 
net operating loss (NOL) is carried forward in a profitable year because in that 
circumstance, ETR is understated even no tax planning.
In addition, ETR itself contains the information of both tax planning and incentive 
effects of tax policy. It is hard to ascertain whether the lower level of ETR is caused by 
tax preference/holidays or tax sheltering. Thus, ETR proxy will introduce measurement 
error into the results of TM examination (See a detailed discussion in Chapter 2).
Remaining Concerns in the Value Relevance Literature
In capital markets research, value relevance studies which assess the extent to 
which selected accounting variables affect stock market values are a major group. 
Some financial variables such as earnings, taxable income, inventory, ETR have been 
documented to be value relevant since they can provide useful information for investors 
and market analysts to evaluate firms’ performance and estimate future earnings (Ball 
and Brown 1968, Beaver 1968, Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, Abarbanell and Bushee 
1997, Shevlin 2002, Lev and Nissim 2004, Hanlon 2004). The fixation, however, on 
reported financial statement numbers of investors and market induces management to 
manipulate the value-relevant financial variables (e.g. book and taxable income) for 
their self-interests (Kothari 2001).
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Two major concerns relating to the value relevance of accounting information 
arise: (1) the lower explanatory and predictive power of earnings on stock prices 
presented in prior literature (Lev 1989); and (2) a deterioration in the association 
between accounting information and stock prices over the past four decades (Collins et 
al. 1997, Francis and Schipper 1999). An argument made by Lev (1989) stresses that, 
if accounting numbers used in regressions are not accurate in depicting the 
performance of the company, the regression results will not explain the extent to which 
earnings predict stock returns. It is an essential point because much of research has 
been done on refining statistical models but appears to fail in testing the quality of input 
data. If value relevance research is conducted on a basis of manipulated data, its 
implications for practice should be doubted. Thus, how the market can assess the 
reliability of financial variables is an empirical issue.
Taken together, the challenges in detecting EM and TM leave the quality of 
accounting information open for further investigation. The inadequate studies in the 
informativeness of BTD weaken BTD's utility on this issue. This study aims to conduct 
a complete study to extend the knowledge of BTD. It also attempts to advance extant 
BTD research by developing a new method to classify different information in BTD and 
further investigate their usefulness. This thesis fills some of gaps in the EM, TM and 
value relevance literature by testing the capability of BTD to proxy EM and TM, and 
earnings quality in the capital markets.
1.4 Why Research BTD in the Chinese Context?
Similar to the Western developed countries, such as the United States of America 
(U.S.), Canada and Australia, China has BTD. BTD has emerged and developed as 
China’s accounting and tax systems evolved from a closely aligned system to 
unaligned systems. In the last 25 years, to adapt to the transition from a socialist
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planned economy to a market-oriented economy and business internationalisation, 
China established its accounting standards to comply with International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), and imported international tax practice to its tax system. This 
importation not only brought some mechanical gaps in the reporting rules, but also 
brought opportunistic differences due to managerial choices in book and tax reporting. 
Although China has a rather short history of BTD, managerial and market practice has 
led it to develop in a similar way to countries with a long history of BTD, such as the 
U.S. and Australia.
Being the largest emerging capital market in the world, however, the reliability of 
accounting information has been questioned (Haw et al. 1998a, Abdel-khalik et al. 
1999, Eccher and Healy 2000, Shen 2001, Chen et al. 2003). Empirical evidence 
shows that management manipulation over earnings in the Chinese listed firms is 
rampant (e.g. Chen 1998, Jian and Wong 2003, Haw et al. 1998b, Chen et al. 2000). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that tax planning is prevalent and easily undertaken in 
China.
Similarly, the increasing occurrence of accounting scandals (e.g. YingGuangXia, 
Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical and QiongMingYuan) has weakened the investors’ 
confidence in their use of accounting information.4 The question of how the investors 
can evaluate the firms’ managed and unmanaged performance remains open and is of 
key interest to market participants and regulators.
These institutional and opportunistic contexts provide opportunities to develop a 
complete and in-depth BTD theory. More importantly, the disclosure requirements for 
China’s B-shares listed companies reveal particular aspects of BTD not readily
4 The accounting scandals in the Chinese capital market include Sanjiu Medical &  Pharmaceutical, 
YingGuangXia and QiongMingYuan scandals and so forth. In YingGuangXia scandal, the firm 
manipulated 0.7 billion RMB net income from 1999 to 2000. QiongMingYuan manipulated 0.54 billion 
profit in 1996.
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observable in other settings, avoiding some of the measurement error in the estimated 
BTD as shown in the U.S. literature. This is particularly advantageous for the empirical 
research of BTD as elaborated in Chapter 5.
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis
The research conducted in this thesis is expected to add to the knowledge about 
the informativeness and usefulness of BTD. It contributes to five lines of research.
(1) This study develops a theoretical framework for BTD research, identifying 
BTD as a function of accounting-tax misalignment, EM and TM. BTD is expected to be 
value relevant because it informs the market of both policy-related information about 
the differences between GAAP and tax laws and quality-related information about 
managerial manipulations.
(2) It makes an important methodological and conceptual contribution by 
decomposing BTD into normal and abnormal components. NBTD provides researchers 
with a measure to evaluate the magnitude of accounting-tax misalignment among 
countries and its variation across the time in a particular country, and ABTD proxies the 
extent of management manipulations and the levels of distortion in reported financial 
information. This identification offers some insights into standard setting and the role of 
accounting.
(3) It extends prior studies concerning BTD and EM conducted in the U.S. by 
controlling for the mechanical causes of BTD and incorporating the consideration of tax 
management. It refines the research design in prior U.S. literature by examining a 
whole reported BTD (i.e. including timing differences and permanent differences) 
instead of one of components of BTD (i.e. using deferred tax expenses as a proxy for 
BTD).
(4) This study involves an initial effort to empirically examine the ability of BTD to 
proxy tax management by utilising China’s observable tax planning incentives. It
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provides empirical support for the proposition that BTD signals the existence of tax 
management. Specifically, the adoption of tax-effect BTD provides an insight into 
studying tax-induced income shifting.
(5) It extends prior fundamental analysis literature by investigating the value 
relevance of BTD from the perspectives of both institutional arrangements and 
earnings quality. The findings also add to the understanding of the Chinese capital 
markets and managerial practice.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
relevant to BTD, earnings management, and tax management research and their 
relations. Chapter 3 presents a detailed review of the value relevance research with a 
focus of BTD issue. Chapter 4 develops a theoretical framework which indicates the 
potential informativeness and usefulness of BTD. Chapter 5 describes the development 
of the Chinese accounting and tax systems, and its emerging capital markets. By 
comparing the features of the U.S. and China’s BTD, it evaluates the possibility of 
research hypotheses specific to the Chinese context. Chapter 6 examines the 
managerial incentives and features of earnings management and tax planning for the 
Chinese listed firms, and develops EM and TM hypotheses from a Chinese context. 
The hypothesis of the value relevance of BTD is also developed. Chapter 7 describes 
the research design and data collection. A cross-sectional BTD regression model is 
proposed to identify NBTD and ABTD. A multiple regression model is performed that 
relates the incentives of earnings management and tax management to ABTD. The 
relevant hypotheses about whether the incentives and likelihoods of tax management 
and earnings management result in a large level of ABTD are tested. To test the value 
relevance of BTD in an emerging capital market, the one-year-ahead earnings 
regression model and return model are proposed. Chapters 8 and 9 report the
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descriptive statistics, regression results and sensitivity analysis regarding the testing for 
EM/TM hypotheses and value relevance hypothesis, respectively. Chapter 8 presents 
that ABTD is positively associated with most of the incentives for EM and TM, 
suggesting it is an appropriate measure of EM and TM. Chapter 9 reports that BTD and 
its components are incrementally informative for future earnings and stock returns 
beyond current earnings in the Chinese capital markets. Chapter 10 draws together the 
findings and discusses the general implications of this research for theory and practice. 
Limitations and future research are also addressed.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW: BTD, EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND TAX
MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops the basic theoretical and empirical foundations for this 
thesis, incorporating a broad-based review of the literature that pertains to the research 
questions. The literature is related to three areas: BTD, earnings management and tax 
management.
Prior research examines the information contained in BTD from two major lines. 
One line studies BTD from an institutional angle, emphasising BTD as a product of the 
discrepancy between accounting rules and tax laws. This line addresses the primary 
informativeness of BTD and explains the definition, components and original causes of 
BTD (Smith and Butters 1949, Beresford et al. 1983).
Another line incorporates managerial incentives and opportunistic choices, 
arguing that BTD is influenced by managerial practice in increasing/smoothing 
accounting earnings or reducing/deferring tax payments (Phillips et al. 2003, Mills and 
Newberry 2001, Plesko 2004, McGill and Outstay 2004, Desai and Dharmapala 2004, 
Mills 1998). These studies extend the potential implications of BTD for explaining 
unobserved managerial practice and provide some support relevant to the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 4.
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To study the comprehensive informativeness of BTD, this chapter first reviews the 
BTD literature in these two lines. To understand the potential ability of BTD to proxy 
EM and TM and its importance, this chapter reviews the EM and TM literature in term 
of four aspects: (1) why and how do managers engage in EM and TM? (2) Why does 
detecting these opportunistic behaviours matter? (3) Why the appropriate indicator of 
EM and TM is the major challenge in existing literature? (4) How does BTD relate to 
EM and TM? As these issues are discussed separately in the literature rather than 
being integrated, the review follows this practice. It commences in Section 2.2 with the 
mechanical causes of BTD due to accounting-tax nonconformity, followed with a 
discussion of the opportunistic causes of BTD in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 overviews the 
earnings management literature relevant to the motivations and approaches of EM, 
challenges in detecting EM and the association between EM and BTD. Section 2.5 
draws together the framework, motivations and approaches of TM. The challenges in 
detecting TM and the role of BTD on this issue are discussed. The tax costs and non­
tax costs trade-offs literature is also reviewed to advance the understanding of the vital 
consideration of tax planning. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of main points 
raised in this chapter.
2.2 BTD and Mechanical Factors
The early research in BTD is normative in nature and begins with a study of the 
dissimilarities between financial income reporting and tax reporting caused by the 
divergence of accounting rules and income tax laws (Smith and Butters 1949), focusing 
on the mechanical causes of BTD. The knowledge about the mechanical causes and 
components of BTD specified in this literature provides a conceptual understanding for 
BTD research.
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2.2.1 Mechanical Causes of BTD
Considerable literature addresses the relationship between accounting and 
taxation in different countries (e.g. Smith and Butters 1949, Beresford et al. 1983, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)1987, Hoogendoorn 
1996, Porcano and Tran 1998, Tran 1997). Two essentially different structures of 
relationship between accounting and taxation are distinguished: (1) dependence 
structure; and (2) independence structure.5
Dependence Structure
With dependence structures, accounting and tax rules are concordant because 
either book rules follow tax rules, or taxable income is determined by the choices made 
in commercial accounts. This is typical of Continental European countries, such as 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Belgium (Hoogendoorn 1996). In these 
countries, financial reporting income equals taxable income, income tax expenses for 
the period equal income tax payable for the period. Hence, no BTD arises. The major 
reason for the existence of dependence structure is that accounting profit and taxable 
income are used by a homogenous group of users and thus are expected to be more 
or less identical (Tran 1997).
Independence Structure
With independence structures, financial reporting rules and tax laws are 
developed separately. Income determination for accounting purposes is distinguishing 
from income determination for tax purposes. Countries traditionally falling into this 
structure include Anglo-American countries such as the United States, the United
5 The U.S. literature usually classifies these two different structures o f relationship between accounting 
and taxation as “ conforming” and “ nonconforming”  structures.
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Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and hence exhibit BTD (Porcano and Tran 1998, 
Hoogendoorn 1996).
In the countries with independence structures, accounting rules and tax laws 
differ because they serve different objectives. Taking the U.S. as an example, the 
function of financial reporting as set in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) is to provide useful information to shareholders and other users of financial 
statements to evaluate firm performance and then make economic decisions about 
business enterprises and investments. Therefore, financial rules tend to prevent 
companies from overstating revenue or understating expenses to financial statement 
users and thus protect third party creditors and investors (Mills and Plesko 2003). For 
example, the traditional conservatism or prudence principle in financial rules requires a 
later recognition of doubtful income and an early recognition of doubtful losses or 
expenses.
In contrast, the chief objectives of tax laws are to raise revenue for governmental 
operations and to achieve social goals (e.g. income redistribution), economic goals (e.g. 
encourage firms to engage in certain economic activities by providing incentives or 
disincentives) and political goals. To arrive at these goals, the government often 
departs from Accounting Standards in determining taxable income (Beresford et al. 
1983). As opposed to financial rules, tax laws tend to constrain taxpayers from 
understating revenue or overstating expenses to tax authorities and hence protect 
governmental revenue. One example is the tax requirement that prepaid rent received 
must be included as income in the year when received, even for a taxpayer on an 
accrual basis, despite the rent being a single payment covering several years’ use. 
Another example is the disallowance for tax purposes of charges to establish 
precautionary and contingency reserves. In tax laws, neither income (profit) nor
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expenses (loss) can be anticipated. The deductions of contingent provision are allowed 
until the contingencies become fixed (Smith and Butters 1949).
In summary, the disparity of objectives as set in accounting rules and tax laws 
leads to the different treatment in tax and financial reporting and subsequently raises 
the issue of BTD.
2.2.2 Composition of BTD
Differences in income and expenses measurement under two sets of reporting 
systems generate two sources of BTD: permanent differences (PD) and temporary 
differences or timing differences (TD) (Smith and Butters 1949, Beresford et al. 1983).
PD occurs when particular revenue or expense is recognised in the determination 
of accounting profit but never in the determination of taxable income, or vice versa. PD 
does not reverse and generally derives from governmental tax policy decisions.
For example, interest income on governmental bonds, is excluded in taxable 
income but recognised as income for financial reporting purpose. Another example is 
non-deductible expenses such as fines or penalties, which are expensed in book 
income but are not deducted from taxable income because allowing a deduction would 
be counter to public policy.
TD occurs when both tax and financial reporting recognise the same amount of 
income or expenses over different time periods or in different patterns. TD signals 
whether the revenue or expenses can be recognised in certain period under accounting 
rules relative to that under tax laws. Unlike PD, TD reverses over time and is ultimately 
net to zero.
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For example, for financial reporting purpose, business revenue is not recognised 
until it is both realised and earned, implying that the firm must have provided the goods 
or service and have reasonable assurance that payment will be received. By contrast, 
for tax reporting purpose, revenue may be recognised on a cash basis. As a result, 
revenue received in advance is recognised as taxable income in the period of receipt 
but is not recognised as financial income in financial reports until a later period. In 
addition, a greater accounting depreciation deduction in the near terms relative to tax 
depreciation recorded in tax reporting is also a typical example.
The detailed items of PD and TD in a Chinese context are discussed in Chapter 5.
2.3 BTD and Opportunistic Behaviour
While the mechanical causes of BTD are widely understood, some might argue 
that, if BTD is caused oniy by the divergent financial accounting and tax treatment, the 
variation of BTD for companies should be relative constant under the same jurisdiction 
after controlling for policy and economic factors. Why does aggregate BTD change 
over time?
Motivated by a continued increase in BTD throughout the 1990s in the U.S. and 
the conjecture that the increasing positive BTD may relate to tax shelters by Treasury, 
some researchers begin to study BTD from a perspective of managerial incentives.6 
The notion underlying these studies is that (1) there is considerable flexibility in 
accounting rules and uncertainty in tax laws; and (2) opportunistic practice by
r> Using financial statements data and tax return information, M ills et al. 2002 report the U.S. BTD 
increases significantly over the 1991 to 1998 period from less than $10 billion to over $150 billion. 
Department o f the Treasury, U.S. (1999) suggests the growth o f BTD over the 1990’s is partial evidence 
o f tax shelters.
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management to manage (increase or smooth) book income, or manage (reduce or 
delay) taxable income might be one of drivers of BTD.
For example, given that financial statements are designed to provide historical 
information to shareholders and others to evaluate a firm’s performance, the 
accounting rules place great weight on consistency over time within the firm, but less 
weight on uniformity of all firms to identical assumptions regarding their businesses’ 
accounting rules. As a result, for different firms, managers can exercise discretion to 
make different determinations about the amount of revenue or expenses to recognise 
in any given periods (Manzon and Plesko 2002).
In addition, due to the variety and complexity of business activities, accounting 
rules leave considerable discretion in estimation and allow flexibility in the choice of 
accounting methods, such as depreciation, cost allocation or asset valuation. Therefore, 
managers may exploit accounting judgement in self-interested attempts, e.g. 
overstating income and assets for increasing compensation and stock price or 
understating income for creating additional reserves for future use (Mills et at. 2002).
Comparatively, tax laws allow fewer choices and flexibility in application of 
accounting methods to determine taxable income than that under accounting rules. 
However, in order to achieve a variety of social, economic and political goals, tax laws 
might vary very often and are to a large extent, complex and frequently subject to 
interpretation by taxpayers. As Scholes et al. (2002) point out, even if you could claim 
to have committed to memory the whole tax code, the ambiguity in how a tax return 
should be prepared is not easy to resolve. Despite the rigid and lengthy rules of tax 
laws, disputes over interpretation of the code are common. In response, managers 
have an opportunity to exploit this uncertainty to report less tax in order to increase 
post-tax returns.
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Given this discretion and uncertainty, distinct incentives of managers likely lead to 
the differences in the amount of income reported to investors and tax authorities that 
might generate the variation of BTD (Manzon and Plesko 2002). Therefore, BTD may 
reflect opportunistic differences in accounting or tax choices (Mills and Plesko 2003).
Using publicly available data from 1988-1998, Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
examine the magnitude and source of BTD. They develop a fixed effect regression 
model to estimate the amount of variation in traditional BTD that can be explained by 
economic and institutional factors. The evidence shows that aggregate BTD has 
increased over time but a relatively small set of variables can explain this increase. 
They interpret “any unexplained residual as attributable to other factors, one of which 
may be tax-sheltering activity”. Shevlin (2002) reminds the inference from this paper 
about tax shelters should be cautious because of any omitted variables and noises in 
the explained variables.
Other studies (e.g. Mills et al. 2002, Desai 2003, Plesko 2004) also document 
increasing trends in BTD in the U.S.. Consistently, Desai (2003) indicates that the 
institutional arrangements, such as the differential treatment of depreciation, stock 
option deductions and foreign source income, only explain less than 50 percent of the 
current BTD. He suggests that the large unexplained BTD may be partly attributable to 
increasing tax shelters. Although these studies do not provide direct evidence to 
support the inference that BTD is associated with tax planning, they suggest that BTD 
may be explained by other factors other than mechanical and economic factors.
The more recent research fills this gap and provides empirical support that BTD is 
associated with managerial opportunistic behaviour in earnings (i.e. earnings 
management) (e.g. Phillips et al. 2003, Joos et al. 2003). Despite some drawbacks that
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exist in their research design, these empirical studies extend the conceptual 
understanding of BTD by incorporating the opportunistic differences into BTD research. 
A detail discussion on this issue is presented in Section 2.4.3.
To examine the potential association between BTD and managerial opportunistic 
behaviour, an understanding of the motivations and approaches of management 
manipulations is essential and necessary. The following sections review the EM and 
TM literature, highlighting the aspects relevant to research issues.
2.4 BTD and Earnings Management Literature
This section first reviews the earnings management literature as to the 
motivations and methods of EM, followed with a discussion of the approaches of 
detecting EM in the current literature. After evaluating the weakness of these 
approaches, the literature that associates BTD with EM is reviewed and argued.
2.4.1 Motivations and Methods of Earnings Management
The EM literature identifies several incentives to manipulate earnings, including: 
(1) accounting-based contracts; (2) stock market expectations; and (3) regulatory 
requirements (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999, Fields et al. 2001). The methods of 
managing earnings are also explicitly or implicitly addressed.
Accounting-Based Contracts
Contractual arrangements, such as compensation contracts and debt contracts, 
are designed to mitigate internal (owner-manager) and external (bondholder- 
shareholder and current owner-potential owner) agency conflicts due to reliance on
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financial accounting numbers. However, these contracts also provide managers with 
incentives to manage earnings in order to increase their compensation or reduce the 
likelihood of bond covenant violations (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986).
A large body of literature has emerged to test the association between contracting 
incentives and earnings management. Healy (1985) and subsequent studies 
demonstrate that bonus schemes create incentives for managers to choose current 
discretionary accruals to maximise the value of their bonus awards. When earnings are 
expected to fall between the upper and lower bound, managers make income- 
increasing choices. When earnings are expected to be either above the upper bound or 
below the lower bound, managers are more likely to choose income-decreasing 
accruals so that to maximise multi-period compensation. Healy’s work provides a 
benchmark for subsequent compensation studies that improve on his methodology 
(Fields et al. 2001).
Controlling for the effects of external agency conflicts and stock-based 
compensation by using internal data from different business units within a single 
corporation, Guidry et al. (1999) find support for the Healy bonus plan hypothesis, 
showing divisional managers are likely to decrease income when the earnings target 
can not be met as set in their bonus plans.
Consistent with Healy’s lower bound hypothesis, Elliott and Shaw (1988) and 
Strong and Meyer (1987) find when earnings are already below expectations or are 
negative for a period, some managers write-off as many costs as possible in that 
period with an impetus of creating reserves for future use by taking a “big bath”. Chen 
and Lee (1995) also find firms with accounting losses are more likely to take further 
write-downs, i.e. “big bath” effect.
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After refining the research design in Healy (1985) by using the modified Jones 
(1991) model and actual data on the bounds instead of estimated bounds, Holthausen 
et at. (1995) also find support for the Healy’s hypothesis at the upper bound although 
no evidence shows that managers manipulate earnings upward around the lower 
bound.
In comparison with compensation contracts, the evidence on the association 
between debt contract and earnings management is mixed. While some studies 
conclude that there is little evidence of earnings management among firms 
approaching debt default (e.g. Healy and Palepu 1990, DeAngelo et al. 1994, Beneish 
and Press 1993), other evidence demonstrates that firms close to debt covenant 
violations will choose income-increasing accounting methods (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994, Sweeney 1994).
Using the firms’ debt-equity ratio as a proxy for closeness to debt covenant 
constrains in cross-sectional regressions, initial studies examine the effect of debt 
covenants on accounting decision and conclude that the larger the firms’ debt-equity 
ratio, the more likely the firms’ managers are to shift reported earnings to the current 
period from future periods (e.g. Christie 1990). DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and 
Sweeney (1994) extend prior literature by examining a sample of firms that actually 
violated a lending covenant and adopting cross-sectional and time-series model of 
normal accruals. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that abnormal accruals are 
significantly positive in sample firms in the year prior to the covenant violation, 
interpreting this as evidence of earnings management. In the year of violation, they 
present the evidence of positive manipulation after controlling for going concern 
qualifications and management changes.
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Sweeney (1994) also documents that covenant violators make a large number of 
income-increasing discretional changes in the violation year and in years following the 
first year of default. Managers of 130 default firms make 205 accounting changes in the 
period from five years prior to two years following the year of default and 76 percent of 
these changes are income-increasing. In addition, the covenant violators are more 
likely to manipulate earnings than a sample of control firms matched by industry, size 
and time period.
Stock Market Expectations
Apart from accounting-based contracting motivation, the widespread use of 
accounting information by investors and financial analysts to evaluate stocks value 
induce managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence stock price 
performance (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Numerous studies have investigated capital 
market-based incentives for earnings management, such as equity valuation and the 
cost of capital.
Aharony et al. (2000) present empirical evidence that accelerating credit sales is 
a low-cost method for B-shares companies’ earnings management in China and is 
widely used by unprotected stated-owned enterprises (SOE) before initial public 
offerings (IPO). They find that total accruals of unprotected SOE decline but the cash 
flows from operation increase after the IPO. The firms manage accounting accruals to 
boost earnings and/or list those business units with temporarily high profits resulting 
from high accounting accruals during the process of financial packaging.
Other studies have examined whether earnings are managed to meet the 
expectation of financial investors, investors or management. For example, Perry and
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Williams (1994) report that managers manipulate discretionary accruals to understate 
earnings, presumably in the hope of reducing the share price.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) demonstrate that firms boost reported earnings to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. Kasznik (1999) finds that managers who issue 
earnings forecasts might manage reported earnings toward their forecasts, consistent 
with firms managing earnings based on stock market expectations.
Regulatory Requirements
In addition to accounting-based contract and stock market motivations, three 
forms of regulatory motivations for earnings management have been discussed in the 
literature: earnings management for tax planning purpose, earnings management to 
reduce the risk of scrutiny and earnings management for seasoned equity offerings 
(SEO) (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The most common hypotheses are that firms manage 
their earnings to reduce or defer taxes and to avoid political costs (Fields et al. 2001). 
The evidence provided in Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) shows that firms adjusted 
accounting accruals by shifting permanent and temporary differences across periods to 
minimise the tax effect of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Guenther (1994a) 
investigates earnings management in response to corporate tax rate changes and 
reports that the decrease in tax rate resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA’86) 
induces firms to shift net income through current accruals from the higher to the lower 
taxed periods.
Research on seasoned equity issues addresses that the issuing firms report 
income-increasing accruals around the time of equity offerings (Rangan 1998, Teoh et 
al. 1998). These positive discretionary accruals are followed with underperformance 
after the offering. Some literature likewise documents that listed firms inflate earnings
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above the thresholds in order to gain rights to issue new equity in China (Chen 1998, 
Jiang and Wei 1998, Haw et al. 1998b, Chen et al. 2000). Firms also have strong 
incentives to withdraw loss from the book to avoid delisting and trading restriction 
(Chen et al. 2003).
In summary, the earnings management literature addresses managers’ incentives 
to alter reported earnings in beneficial ways in contractual and regulatory contexts. 
These findings indicate a variety of determinants of earnings management, including 
increasing managers’ compensation, reducing the likelihood of debt covenant violation, 
influencing stock market perceptions, reducing taxes, and avoiding regulatory 
intervention. However, how to measure the incidence of earnings management is a 
difficult work despite the popular wisdom that earnings management exists prevalently 
(Beneish 2001).
2.4.2 Current Approaches to Detect EM
Detecting EM is a significant issue since earnings management distorts financial 
reports and misleads some stakeholders about underlying economic performance of 
the company, thereby weakening the role of accounting in providing useful information 
for economic decision-making. More importantly, stakeholders can not see through 
earnings management and its effect on evaluation and estimation of accounting 
numbers (Fields et al. 2001). The major problem lies in managerial manipulation being 
largely unobservable and the difficulty in measuring the managed and unmanaged 
earnings (Beneish 2001).
In the earnings management literature, three approaches have been commonly 
used to detect managerial discretion over earnings: those based on aggregate accruals, 
those based on specific accruals and those based on the distribution of earnings after
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management. Among them, aggregate accruals variable is widely used as a proxy for 
earnings management although it has been subject to significant criticism (McNichols 
2000, Guay et al. 1996, Beneish 1997). Numerous studies have been undertaken to 
examine accruals in detecting EM (e.g., Healy 1985, DeAngelo 1986, Jones 1991, 
Dechow et al. 1995, Dechow and Sloan 1991, Guenther 1994a). These and other 
studies construct measures of abnormal (sometimes called discretionary) accruals from 
the residual of a regression of total accruals on explanatory variables.
However, extant studies suggest that accrual variables poorly measure the 
managers’ discretion to manage earnings (e.g. Phillips et al. 2003, Guay et al. 1996, 
Bernard and Skinner 1996, McNichols 2000). For example, Bernard and Skinner (1996) 
argue that abnormal accruals estimate using Jones model reflect measurement error 
due in part to the systematic misclassification of normal accruals as abnormal accruals. 
Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate the power and specification of five discretionary accruals 
models such as Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones model and the Industry 
Model, they conclude that “the models aii generate tests of low power for earnings 
management of economically plausible magnitude” (p193). The misspecification is 
performed due to the correlation between the magnitudes of normal accruals and 
past/contemporaneous firm performance. Consistently, Guay et al. (1996) demonstrate 
that accruals derived from five alternative models reflect considerable imprecision 
and/or misspecification.
Besides the misspecification, another weakness of accruals measure is easily 
ignored because most earnings management studies merely focus on earnings 
manipulation by means of accounting choices. Actually, earnings management can 
also be accomplished through real transactions (e.g. Roychowdhury 2004, Jian and 
Wong 2003). When earnings are managed by real activities in which operating cash
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flows and earnings are generated simultaneously, accruals fail to detect this type of 
earnings management.
Therefore, using accruals variable as a proxy for earnings management is flawed 
though it is widely used in the earnings management literature. While its shortcomings 
have been acknowledged, it seems difficult to seek a better measure to replace it.
2.4.3 The Role of BTD and EM
While recent literature debates whether accruals variable is an appropriate 
measure of earnings management, some scholars start to examine the association 
between BTD and earnings management. Given that BTD addresses the different 
income reported to investors and tax authorities, larger BTD might imply high book 
income reported due to financial reporting incentives, or low taxable income reported 
due to tax incentives. Revsine et al. (1999) suggest that the ratio of pre-tax book 
income to taxable income can be used as a measure of accounting conservatism or 
aggressiveness. Penman (2001) regards BTD as a diagnostic to detect manipulation of 
core expenses. He indicates that, if a firm is estimated to generate higher GAAP 
income, it must recognise more deferred taxes.
Using confidential tax return data, Mills and Newberry (2001) present evidence 
that firms with incentives of earnings management have larger BTD. In particular, 
public firms, highly leveraged privately-held firms, and financial distressed privately- 
held firms all have high levels of BTD.
Phillips et al. (2003) reduce the measurement error in accruals metric to detect 
EM by using deferred tax expense (DTE) as a proxy for BTD. They find that BTD is 
incrementally useful beyond all three accruals-based measures to detect EM when
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firms employ the strategy to avoid an earnings decline and loss. By testing three 
earnings thresholds (prior year’s earnings, zero earnings, and analyst earnings 
forecasts), they conclude that BTD can supplement accruals measure in detecting EM 
to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss. However, BTD is not incrementally 
useful in detecting EM to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
The paper of Phillips et al. (2003) is the first empirical study to evaluate the 
usefulness of BTD as a metric of EM relative to various accruals measures, where they 
claim that an investigation of timing BTD will help separate management discretion 
from nondiscretionary choices. Assuming that GAAP allows managers greater 
discretion than tax laws in determining the amounts of income and expenses in certain 
period, managers might exploit the discretion in accounting choices to manipulate 
earnings. DTE, reflecting the temporary differences between book income and taxable 
income under two systems, can capture this discretion in financial reporting vis-ä-vis 
tax reporting. Holding taxable income constant, the change of DTE can detect EM. For 
example, an increase of net deferred tax liabilities means that firms report higher pre­
tax book income than taxable income, and vice versa. Considering that some tax 
planning activities might also create DTE, the paper performs a sensitivity analysis and 
concludes that positive BTD caused by tax planning does not lead to the positive 
relation between DTE and EM.
Building on some studies (Burgstahler et al. 2002, Dhaliwal et al. 2004, Mills and 
Plesko 2003, Schrand and Wong 2003) those suggest that the accruals leading to 
negative DTR (deferred tax ratio—deferred tax expense divided by lagged total assets) 
are subject to greater management discretion than the accruals leading to positive DTR, 
Joos et al. (2003) compare the persistence of negative and positive DTR across the 
time and demonstrate that negative DTR is less stable across time and thus it is a 
better predictor of EM than positive DTR. They find evidence consistent with Phillips et
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al. (2003) that DTE can detect earnings management beyond total accruals and 
abnormal accruals, DTE can signal different earnings management strategies 
depending on the earnings target.
Following Phillips et al. (2003) and Joos et al. (2003), Phillips et al. (2004) 
decompose the changes in net deferred tax liabilities into eight components to 
determine which component can predict earnings management. They use the change 
of net deferred tax liability as a proxy for BTD and find that firms use revenue and 
expense accruals and reserves and other asset valuations to manage earnings 
upwards. The study addresses how firms manage their earnings although some 
empirical issues are argued by Krull (2004).
While the above literature extends the role and implications of BTD, unfortunately, 
all of them ignore the effect of institutional factors on BTD measure. One simple 
question emerges: what if the BTD (or DTE) is caused by the differences between 
GAAP and tax regulations or caused by the changes in GAAP and/or tax laws? In 
addition, when testing the ability of BTD to identify earnings management, permanent 
difference as a major component of BTD is neglected. This omission will impact the 
explanatory power as some earnings management activities also generate permanent 
difference.7
Furthermore, the assumption that managers manage income upward while 
keeping taxable income constant as made in Phillips et al. (2003) remains controversial. 
One might question: if the benefits brought from an earnings management strategy are 
much higher than the resultant tax cost, will firms forsake this strategy so as to pursue
7 Firms might claim a large amount o f expenses in financial reports to “ take a bath”  while these expenses 
are non-deductible or not fu lly deductible under tax reporting, thereby leading to PD. For example, 
donation, entertainment fee.
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a constant tax payment? In practice, is it possible for firms to disregard the benefits 
from tax planning?
In summary, recent studies such as Phillips et al. (2003), Joos et al. (2003) 
extend prior literature by demonstrating BTD can be used to detect earnings 
management, and in some settings it is more useful than total accruals and abnormal 
accruals in accurately classifying firm-years as earnings management or non-earnings 
management firm-years pertaining to avoiding a loss and a earnings decline. However, 
there is still much to do in the empirical work, such as controlling for the effect of 
mechanical factors when examining the ability of BTD in detecting earnings 
management, measuring BTD by using both of permanent differences and temporary 
differences rather than singly using temporary differences.
2.5. BTD and Tax Management Literature
This section addresses the framework of tax management, and the motivations 
and forms of tax management in prior literature. It also discusses the impact of tax and 
non-tax costs consideration on tax management. The weaknesses of current approach 
in detecting tax management and the potential role of BTD are debated.
2.5.1 The Framework of Tax Management
In the tax management literature, the conceptual framework of Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992) is widely used. By adopting a positive approach to explain the role of 
taxes in organisations, they develop their conceptual framework around three cental 
themes (known as all parties, all taxes, and all costs) which provides a structure for tax 
management to achieve organisational goals, e.g. profit or wealth maximisation. In the 
framework of Scholes and Wolfson, tax minimisation is not necessarily the objective of
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effective tax planning. Effective tax planning is defined as tax-favoured activity that 
maximises the firm’s expected discounted after-tax cash flows. It “requires the tax 
planner to consider the tax implications of a proposed transaction for all of the parties 
to the transaction, to consider not only explicit taxes (tax dollar paid directly to tax 
authorities) but also implicit taxes (taxes that are paid indirectly in the form of lower 
before-tax rates of return on tax-favoured investments), to recognise that taxes 
represent only one among many business costs, and all costs must be considered in 
the planning process: to be implemented, some proposed tax plans may require 
exceedingly costly restructuring of the business” (Scholes and Wolfson 1992, p2).
Tax planning takes many forms, including (1) converting income from one type to 
another, such as selection of the type of income, transaction, or situations which are 
treated most favourably by the tax law, e.g. changing interest income to dividend 
income, choosing financial lease rather than operating lease; (2) shifting income from 
one time period to another, e.g. avoidance or postponement of recognition of income, 
alternation in the timing of incomes and deductions (deferring tax); and (3) shifting 
income from one pocket to another, for example, converting income from subsidiary 
with high tax rate to another with low tax rate (e.g. transfer pricing) (Scholes et al. 
2002). But all of them share a common goal—reducing corporate income tax liability to 
maximise the firm’s expected discounted after-tax cash flows.
2.5.2 Motivations and Approaches of Tax Management
The incentives of tax management addressed in prior literature may be 
summarised as follows: (1) to maximise shareholders’ returns. Because taxes 
negatively affect the interest of firms and investors, e.g. the higher tax payment, the 
less net income and cash flow are. Nobody likes to pay more tax than they must and 
hence they spend nontrivial resource to keep the tax bite as painless as possible
(Scholes et al. 2002); (2) to reduce the risk of tax scrutiny and political cost (Fields et al.
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2001, Watts and Zimmerman 1978); (3) tax-based contract motivation such as after-tax 
compensation schemes (Dhaliwal et al. 2000, Phillips 2003); (4) stock market 
expectations. Low tax burden means high post-tax returns and a competitive 
advantage since tax is a possible price determinant (Ziegler 1997, Levenson 1999, 
Mintz 1999, Swenson 1999); and (5) high returns to investment in tax planning. Mills et 
al. (1998) indicate that an additional $1 investment in tax planning results in $4 
reduction in tax liabilities on average. Consistently, Gupta and Mills (2002) also report 
high returns to firms that invest in tax avoidance at the state level.
Underlying these motivations, a large body of literature has shown the existence 
and pervasiveness of tax planning activity. For example, to achieve the goal of 
reduction of tax liability, firms engineer transactions that generate tax losses, convert 
income into a different, low-taxed firm, exclude income from taxation, and defer 
recognition of income into a later year. Scholes et al. (2002) report that, in the U.S., 
every year firms spend billions of dollars on tax planning. Gupta and Mills (2002) and 
Jacob (1996) find that firms lower their state tax burden and global taxes by means of 
transferring price. Guenther (1994a) demonstrates that large firms and firms with low 
level of iong-term debt, firms with high levels of manager ownership reduce their 
income tax by shifting net income from the higher to the lower tax periods.
2.5.3 Tax and Non-Tax Costs Trade-Offs Literature
Tax planning is rewarding, however, firms can not engage in it arbitrarily due to 
the consideration of tax costs and non-tax costs. The trade-offs literature reveals the 
impact of tax costs and non-tax costs on managerial decisions and suggests that EM 
and TM are dependent of each other.
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The Trade-Offs between Tax Costs and Non-Tax Costs
Most tax-minimising strategies often result in lowering reported income, however, 
many financial contracts with creditors, lenders, customers, managers and other 
stakeholders use earnings to specify the terms of trade, influencing managers’ 
willingness to report lower income. As a result, managers should consider a trade-off 
between tax costs (tax payment) and nontax costs (e.g. lower performance evaluation, 
lower market value of firm, lower manager compensation and higher possibility of debt 
covenant violations, higher political cost and tax audit cost etc.) when engaging in a tax 
planning activity. This conflicting consideration has drawn considerable managerial 
attention, especially for public firms.
The evidence from studies of public firms suggests that regulatory capital and 
financial reporting concerns dominate taxes (Shackelford and Shevlin 2002). Public 
firms exhibit less aggressive tax behaviour than private firms because they face higher 
non-tax costs arising from capital market pressure or agency problems (Mills and 
Newberry 2001, Cloyd et al. 1996). Klassen (1997) provides support by demonstrating 
manager-owned firms place a higher priority on tax management due to its lower 
financial reporting costs. These findings are consistent with Scholes et al. (2002)’s 
conjecture that firms should make trade-offs between the benefits of tax planning and 
the nontax costs associated with financial statement reporting, implying tax 
minimisation might not be the optimal business strategy.
The Interaction of EM and TM
The literature in tax and non-tax costs tradeoffs is numerous, which suggests that 
financial accounting management and tax management are not independent 
(Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). Firms’ strategies reflect integration of multiple factors,
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including taxes and interaction of financial reporting costs and taxes, rather than tax 
minimisation only. The discretionary financial reporting accruals are correlated with 
discretionary tax accruals (Plesko 2003). Therefore, tax planning affects financial 
accounting choices, and vice versa. For example, to test tax effect on accounting 
choice, Cloyd et al. (1996) demonstrate that public firms are less likely than private 
firms to choose the conformity (i.e. increasing both tax and book or reducing both tax 
and book) due to higher levels of nontax costs for reporting lower tax income and of tax 
costs for reporting higher book income.
Although firms face incentives (based on compensation contracts, debt contracts 
and asset pricing) to report higher income by EM, the additional incentive to report 
lower taxes causes them to reach a new equilibrium with lower reported earnings. 
Northcut and Vines (1998) provide evidence consistent with managers balancing the 
benefits of tax planning and earnings management in which firms are willing to report a 
lower book income in order to avoid political scrutiny and future taxes prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S. The evidence shown in Mills (1998) that larger positive 
BTD leads to more IRS tax adjustments indicates that firms can not costlessly 
maximise financial reporting benefit and tax saving independently.
Guenther et al. (1997) provide another example to show how firms trade off the 
conflict between financial reporting and tax objectives. They find that when recognition 
criteria for tax and financial reporting purposes become alike, firms prefer to reduce 
their taxable income by deferring income and save taxes at the cost of lower reporting 
earnings, consistent with other studies where firms are willing to reduce book income in 
order to save taxes (e.g., Guenther 1994b, Boynton et al. 1992, Manzon 1992, 
Dhaliwal and Wang 1992, Maydew 1997).
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Alternatively, firms are willing to forgo tax saving so as to avoid reducing book 
income (Beatty et al. 1995, Hunt et al. 1996). By examining firms that restated financial 
statements in conjunction with SEC allegations of accounting fraud during the years 
1996 to 2002, Erickson et al. (2004) present direct evidence that listed companies are 
willing to sacrifice substantial cash and pay additional income taxes to inflate their 
accounting earnings.
Ignoring deferring tax accounting, prior research asserts that firms are able to 
inflate book income without tax consequences or undertake substantial tax reducing 
activities without affecting financial reporting. Plesko (2003) estimates that for each 
dollar of income increasing discretionary accrual recognised for financial reporting 
purpose, taxable income is increased by 0.326 dollar. By contrast, firms with income 
decreasing accruals are estimated to reduce taxable income by 0.630 of the amount, 
implying that firms either exploit opportunities to recognise greater book income when 
the tax costs are small, e.g. in tax holidays or with tax losses, or firms enable to 
minimise the tax effects of increased book income through other mechanisms but keep 
book income constant. It is consistent with a report on Enron conducted by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (2003), which points out firms are able to aggressively manage 
their tax reporting income by using transactions that affect only taxable income, without 
(or with very little) impacts on the amount of pre-tax income reported to shareholders. 
As reported, from 1995 to 2001, Enron created twelve transactions with more than $2 
billion in additional financial accounting income through a reduction in the tax expenses.
In conclusion, the literature in this regard indicates that the consideration of tax 
and non-tax costs is an essential factor in tax strategy choosing. EM and TM might 
exist simultaneously and interact with each other due to the trade-offs between tax and 
non-tax costs. Those EM or TM studies with an assumption of the absence of their
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counterpart may leave the interpretation of their empirical findings defective, especially 
when some explanatory variables of TM and EM are not orthogonal to each other.
2.5.4 Current Approach to Detect TM
While tax planning is prevalent in today’s business, how to detect managerial 
manipulation in taxable income has invited considerable attention of researchers, 
government and financial statement users. As with detecting EM, capturing tax 
management is not easy, due mainly to the confidentiality of tax data and lack of an 
appropriate measure for TM.
The Difficulty in Measuring Tax Planning
Capturing the manipulated taxable income is extremely difficult since taxable 
income is not publicly available information. Some studies attempt to infer a firm’s 
taxable income from its financial statements, such as by using the gross-up current tax 
expense to divide by statutory tax rate, or using current tax expense to approximate tax 
liability. However, doing this is fraught with problems because of the existence of tax 
credits, tax rate differences, consolidation, tax loss carry forwards (see Hanlon 2003 for 
a detailed analysis).
A typical example is shown in China where the income tax rate is not identical. 
Different firms might apply different income tax rates depending on firms’ established 
location and their engaging industry (A detailed description is presented in Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, in a consolidated group, the related parties may obtain different 
applicable tax rates, e.g., 0%, 15%, 10%, 24%, and 33%. But the book income in 
consolidating report is not released on an individual basis. This leads to great difficulty 
in classifying how many income tax expenses are calculated by certain tax rate.
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Therefore, using tax expenses to estimate taxable income is full of noise because the 
reported tax expenses cannot be grossed-up to divide by a single tax rate.
The Drawback of ETR as a Measure of TM
While measuring manipulated taxable income is difficult, some studies suggest 
that effective tax rate (ETR), may be a reasonable measure in determining how 
aggressively the firm pursues tax minimisation (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). Shevlin 
(1999) argues that ETR (current tax expense divided by pre-tax book income), not only 
provides a convenient summary statistic of corporate tax burden but also is an 
appropriate indicator of measuring tax planning effectiveness and tax aggressiveness. 
In response, ETR is widely used as a proxy for tax planning (e.g. Mills et al. 1998, 
Wilkinson et al. 2001, Gupta and Mills 2002, Rego 2003, Phillips 2003).
ETR, being a ratio of taxes to pre-tax book income, can be measured in different 
ways. For example, the numerator can be income tax expenses, current tax expenses, 
current tax expenses plus foreign tax expenses, total tax expenses minus the change 
in deferred tax liabilities, total tax expenses minus the deferred tax expenses or 
deferred tax expenses. Similarly, the denominator may take many forms, such as 
taxable income, pre-tax income, operating cash flow, gross margin or working capital 
from operation (Wilkie and Limberg 1993, Callihan 1994). Given that taxable income is 
confidential and market value data are not always available, most ETR is generally 
calculated on an annual basis using taxes and income from financial statement data.
The problems associated with ETR measure, however, are strongly questioned in 
previous research (Wilkie 1992, Wilkie and Limberg 1993, Scholes et al. 2002, Callihan 
1994, Plesko 2003). Wilkie and Limberg (1993) evaluate the ability of ETR in 
measuring tax burden and indicate that ETR is an unavailable and unreliable indicator
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of determining cross-firm or through-time differences in tax (dis)advantage. They 
analyse that ETR is unavailable when firms with zero or negative pre-tax income. In 
empirical studies, the zero and negative ETR are usually removed from the total 
sample as they have no economic meanings. However, this omission leads to weak 
representativeness of the total observations, especially for years with general 
recessions.
Even if ETR is available, the reliability of ETR is threatened when (1) a profitable 
firm experiences net operating loss (NOL) for tax purpose; (2) different tax and/or 
accounting treatment exists across firms and across time; (3) tax preference and pre­
tax income are not proportional, e.g. ETR is a ratio, it is hard to explain lower ETR is 
because firm has low pre-tax income or firm has large tax preference (positive BTD); 
and (4) implicit taxes exist.
For example, Scholes et al. (2002) argue that ETR has little economic meaning. It 
is deceiving and not especially useful for tax planning purpose due to its exclusion of 
implicit taxes. Wilkie (1992) reports the experience of NOL carryforwards can affect the 
estimation of ETR. In essence, when a NOL carryforward is applied in a profitable year, 
ETR will be understated even though no tax planning occurs.
In addition, prior studies use ETR as a measure of tax planning by assuming that 
firms have similar or identical tax rates, and infer that firms engaging in tax minimising 
strategies will have lower ETR than other firms that do not (Wilkinson et al. 2001). This 
is implausible in reality. Tax rate differential due to tax preference exists frequently 
because one of objectives of tax laws is to influence economy by providing incentives 
or disincentives to encourage certain business activities. It is arbitrary to judge a lower 
level of ETR as a result of tax sheltering rather than tax preference/holidays because
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ETR per se contains the information of both tax planning and incentive effects of tax 
policy.
Therefore, ETR is an equivocal estimator of tax planning. Using ETR as a proxy 
for TM will introduce measure error into the results of TM examination.
2.5.4 The Role of BTD and TM
Extant literature predicts the role of BTD in detecting tax management is intuitive. 
The intuition underlying this literature is that, inconsistent financial accounting and tax 
reporting should be a characteristic of tax planning because the goal of tax planning is 
to reduce tax payment. Because BTD presents the differences in income reported to 
investors and tax authorities, large BTD might imply lower taxable income relative to 
book income, especially when this tax strategy does not affect the amount of book 
income.
The U.S. Treasury white paper (1999) points out one feature of corporate tax 
shelter is a reduction in taxable income with no concomitant reduction in book income. 
As a result, the growing BTD in the U.S. during the 1990s, is possible evidence of 
corporation’s growing use of tax shelters that decrease taxable income relative to book 
income (Department of the Treasury 1999).
By examining the magnitude and source of BTD during the 1990s, some studies 
find evidence that aggregate BTD has increased over time but the growing BTD can 
not be explained by institutional arrangements, such as the differential treatment of 
depreciation, stock option deductions and foreign source income. They suggest that 
the large unexplained BTD during the late 1990s may be partly associated with
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increased tax sheltering activities (e.g. Manzon and Plesko 2002, Desai 2003, Plesko 
2004, Mills et al. 2002).
The descriptive evidence provided by Hanlon (2005) shows that firms with a high 
BTD (positive and negative) exhibit a lower ETR. Mills (1998) provides empirical 
evidence that proposed audit adjustments are positively related to firms’ BTD, 
suggesting larger positive BTD implies aggressive tax reporting.8
As a consequence, the literature concerning the association of BTD with TM 
suggests that BTD may be a potential indicator of tax planning, though there is not 
much empirical evidence to support this prediction as yet.9
2.6 Summary
This chapter provides a broad overview of BTD, EM and TM literature. It 
evaluates the contributions of prior literature and analyses some research gaps in the 
relevant research.
Despite the broad and rapid growth in earnings management and tax 
management research, existing work suffers from a weak observability of managerial 
actions or a lack of an appropriate measurement for EM and TM (Beneish 2001, 
Hofmann 2002).
8 Tax audit adjustments include both adjustments due to tax planning (e.g. the gap o f tax liab ility declared 
due to different understanding and the interpretation o f tax regulations by taxpayers and tax authorities), 
and illegal tax evasion. Therefore, high tax audit adjustments may imply more tax planning and/or tax 
evasion.
9 Lopez et al. (1998) and Desai and Dharmapala (2004) attempt to use BTD as a proxy for aggressive tax 
planning, but their studies are not conducted to test the ability o f BTD in detecting TM. For example, the 
study o f Lopez et al. is to examine the association between firm-level tax aggressiveness and the 
magnitude o f earnings management. Desai and Dharmapala (2004) investigate the link between tax 
planning and corporate governance.
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The information in BTD, institutional and opportunistic factors, found in two 
separate research lines, provides an opportunity to study the implications and role of 
BTD on this issue. The current BTD research, however, has not been conducted in a 
systematic and comprehensive way in terms of theoretical and empirical work. There 
seems to be very little effort to explicate a “theory of BTD". Relatively, the weaknesses 
exposed in the empirical studies can be summarised into four aspects:
(1) Much of work does not reveal the implications of BTD from a comprehensive 
picture as a result of the exclusion of either mechanical factors or opportunistic factors 
(e.g. Phillips et al. 2003, Joos et al. 2003, Desai and Dharmapala 2004). This omission 
raises the difficulty and noise in interpreting their findings;
(2) The measurement of BTD in empirical studies is problematic. While 
investigating the usefulness of BTD in detecting EM, existing empirical studies usually 
drop permanent differences from BTD and only use deferred taxes as a proxy for BTD 
(e g. Phillips et al. 2003, Joos et al. 2003, Hanlon 2005) or gross-up total taxes to 
measure taxable income, thereby introducing measurement error due to credits, tax 
rate differences, consolidation, tax loss carry forwards (e.g. Desai 2002, Lev and 
Nissim 2004). Although Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) provide some reasons 
for focusing on deferred tax expenses, the limitation in this measurement leaves their 
conclusions open to further investigation;
(3) In current BTD studies pertaining to EM and TM, one common assumption is 
EM (TM) is undertaken in the absence of TM (EM). In so doing, taxable (book) income 
may act as the economic benchmark to evaluate manipulation in book (taxable) income 
(e.g. Weisbach 2002, Phillips et al. 2003, Joos et al. 2003, Plesko 2004, McGill and 
Outslay 2004). However, this assumption is inconsistent with the tax and non-tax trade­
offs literature that indicates EM and TM may exist simultaneously and interact with 
each other (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). As a result, the deduction that deferred tax
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expenses (permanent differences) may be a proxy for EM (TM) built on the above 
assumption is flawed;10
(4) The assertion that BTD is an indicator of TM does not have much empirical 
support other than studies using private data (e.g. Mills 1998).
Overall, the literature review in this chapter indicates that there are still many 
questions unexplored in recent BTD research. In particular, the inadequacy in theory 
development limits the understanding of the informativeness of BTD and its usefulness 
in detecting EM and TM. The following chapter reviews the value relevance literature, 
with a focus of the relevance of BTD for the capital markets.
10 Permanent differences (deferred tax expenses) can not detect all TM (EM) because TM (EM) may also 
raise deferred tax expenses (permanent differences). For example, i f  firms engage in TM  by using 
straight-line depreciation for book purpose and accelerated depreciation for tax purpose, deferred tax 
expenses w ill arise. Conversely, i f  firms engage in EM by artificially claiming a large amount o f expenses 
in financial reports, but these expenses are not allowed to be deducted under tax reporting rules, 
permanent differences w ill arise.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW: BTD AND VALUE RELEVANCE
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a theoretical foundation for the potential relevance of BTD 
for equity valuation. It reviews the literature of value relevance with a particular focus of 
the valuation role of BTD. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the informativeness of BTD has 
not been revealed adequately because prior BTD studies are conducted in two 
separate lines, ignoring either the mechanical causes or the opportunistic causes. A 
similar problem existed in the research into the vaiue relevance of BTD is a split 
investigation of its valuation role.
The value relevance research related to BTD is made up by two lines. One 
research line focuses on the policy-related information (i.e. mechanical information) of 
BTD. They demonstrate that BTD resulting from revenue and expenses items 
recognised for tax and financial reporting purposes is value relevant (e.g. Guenther and 
Sansing 2000, Amir et al. 1997b, Givoly and Hayn 1992, Beaver and Dukes 1972, 
Barragato and Weiden 2004).
Another line concentrates on the quality-related information (i.e. opportunistic 
information) impounded in BTD. The notion underlying this literature is that 
opportunistic financial reporting (e.g. earnings management) may affect the earnings 
quality and decrease the value relevance of accounting information in the capital 
markets. If BTD may reflect information about management manipulations, there 
should be some associations between BTD and stock values. The research in this line
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finds that the information of BTD associated with earnings quality affects the market’s 
response on earnings and earnings expectation (e.g. Chaney and Jeter 1994, Joos et 
al. 2000, Hanlon 2005).
The review begins with the value relevance literature in terms of its general 
purposes, development and the key concerns. The next section moves to the specific 
literature as to the value relevance of BTD. In particular, the role of BTD in affecting 
stock returns is debated from two perspectives: the policy-related information (i.e. 
mechanical information) and the quality-related information (i.e. opportunistic 
information). Section 3.4 concludes with a summary of main points addressed in this 
chapter. The specific literature relevant to China is reviewed in Chapter 6 when 
developing the formal hypotheses.
3.2 Value Relevance Literature
This section outlines the value relevance literature in terms of its general 
purposes, development and the key concerns. The debate about whether or not 
managerial manipulations weaken the value relevance of accounting information is also 
considered.
3.2.1 Purposes of Value Relevance Research
Value relevance research is one of the major areas in capital market-based 
accounting research, which examines the association between a security price-based 
dependent variable and a set of accounting variables (Beaver 2002). The purpose of 
value relevance studies is to assess whether particular accounting variables reflect 
information that is used by investors in valuing firms’ equity (Barth et al. 2001).
47
The notion underpinning value relevance research is that accounting figures 
provide information that reflects firms’ performance and consequently should be 
reflected in stock prices. Under efficient market hypothesis (EMH), once accounting 
figures are released, the new information will be instantly and fully reflected in share 
prices (Brown 1994). The importance of this concept is that it justifies the use of the 
movements in share prices as the test of the usefulness of accounting information.
The theoretical foundation of value relevance studies is “a combination of a 
valuation theory plus contextual accounting arguments that allow researchers to predict 
how accounting variables relate to the market value of equity “(Beaver 2002, p462).
Holthausen and Watts (2001) conclude that value relevance studies appear to 
underlie two theories: “direct valuation” theory and “inputs-to-equity-valuation” theory. 
In “direct valuation” theory, earnings and book value of equity are intended to either 
measure, or be highly associated with stock prices. Under inputs-to-equity-valuation 
theory, it investigates that whether the accounting information input to valuation models 
is useful for investors in valuing firms’ equity.
3.2.2 Development of the Literature
Starting with Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), many researchers have 
devoted considerable effort on analysing the relation between stock prices and 
accounting disclosures in the last three decades. Among accounting variables, 
accounting profit (earnings) has received the most concerns in value relevance 
literature. Motivated by the weak explanatory power of earnings, some studies extend 
the focus to non-earnings information and perform subsequent fundamental analysis 
research.
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Earnings and Stock Returns
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) pioneer the early research on the 
return-earnings relation. Beaver (1968) formalises the theory of information content. In 
his definition, a firm’s earnings report is said to have information content if it leads to a 
change in investors’ assessment of the probability distribution of future returns (or 
prices). He documents that the stock return variance is higher in the earnings 
announcement period relative to non-announcement period and concludes that 
accounting information is informative for stock returns.
Ball and Brown (1968) investigate the relationship between earnings reports and 
share returns. They find that earnings are useful for investors, in that the earnings 
forecast errors or earnings innovations, are significantly related to abnormal returns. 
Since then, numerous studies have been conducted in earnings-returns relationship 
(e.g. Easton and Harris 1991, Liu and Thomas 2000). Earnings variable is predicted to 
be value relevant as it provides useful information in the estimation of future dividends. 
Easton (1985) provides empirical evidence for this prediction. Beaver (1989) explains 
three-link inference process as: (1) current earnings are useful for predicting future 
earnings, (2) future earnings are an indicator of future dividend-paying ability, and (3) 
expected future dividends are discounted to the present to infer equity value.
While the association between returns and earnings is evident, the explanatory 
power of earnings, as presented in most literature, has been very weak, sometimes 
negligible. For example, low explanatory power (R2) is common, generally being 
between 2%-5%, implying only 2%-5% of the change in share prices can be interpreted 
by the earnings information released on a given announcement date (Lev 1989).
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Bernard (1989) critically reviews empirical studies of the relation between stock 
returns and earnings to identify models of equity valuation. He indicates that 
specification of the return/earnings relation has become more sophisticated over time. 
He cautions that the absence of many relevant factors from the simple return/earnings 
valuation model might interpret any results.
Ohlson (1990) argues that the theoretical underpinning of the informational 
perspective of accounting has its limitation and suggests more theory-based equity 
valuation models and a shift of the empirical research focus from the explanation of 
observed stock prices to the prediction of future profitability.
Since then, research has analytically and empirically examined the relevance of 
earnings and non-earnings information for firm equity valuation. The non-earnings 
information studies perform subsequent fundamental analysis research with a focus on 
financial statements rather than earnings only (Bauman 1996).11
Non-Earnings Information and Stock Returns
Papers by Ou and Penman (1989a), Ou and Penman (1989b) and Ou (1990) 
represent the early empirical studies to examine the information conveyed by financial 
statements through the Pr measure.12 Ou (1990) examines the relevance of non­
earnings variables in financial statement underlying a “predictive information link” 
between non-earnings variables and future earnings change and a “valuation link” 
between predicted future earnings changes and stock returns. She argues that non­
earnings variables enable users to predict future earnings as some non-earnings 
numbers may identify the “transitory component” of current earnings and may reflect
" in  the study o f Bauman (1996), accounting information is divided into earnings information (e.g. book 
value, earnings, dividends) and non-earnings information (e.g. all other financial information data, 
earnings components).
12 Pr means the probability o f a one-year-ahead increase in earnings.
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managerial decisions. As a result of that, they might provide incremental information 
content over and above earnings. Consistently, Ou finds that some non-earnings 
accounting numbers (e.g. percentage growth in the “inventory to total assets” ratio, 
percentage growth in the “net sales to total assets” ratio) contain information about 
future earnings changes not reflected in current and prior earnings. Stock prices react 
when investors use non-earnings information to revise their expectations regarding 
future earnings.
The core of the fundamental valuation model is developed by Ohlson (1995) in 
which, beside book value, dividends and earnings, any value-relevant information can 
directly incorporate into equity value (Bauman 1996). This paper represents a starting 
point for researchers interested in fundamental analysis study and extends the 
evaluation of the usefulness of accounting information from the income statement to 
the balance sheet, although it does not provide a fully-developed framework for 
fundamental analysis (Bauman 1996).
An influential paper by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) identifies 12 financial 
variables (fundamentals) claimed by analysts to be useful in evaluating firms’ 
performance and estimating future earnings, and examines the incremental value- 
relevance of these variables over earnings. The key findings are that fundamental 
signals, such as inventory, effective tax rate, audit qualification, gross margin, and R&D 
are all value-relevant and they add approximately 70%, on average, to the explanatory 
power of earnings with respect to excess returns, and, analysts should search for 
information other than current earnings while assessing the firm value. This paper 
makes three contributions to prior literature: (1) it enriches the traditional 
return/earnings regression by adding some independent accounting variables and 
identifies the economic intuition behind these fundamental signals; (2) It employs 
fundamental information to assess the earnings quality and documents that
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fundamental signals are indicative of the growth and persistence of earnings; (3) it 
provides basis principle of fundamental analysis and avenue for future research (See 
Bauman 1996 for a analysis).
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) supplement Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) by 
investigating how accounting-based fundamental signals affect the decision of market 
participants in the predictive perspective, e.g. the forecast of one-year-ahead earnings 
and long-term growth in earnings, long-term growth forecast revision, and one-year- 
ahead forecast error. They find the fundamental signals, such as inventory, gross 
margin, effective tax rate, earnings quality and audit qualification are negatively 
associated with future earnings and have incremental explanatory power relative to 
current-year earnings. The evidence also supports that analysts are aware of the future 
earnings information embedded in some of fundamental signals and respond to it by 
revising their forecasts, but analysts underact to the information in the fundamental 
signals about future earnings changes, leading to predictable forecast errors.
Following the spirit in Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee 
(1997), Zhou (2004) selects eight accounting variables as indicators of earnings quality 
to examine the usefulness of fundamental information in firm valuation and future 
earnings prediction for China’s A-shares listed companies. The finding indicates that 
the earnings quality indicators, such as accounting receivable, provision for bad debt, 
and operating cash flow, have incremental explanatory power for stock returns and 
future earnings. The negative association is consistent with companies with lower 
(higher) earnings quality having poorer (better) stock returns and earnings performance 
in future years.
Recent literature extends prior fundamental analysis by demonstrating estimated 
taxable income has incremental information in explaining stock returns. For example,
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Shevlin (2002) and Hanlon et al. (2004) report that the estimated taxable income can 
convey incremental information over earnings with regard to contemporaneous stock 
returns. Lev and Nissim (2004) demonstrate that the quality-related information in 
taxable income is incremental compared to that in accruals and cash flows.
In summary, the development in value relevance research has moved the work 
from single returns-earnings analysis to broad returns-financial statements analysis by 
establishing fundamental analysis studies. An advantage of fundamental analysis is 
that it enriches the understanding of the determinants of share prices by examining the 
key value-drivers other than earnings and of returns-earnings relation from a 
perspective of earnings quality.
3.2.3 The Problems in Value Relevance Research
Two major concerns addressed in value relevance research are: (1) a relatively 
weak explanatory and predictive power of earnings to stock prices; (2) a declining 
value relevance of financial statements over time (e.g. Lev 1989, Lev and Zarowin 
1999, Collins et al. 1997, Francis and Schipper 1999).
While the evidence for an association between returns and earnings is compelling, 
the explanatory power of earnings has been weak despite numerous researchers 
incorporating sophisticated econometric modelling and more variables to refine the 
research design.
Lev (1989) argues that the weak returns-earnings relation is counterintuitive as 
the vital role of earnings play in financial information system. He attributes the
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weakness partly to low quality of accounting earnings.13 By the quality of earnings, Lev 
means their ability to predict abnormal returns: the higher the predictive content of 
earnings and other variables, the higher their quality. He suggests focusing on how 
alternative accounting methods affect the time-series properties and hence the 
predictability of accounting numbers, and studying more closely the motives, means 
and effects of earnings management. Lev (1989) stresses that, if accounting numbers 
used in regressions are not accurate in depicting the performance of the company, it is 
unreasonable to expect that the regression results can show strong explanatory power 
of earnings.
Consistently, Barth et al. (2001) argue that an accounting variable is judged as 
value relevant only if it contains information relevant to investors in valuating the firm 
and is measured reliably enough to be reflected in share prices, implying an unreliable 
accounting variable might damage the extent of value relevance, i.e. the power of 
explaining share prices.
Motivated by a strong claim that financial statements have lost their value 
relevance, Collins et al. (1997) investigate the changes in the value relevance of 
earnings and book values over the past forty years. Although they find the combined 
value relevance of earnings and book values has not declined over time, they are not 
certain whether some unknown economic phenomena are responsible for the changes 
in value relevance. Correspondingly, Beaver (2002) points out one of the unresolved 
issues in value relevance research is other purposes of financial statements. 
Accounting for contracting purposes is a major candidate.
13 Lev addresses several major reasons o f lower explanatory power o f earnings for stock prices, including 
methodological shortcomings, inefficient capital market, and poor “ quality” o f earnings. This study 
exposes a focus of earnings quality.
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Recent review studies such as those of Kothari (2001) and Barth et al. (2001) 
also suggest that there is much still to learn how accounting information is 
disseminated, interpreted and impacted into stock returns. In particular, examining the 
effect of earnings management on prices does matter because the investors and the 
market might be fixated on reported financial numbers.
3.2.4 Managerial Manipulation, Earning Quality and Value Relevance
A large body of literature has addressed that earnings are subject to managerial 
discretion because of the flexibility accorded under GAAP (e.g. Fields et al. 2001, 
Healy and Wahlen 1999, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). In addition, misalignment of 
managers’ and shareholders’ incentives could induce managers to manipulate income 
opportunistically, thereby creating distortions in the reported earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, Healy and Palepu 1993, Healy and Wahlen 1999).
As a result of that, the debate about whether or not management discretion 
affects the quality of accounting information and hence impairs the value relevance of 
earnings is opened. Despite some studies claiming that managerial discretion can 
improve the quality of earnings (e.g. Hunt et al. 1995, Healy and Wahlen 1999, Hand 
1989, Subramanyam 1996, Beaver and Venkatachalam 2000), much research 
supports the point that managerial discretion results in a lower quality of accounting 
information, namely a less “representative” indicator of the faithful performance of firms 
and a less persistence of earnings and consequently reduces the value relevance (e.g. 
Lev 1989, Hawkins and Pearlman 1978, Warfield et al. 1995).
Hawkins and Pearlman (1978) detail some factors relating to the quality, for 
example, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, consistent accounting policy, 
debt level, etc. They identify the changes in accounting policies or estimates, the
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deferred tax portion of income tax expenses, unusual increase in debts, creditors, and 
borrowings as “accounting red flag”, which would alert analysts to potential cases of 
deteriorating quality.
Similarly, Lev (1989) indicates that arbitrary nature of accounting methods and 
valuation techniques, lag in accounting recognition or managerial manipulation might 
lead to lower quality of accounting information. He stresses that manipulation of 
financial variables is obviously a key concern to investor as it hampers the ability of 
financial variables to monitor managers and to assess the value of security.
Whilst Sloan (1996) attributes less persistence of earnings performance to 
earnings management, the evidence in Xie (1998) supports that firms that managed 
earnings upward show subsequent stock price declines whereas firms with downward- 
managed earnings have positive returns.
Similarly, Barth et al. (1996) demonstrate that managerial discretion reduces 
reliability in that pricing multiples on loan fair values are predictably lower for banks 
with lower regulatory capital. A study by Christensen et al. (1999) finds that the greater 
managers’ incentives for earnings management, the less informative the earnings 
announcement to investors. Concurring with Christensen et al. (1999), Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004) demonstrate that opportunistic earnings management impairs the 
value relevance of accounting information as reflected in stock prices.
These studies address that managerial manipulation in earnings worsens the 
quality of financial variables and weakens their value relevance.
Likewise, a question of whether tax planning is a good news or bad news for the 
market raises a common concern. Some literature asserts that a lower tax burden
56
implies higher after-tax returns, the greater after-tax cash flows, a higher earnings per 
share (EPS) and a more favourable light with analysts when compared to competitors 
(Levenson 1999). Therefore, lowering the ETR by tax planning is a way to increase 
earnings (Ziegler 1997) and increase share prices (Mintz 1999, Swenson 1999).
By contrast, some studies argue that TM is a bad news for market since it 
frequently affects current and future earnings.14 Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) claim an 
unusual decrease of ETR (except for a statutory tax change) is a negative signal about 
earnings persistence. Consistent with their point, Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) 
indicate that a decline (increase) in the ETR driven by tax planning implies earnings will 
not persist at current levels and bodes poorly (well) for future economic performance. 
Guenther and Jones (2002) also document that the changes in ETR irrelevant to 
statutory tax are positively related to stock returns, implying reduced tax liability by tax 
planning is an indicator of less persistence and weak predictability of earnings.
Despite the debates over managerial discretion, manipulations in book and 
taxable income necessarily trigger discretionary earnings or cash flows, misleading the 
investors’ decision and forecast of future performance and consequently influencing 
share prices. This is because the investors and the market heavily rely on reported 
financial statement numbers. However, the investors and financial analysts are not 
fools. When information users perceive that the accounting data have been 
manipulated, they will seek out and turn to rely on other information resources.
14 See Lev and Nissim (2004) for a detail discussion. They explain firms often reduce their taxes by 
smoothing current and future taxable income. Taxable income is frequently manipulated by timing o f 
transactions. Thus, a relatively low current taxable income indicates low earnings quality.
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3.3 The Value Relevance of BTD
A well-established financial accounting literature argues that opportunistic 
financial reporting (e.g. earnings management) decreases the value relevance of 
accounting information in the capital markets. If BTD may convey information about 
management manipulations, there should be some associations between BTD and 
stock values. This intuition motivates recent BTD literature turns to capital market 
studies in term of earnings quality.
Prior literature has provided evidence on the value relevance of BTD in terms of 
its information about different financial accounting and income tax reporting rules (e.g. 
Guenther and Sansing 2000, Givoly and Hayn 1992, Barragato and Weiden 2004). 
Recent research extends this literature by studying the information content of BTD 
associated with the earnings quality (e.g. Hanlon 2005, Lev and Nissim 2004), though 
there is sparse empirical evidence in this field.
3.3.1 Mechanical Causes of BTD and Share Returns
The studies that examine the effects of BTD on stock returns focus on 
investigating the valuation role of the temporary book-tax differences (i.e. deferred 
taxes) resulting from tax-effect accounting. Because accounting reporting rules require 
inter-period tax allocation, the income tax expense reported in the income statement is 
determined on the basis of pre-tax income (book income), adjusted for permanent 
differences between the current taxable income and book income. Deferred tax 
information resulting from various revenue and expenses items recognised for book 
and tax purposes temporarily yields the gaps between the income tax expenses and 
current tax liability. This requirement contributes to the recognition of deferred tax 
assets and liabilities. The deferred tax information has been confirmed to be value
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relevant because it informs on expectations about firm’s future tax-related cash flows 
and future earnings (e g. Guenther and Sansing 2000, Givoly and Hayn 1992, Beaver 
and Dukes 1972).
Beaver and Dukes (1972) firstly report that unexpected stock returns are more 
highly correlated with unexpected earnings measured with deferred taxes than without 
deferred taxes. They conclude that the information used to set stock prices include 
earnings that are based on inter-period tax allocation accounting. In order to assess 
whether the deferred tax liability is viewed as a “real” and imminent liability and 
subsequently discounted by investors, Givoly and Hayn (1992) examine the relation 
between firm characteristics and unexpected share returns around news disclosures 
about the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The findings are consistent with their hypotheses, 
indicating that investors discount deferred liability according to the likelihood and timing 
of its settlement. Using a price-level model in the spirit of Feltham and Ohlson (1995), 
Amir et al. (1997) provide support that net deferred taxes and the components thereof 
are of incremental value relevance to investors. They find the results that “are 
consistent with investors’ valuation of deferred taxes depending on when these 
deferred taxes reverse”.
However, Guenther and Sansing (2000) argue that the timing of the expected 
deferred tax reversal does not affect firm value although they support that deferred 
taxes affect current earnings and provide information useful for predicting future 
earnings. They demonstrate that the deferred tax liabilities (assets) expected to reverse 
later (sooner) are not worth less (more) than that expected to reverse sooner (later), 
but deferred tax assets and liabilities transform book values of underlying liabilities and 
assets into estimates of the after-tax cash flows on which the firm’s market value is 
based.
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While most studies investigate the value relevance of deferred tax information by 
assuming its ability in predicting future income tax payments and future cash flows, 
Cheung et al. (1997) extend prior literature by providing first empirical evidence that 
deferred tax information leads to the superior forecast of future tax payments and 
enhances prediction of future cash flows. In so doing, they show an alternative 
approach to interpret the association between deferred taxes and price reaction.
However, with the exception of temporary book-tax differences, little studies 
examine the implication of an entire BTD (e.g. permanent differences and timing 
differences) for share valuation in terms of the differences between GAAP and income 
tax laws. A working paper by Barragato and Weiden (2004) addresses the first 
empirical study on this issue. They argue that, if temporary book-tax differences impact 
the firms’ future tax-related cash flows, permanent book-tax differences should affect 
the time value of expected future tax payments and/or refunds. They investigate the 
valuation implications of PD and TD of firms granting employee stock options. Despite 
the flaw in the estimation of PD, they provide evidence consistent with that deferred 
taxes recognised for financial accounting purposes and unrecognised permanent tax 
assets associated with stock options are both incremental value relevant.15
3.3.2 Opportunistic Causes of BTD, Earnings Quality and Share Returns
While one of the BTD research lines suggest that BTD is associated with 
managerial manipulations and how to identify the reliability of financial information 
raises a major concern in the value relevance literature, some researchers begin to 
examine the potential association of BTD with stock prices in terms of financial 
statement quality.
15 In the study o f Barragato and Weiden (2004), permanent tax assets are measured by the difference 
between end o f year share prices and the weight average exercise price o f option outstanding, multiplied 
by the number o f options outstanding and then by the statutory Federal tax rate o f 35%.
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For example, Chaney and Jeter (1994) find that deferred taxes are negatively 
related to security returns. The evidence shows that firms whose deferred taxes are 
large and high variable, the market’s response to earnings is weak, indicating deferred 
taxes provide information about the level of noise in reported earnings. Revsine et al. 
(1999) state that “a widening excess of book income over taxable income....represents 
a potential danger signal that should be investigated, because...[it] might be an 
indication of deteriorating earnings quality” (P633). Joos et al. (2000) find that the 
association between earnings and prices weakens as deferred taxes (a proxy for BTD) 
increases. They interpret this result as evidence that greater book-tax disconformity 
signals low earnings quality.
Hanlon (2005) demonstrates that firms with large positive and negative BTD have 
less persistent earnings (earnings, accruals and cash flows) for one-year ahead, and 
have a higher level of discretionary accruals that subsequently reverse as compared to 
firm-years with small BTD. Investors interpret large positive BTD as a “red flag” and 
reduce their expectations of future earnings persistence for these firms. However, cash 
flow component of earnings is also less persistent for firms with large BTD, suggesting 
a portion of the lower persistence might be attributed to tax planning in addition to EM 
in accrual process.
However, there appears no explicit evidence showing that BTD is value relevant 
due to its quality-related information. It seems hard to ascertain the value relevance of 
BTD is attributed to its quality-related information or its policy-related information. This 
is because this different information has not been identified and discriminated. In 
addition, the above studies only focus on DTE rather than a total BTD. An important 
paper by Lev and Nissim (2004) extends prior literature by investigating the ability of 
the ratio of net taxable income to net book income (a proxy for taxable income) to
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predict earnings growth and stock returns. They claim that this ratio is comprehensive 
as it reflects temporary differences, permanent differences and discretionary tax 
accruals. They infer that it informs on future earnings growth because this ratio reflects 
transitory effects of earnings management and the information about the differences 
between GAAP and the tax code. The results show that the ratio of tax-to-book income 
predicts subsequent five-year earnings growth and is strongly (weakly) related to 
subsequent stock returns before (after) the implementation of the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 109, in 1993. More importantly, the 
predictive ability about future earnings of the ratio is superior to cash flows and 
accruals. However, the focus of Lev and Nissim (2004) is to demonstrate the value 
relevance of the estimated taxable income rather than BTD itself.
In conclusion, prior value relevance literature associated with BTD shows two 
research lines. One investigates the value relevance of BTD in terms of its information 
about divergent book and tax reporting rules with a focus of temporary differences. An 
alternative research line examines the role of BTD in market pricing associated with 
earnings quality. However, the research in this regard is fairly limited. So far, no direct 
evidence shows that the value relevance of BTD is determined by its information about 
divergent book and tax reporting rules or information about earnings quality, or both.
3.4 Summary
The value relevance studies assess whether particular accounting variables used 
by investors affect firms’ equity valuation, underlying accounting function provides 
useful information to reflect firm performance and affect share prices. However, the 
implications of value relevance research for the capital markets have been threatened 
by the low quality of accounting information due to managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
Recent evidence has demonstrated that the value relevance of accounting information
has been impaired and weakened by managerial manipulations (Marquardt and
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Wiedman 2004). As a result of that, how to evaluate the extent of reliability of reported 
accounting numbers has been a significant concern for the capital markets.
The current BTD research attempts to extend the usefulness of BTD in predicting 
future earnings and share pricing as a potential indicator of earnings quality. However, 
the inadequacy in theory development of BTD also hinders this endeavour, leading to a 
weak proposition.
In the next chapter, this thesis attempts to develop a theoretical framework to 
deepen the BTD theory, and in doing so fills the research gaps in the BTD, EM and TM 
and value relevance literature as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF BTD
4.1 Introduction
As illustrated earlier, there does not appear to be any previous attempts to 
explicate a “theory of BTD”. The split focus and the difficulty in discriminating the 
mechanical and opportunistic information within BTD have hindered a comprehensive 
understanding of the informativeness of BTD. This might also restrict the role of BTD in 
capturing earnings management and tax management and evaluating the earnings 
quality. This chapter develops a theoretical framework that interprets BTD as a function 
of accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management and tax management. 
Therefore, BTD may be an appropriate measure of EM and TM after controlling for the 
effect of accounting-tax misalignment and so may signify the earnings quality. It is 
potentially value relevant because it provides the policy-related information about 
different requirements in book and tax reporting and the earnings-quality-related 
information regarding managerial manipulations to the capital market. Both of 
information may aid investors to precisely evaluate and forecast firms’ future 
performance and so may affect share returns.
The framework is conditional on two major premises: (1) accounting rules and 
income tax laws differ, mechanistically causing some amount of BTD; and (2) 
management has incentives to opportunistically manage book and taxable income (or 
income tax), and hence affects BTD.
64
Two important concepts are introduced in this framework: normal BTD (NBTD) 
and abnormal BTD (ABTD). NBTD refers to the mechanical differences due to the 
divergent reporting rules for book and tax purposes, signalling the extent of accounting- 
tax misalignment. ABTD refers to the opportunistic differences due to the managerial 
choices in accounting and tax reporting, quantifying the level of management 
manipulations.
The remainder of this chapter is broken into three parts. A framework of BTD is 
constructed in Section 4.2. The section firstly refines the definition of BTD by analysing 
the impact of managerial discretion in GAAP and tax laws and opportunistic incentives 
on BTD and the logic behind the traditional definition of BTD. Next, it discusses the 
effect of different earnings management and tax management strategies on variation in 
BTD. Importantly, two concepts of normal and abnormal BTD are developed to identify 
different information within BTD. The corresponding implications of this identification for 
the usefulness of BTD are discussed. Section 4.3 presents the reasoning concerning 
the value relevance of BTD by analysing how the policy-related and quality-related 
information impounded in BTD aid to predict future earnings, thereby affecting stock 
prices. Section 4.4 recapitulates this chapter.
4.2 The Theoretical Framework of BTD
Usually, BTD is regarded as the gap between pre-tax book income and taxable 
income due to different institutional arrangements for the same economic transaction 
underlying accounting rules and income tax laws. However, managers’ opportunistic 
applications of accounting and tax rules also contribute to the variation in BTD. As a 
result, this study defines BTD as the differences between book income and taxable 
income due to the divergent reporting rules for book and tax purposes, and the
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differences due to managerial accounting and tax reporting choices. The detailed 
analysis is presented as follows.
4.2.1 Discretion in GAAP and Tax Laws and Managerial Incentives
In countries where accounting rules and tax laws are developed separately, the 
conflicting objectives of the two systems lead to divergent requirements in income 
reporting and hence generate mechanical BTD. When different recognition in income 
or expenses (e.g. accrual basis and cash basis), different estimation methods (e.g. 
book depreciation versus tax depreciation), or different reporting entities (e.g. 
consolidation and separate legal entity) are adopted to report income for book and tax 
purposes, BTD is formulated in forms of permanent differences and and/or timing 
differences.
Based on this understanding, BTD is simply a product of accounting-tax 
misalignment. However, an important issue arises: it is impractical to require that 
accounting rules and tax laws specify accounting and tax treatment for each detail of 
business transaction because business activities are intricate and changing. This 
necessarily leaves considerable uncertainty in applying accounting standards and tax 
laws.
In addition, GAAP and tax laws per se permit considerable discretion and 
uncertainty in reporting practice (Fields et al. 2001, Healy and Wahlen 1999, Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, Scholes et al. 2002, Manzon and Plesko 2002). For example, the 
standards of comparability, consistency and materiality in GAAP permit managers to 
exercise discretion to make different determinations about the amount of revenue or 
expenses to recognise in any given periods. These standards also allow flexibility in 
estimation and the choice of accounting methods, such as depreciation, cost allocation
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or asset valuation. Likewise, tax laws are not immutable. In attempts to achieve a 
variety of social, economic and political goals, tax laws might often vary across time, 
industries and firms.
These uncertainty and discretion provide managers with opportunities in income 
reporting choices. When managers have different incentives to report firms’ 
performance, they may opportunistically implement accounting standards and tax laws, 
thereby resulting in a distorted BTD. Assume that two firms have the same amount of 
BTD in the absence of any EM and TM, if one firm has economic incentives to choose 
aggressive accounting methods (e.g. inflating income) and to take an aggressive tax 
position (e.g. reducing tax payment), its BTD is expected to be larger than the one 
without these incentives.
As a result, theoretically, BTD reflects not only the mechanical differences 
resulting from accounting-tax nonconformity, but also the opportunistic differences 
arising from managers exploiting the discretion and uncertainty in accounting and tax 
rules to manage earnings and taxes for their attempts. The next section discusses how 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour can create variation in BTD.
4.2.2 The Impacts of Different EM and TM Strategies on BTD
The positive accounting theory and tax planning literature demonstrate that 
managers have strong incentives to manage earnings and taxes (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, Fields et al. 2001, Scholes et al. 2002). The literature in tax and 
non-tax costs tradeoffs suggests that EM and TM are not separate (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001). Based on distinct incentives, propensity to engage in aggressive 
behaviour and a cost-benefit trade-off, firms may choose various strategies, including 
aggressive, modest and conservative strategies. For example, some studies indicate
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that firms have competing incentives to increase income reported to shareholders while 
at the same time to minimise taxable income reported to tax authorities (Treasury 1999, 
Manzon and Plesko 2002, Desai 2002, Mills et al. 2002).
However, the literature on tax and non-tax costs tradeoffs suggests that it is 
difficult to pursue these conflicting incentives by engaging in aggressive earnings 
management and tax planning simultaneously. This is because of relatively strict 
expenses recognition required by tax laws and relatively strict (or conservative) income 
recognition set by accounting standards. As a result, most tax-minimising strategies, 
such as deferring taxable income or accelerating tax reductions, often result in lowering 
reported income.16 Similarly, earnings-inflating strategies, such as accelerating book 
income or deferring expenses, also yield an increase of taxable income, leading to a 
high tax payment.
Therefore, some studies suggest that an optimal tax planning (earnings 
management) should be undertaken in the manner to decrease or smooth taxable 
income while keeping book income constant, or in the manner to increase or smooth 
book income while keeping taxable income constant (e.g. Shevlin 2002, Weisbach 
2002, Plesko 2004, McGill and Outslay 2004, Phillips et al. 2003, Joos et al. 2003). 
Even if these ideal strategies are not accessible, the self-interested incentives and the 
benefits of manipulation also motivate firms to choose a relative conservative strategy 
where book and taxable income (taxes) are managed in a same direction, such as 
saving taxes by reducing book income (e.g., Guenther 1994b Boynton et al. 1992, 
Manzon 1992, Dhaliwal and Wang 1992, Maydew 1997), or inflating their accounting
16 See Guenther (1994) for a thorough analysis. Guenther indicates that managers who accelerate accrued 
expenses for tax purpose w ill likely be accelerating accounting expenses as well. Likewise, delaying 
taxable income w ill also in many cases defer book income simultaneously. But they are not vice versa. 
This is because accounting rules generally try to avoid overstating revenue or understanding expenses 
while tax rules tend to constrain taxpayers from understating revenue or overstating expenses to tax 
authorities as a result o f their different objectives.
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earnings at the costs of paying additional income taxes (Hunt et al. 1996, Erickson et al. 
2004).
As depicted in Figure 4.1, the various strategies for EM and TM may be 
summarised as follows: (1) managing book income while keeping taxable income 
(taxes) constant (denoted as B’>0 and B'<0, where T-0); (2) managing taxable income 
(taxes) while keeping book income constant (denoted as T'<0 and T’>0, where B'=0); 
and (3) managing book and taxable income (taxes) simultaneously, either in a different 
direction or in a same direction (denoted as B’>T' and B'<T', where B'^T').17
However, no matter which strategy firms choose, these actions necessarily raise 
the variation of BTD because BTD is a function of book and taxable income or a 
function of prima facie income tax expense and income tax payable. Therefore, the 
logic behind the definition of BTD is that BTD is a function of accounting-tax 
misalignment, earnings management and tax management. It informs of not only the 
discrepancy between book and tax reporting rules, but also the philosophies behind 
management’s strategies or behaviour in managing earnings and income tax.
4.2.3 Defining Normal and Abnormal BTD and Its Implications
While the variation in BTD may be driven by accounting-tax divergence and 
management opportunistic behaviour, an important issue is how to judge the variation 
of BTD as a result of institutional arrangements rather than EM and TM. As a result, the 
identification of these two drivers is needed for clearly interpreting the changes in BTD 
and their distinct meanings.
17 The symbols are defined as: BA=unmanaged book income (prima facie income tax expense), 
B'=managed book income (prima facie income tax expense), TA=unmanaged taxable income (income tax 
payable) and T  ^managed taxable income (income tax payable), AR = accounting rules, TR = tax rules. 
The strategy that manages book and tax in a same direction and in a same amount (i.e. B'= T )  is 
conservative but wise because this action won’t raise the variation in BTD, thereby having less risk o f 
being detected and less resultant tax adjustment costs.
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Accordingly, this thesis defines the mechanical differences due to divergent 
income reporting requirements for book and tax purposes as “normal BTD" (NBTD). It 
also defines the opportunistic differences due to aggressive book and tax reporting as 
“abnormal BTD" (ABTD). Assuming that NBTD and ABTD may be reliably measured, 
the magnitude of NBTD may signify the extent of accounting-tax misalignment after 
controlling for the economic factors. For example, a growing or volatile NBTD may 
imply an increasing gap or frequent changes in the two systems. This is meaningful 
when studying different accounting and tax settings in different countries or the 
changes in institutional arrangements across time for a specific country.
Similarly, the magnitude of ABTD may measure the degree of the unobservable 
EM and TM. A large or volatile ABTD (positive and negative) may imply a large extent 
of aggressiveness or frequent manipulations. This notion is of particular importance as 
it rules out the mechanical effects and leaves ABTD as explained by EM and TM.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the conceptual framework of BTD developed in Sections 
4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, where NBTD is simply a product of accounting-tax misalignment, 
ABTD is a result of earnings management and tax management. This can be 
represented mathematically as:
NBTD = f ( B , f ) = f  (unmanaged book, unmanaged tax)
ABTD = /"(managed book, managed tax)
BTD = f (B ,T )  + f ( B \T ' )
= /"(accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management, tax management)
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F ig u re  4.1
The T h e o re tica l F ra m e w o rk  o f  B o o k -T a x  D iffe re n c e s
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The next section discusses the measurement of BTD and its components at the 
conceptual level.
4.2.4 The Measurement of BTD
An appropriate measurement of BTD is very important for precisely 
understanding the meaning of BTD. As argued in Chapter 2, the measurement error, 
such as simply using timing differences (i.e. deferred tax expenses) or permanent 
differences as a proxy for BTD will leave the research conclusions questionable.
Based on the definition and components, BTD can be measured accurately in two 
dimensions:
(1) Using book income minus taxable income or the sum of permanent 
differences and timing differences, called income-effect BTD;
(2) Using prima facie income tax expense (the multiplication of book income and
applicable tax rate) minus current tax liability, or the sum of tax-effect permanent
differences (the multiplication of applicable tax rate and permanent differences) and
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tax-effect timing differences (the multiplication of applicable tax rate and timing 
differences), called tax-effect BTD.
Relatively, the measure of tax-effect BTD is superior to the income-effect BTD. 
This is because the tax-effect BTD reflects tax consequences and hence can be used 
to capture the tax planning strategies that reduce overall tax burden without affecting 
total book and taxable income in a consolidated group (i.e. income shifting). 
Conversely, the income-effect BTD only can capture those tax planning strategies 
which affect income consequences.18
Being the components of BTD, NBTD and ABTD can also be measured in two 
dimensions, i.e. income-effect and tax-effect forms. According to their definition as 
shown in Section 4.2.3, NBTD can be conceptually measured by using unmanaged
book minus unmanaged tax (i.e. B - f )  while ABTD can be measured as the gap 
between managed book and managed tax (i.e. B ' - T ' ). Given that managed and 
unmanaged book and tax are not directly measured, NBTD and ABTD are estimated 
from total BTD. The detailed estimation of NBTD and ABTD is presented in Chapter 6.
4.3 The Reasoning of Value Relevance of BTD
While the potential informativeness of BTD has been conceptually revealed, this 
thesis attempts to examine the usefulness of BTD in valuing firms’ equity. According to 
the principle of value relevance, this section deduces that BTD is relevant for firm 
valuation by analysing the predictive and explanatory power of NBTD and ABTD to 
future earnings and stock returns respectively.
18 Income-effect BTD can not detect income-shifting tax strategy because this strategy only influences the 
overall tax payable but does not generate book and taxable income gap in a consolidated group. See an 
illustration o f how the tax-effect BTD can address income-shifting tax strategy in a Chinese setting in 
Appendix 3.
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4.3.1 The Predictive and Valuation Links
In the value relevance literature, an accounting variable is defined as value 
relevant if it exhibits the significant association with a measure of equity market value 
or stock prices (Barth et al. 2001, Barth 2000, Ohlson 1995, Beaver 1998). Some 
studies also regard an accounting variable as value relevant if it is informative for 
evaluating firms’ performance and estimating future earnings and this predictive 
information has been reflected in stock prices (Ou 1990, Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, 
Abarbanell and Bushee 1997).
One maintained hypothesis in most capital markets-based studies in accounting 
is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), in that new information will be instantly and 
fully reflected in stock prices. Under EMH, the rationale of value relevance is 
established by the following predictive and valuation links: (1) the basis theory 
suggests that stock price is the present value of expected future dividends (e.g. Ohlson 
1995) or future benefits accruing to equity holders; (2) future dividend-paying ability is 
determined by future performance, i.e. future earnings and/or future cash flows; (3) 
future performance is predicted by current or historical accounting data. Therefore, the 
accounting data that affects evaluating future performance or estimating future 
earnings/cash flows may be correlated with share prices, such as current earnings, 
current cash flows, taxable income, ETR, inventory, accounts receivable. This is 
because the stock return’s response to the prediction of future earnings changes is 
beyond its response to current earnings (Ou 1990). Likewise, the prediction of future 
cash flows is important because future cash flows determine the ability of future 
dividends payment and the expected returns to investors. Thus, a firm’s ability to 
generate cash flows may affect the values of its security.
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Following these two-links, this thesis deduces that BTD should be value relevant 
because (1) its policy-related information about different income reporting requirement 
for book and tax purposes may reveal some transitory earnings components, thereby 
aiding the prediction of firms’ future tax-related cash flows and future earnings; and (2) 
its quality-related information about managerial manipulations may reflect the 
distortions in reported earnings and cash flows, thereby affecting the investors’ 
estimation and forecast of firms’ future profitability. A detailed discussion is presented 
as below.
4.3.2 The Value Relevance of NBTD
This section firstly hypothesises that the policy-related information in BTD (i.e. 
NBTD) is of value relevance because the differences in income reporting requirements 
for book and tax purposes may inform investors of future earnings and cash flows.
Different income reporting requirements in accounting and tax rules raise the 
issue of BTD in forms of timing differences (i.e. deferred taxes) and permanent 
differences. The inference of the value relevance of NBTD rests on the linkages 
between deferred taxes and future tax payment, permanent differences and future 
earnings. Deferred tax information resulting from various revenue and expenses items 
recognised for book and tax purposes yields the gaps between income tax expenses 
and current tax liability temporarily. As a result, the magnitude of net deferred taxes 
has an effect on current tax-related cash flows. In particular, the reversal of these 
temporary differences in near future affects future tax payment and hence informs of 
share price.19 For example, the reversal of deferred tax liabilities will increase future tax
19 In brief, income tax expense = (pre-tax book income +/- permanent differences) * tax rate, current 
income tax liability = (pre-tax book income +/- permanent differences +/- temporary differences)* tax 
rate. Thus, the size o f temporary differences affects current tax-related cash flows while permanent 
differences affect current earnings. Cheung et al. (1997) provide direct evidence that deferred tax 
information enhances the prediction o f future cash flows.
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payment while the reversal of deferred tax assets will reduce future tax payment. This 
has been confirmed by Guenther and Sansing (2000), Amir et al. (1997), Givoly and 
Hayn (1992), Ayers (1998), Cheung et al. (1997) and others.
Likewise, permanent differences (PD) deriving from different recognition in 
permanent items directly affect the calculation of income tax expenses and hence 
influence current post-tax earnings. For example, holding pre-tax earnings constant, 
higher (lower) positive PD implies higher (lower) income tax expenses, leading to lower 
(higher) current post-tax earnings. This information implicitly informs on firms’ future 
performance since current earnings are a significant predictor of future earnings. In 
addition, PD also contributes some transitory components to current earnings because 
PD is uncertain and varies with different objectives of institutional settings (e.g. tax 
preference, non-deductible expenses, non-taxable income). Therefore, PD information 
is hypothesised to be associated with share prices although there is no much empirical 
support other than the study of Barragato and Weiden (2004), where they demonstrate 
that PD is incrementally value relevant.
Taken as a whole, NBTD, consisting of temporary and permanent differences, is 
conjectured to be relevant for share pricing because it informs of future cash flows and 
future earnings.
4.3.3 The Value Relevance of ABTD
This section argues that the quality-related information in BTD (i.e. ABTD) is 
relevant for equity valuation because the implied information about earnings 
management and tax management may be informative of the persistence of current 
earnings and cash flows, thereby affecting the investors’ evaluation and expectation of 
firms’ future performance.
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Accounting information is subject to manipulation because the fixation on 
reported financial numbers of the investors and market induces management to 
manipulate the value-relevant financial variables for their self-interests (Kothari 2001). 
Prior literature suggests that earnings management aims to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999).
Tax management aims to influence a firm’s expected discounted after-tax cash 
flows (Scholes et al. 2002). These opportunistic behaviours necessarily trigger the 
distortion of reported earnings and cash flows, e.g., an overstatement or 
understatement. The consequential noise in reported performance will affect investors’ 
expectations of future benefits, thereby influencing share prices.
The potential for ABTD to be value relevant lies in it reveals these distortions and 
informs investors of their impact on future performance. As defined in Section 4.2, 
ABTD is the differences between managed book and managed taxable income. Its 
variation reflects the extent of EM and TM (i.e. the distortions in reported earnings). 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how ABTD informs investors on the distortions in reported 
earnings and cash flows and future performance.
As summarised in Section 4.2.2, there appear six typical management 
manipulations as analysed in prior literature. These are presented schematically in 
Figure 4.2, in which scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 5 hypothesise that firms singly engage in 
either EM (denoted as B’>0 and B'<0, i.e. T -0 ) or TM (denoted as T'<0 and T’>0, i.e.
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B'=0).20 In scenarios 3 and 6, firms are hypothesised to engage in both EM and TM 
(denoted as B'>T' and B'<T', where B'^T'). In scenario 1, 2 and 3, firms are assumed to 
manipulate earnings upward (boosting earnings) or/and manipulate taxable income 
downward (i.e. reducing or deferring taxes), leading to a positive ABTD. Thus, a 
positive ABTD is a result of overstated current earnings and/or tax-related cash inflows. 
In contrast, in scenarios 4, 5 and 6, firms manipulate earnings downward (i.e. 
smoothing earnings or taking a bath) or/and manipulate taxable income upward i.e. 
smoothing taxes), leading to a negative ABTD. Thus, ABTD signifies the levels of 
distortion in the current performance if these opportunistic behaviours occur.
Figure 4.2
The A ssociation between A BTD  and A nticipated Future Perform ance
ABTD
1
Positive ABTD Negative ABTD
B'<TB’>T'
Understated Current Earnings 
and/or Tax-related Cash Inflows
Overstated Current Earnings 
and/or Tax-Related Cash Inflows
Anticipated 
Future Performance
Lev and Nissim (2004) and Sloan (1996) suggest that, when current earnings are 
overstated (understated), the expected growth in future earnings will be lower (higher). 
This may be explained as (1) overstating (understating) current earnings increase 
(decrease) the base of future earnings growth, thereby decreasing (increasing) future
20 rhe symbols are defined as: B' = managed book income or prima facie income tax expense, T' = 
managed taxable income or income tax payable.
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growth; and (2) overstated earnings are transitory and less persistent and will generally 
be followed by understated future earnings.
Current studies also argue that an understated current tax liability caused by tax 
planning (i.e. large positive BTD) bodes poorly for future economic performance 
because cash flows will not persist at current levels (e.g. Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, 
Abarbanell and Bushee 1997, Guenther and Jones 2002). In addition, this 
understatement could lead to potentially high auditing risk and high tax audit 
adjustments in the future, leading to a negative effect on future performance.21
Therefore, a positive ABTD resulting from boosting earnings or/and reducing 
taxes may inform of a lower future performance. Conversely, a negative ABTD 
resulting from taking a bath or/and manipulating taxable income upward may inform of 
a higher future performance. For these reasons, ABTD is expected to be value relevant 
as it affects performance measurement and prediction.
In general, the inference is that BTD is informative for equity valuation because it 
may reveal both policy-related and quality-related information that have implications for 
the market’s estimation of firms’ future performance. This information is expected to be 
reflected in the contemporaneous stock prices.
4.4 Summary
This chapter constructs a theoretical framework for BTD research, interpreting 
BTD as a function of accounting-tax misalignment, EM and TM. The concepts of NBTD 
and ABTD are developed to identify the mechanical differences due to different income
21 Some studies have demonstrated that large positive BTD leads to higher tax audit adjustments and tax 
audit costs despite whether the larger BTD is caused by efforts to reduce taxable income or efforts to 
increase book income (e.g. M ills 1998, M ills and Sansing 2001).
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reporting requirements under two sets of systems and opportunistic differences due to 
managerial manipulations. If NBTD and ABTD can be reliably measured, NBTD may 
be used to estimate the extent of accounting-tax nonconformity while ABTD may be 
used to proxy the existent and incidence of unobserved EM and TM.
Building on the prediction and valuation links, this chapter presents a 
comprehensive reasoning of the value relevance of BTD by analysing the information 
embedded in NBTD and ABTD and assessing their potential roles in equity valuation. It 
concludes that BTD should be value relevant because its policy-related information in 
NBTD about the differences between GAAP and tax laws and quality-related 
information in ABTD about earnings quality are sufficient to affect future earnings and 
share prices.
Next, this thesis attempts to test this framework by empirically investigating the 
usefulness of BTD in proxying earnings management and tax management and 
predicting future earnings and stock prices in a Chinese context. Given that variation in 
BTD is of jurisdictional and practical dependence, it is necessary to evaluate the 
particular differences between accounting and tax rules, managerial discretion in book 
and tax reporting, the opportunities and incentives for earnings management and tax 
management in a specific country. These are presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ACCOUNTING, TAX, CAPITAL MARKET AND BTD IN CHINA
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 establishes the theoretical framework showing that BTD is a function of 
accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management and tax management. It may 
inform investors of firms’ future performance and thus is of potential value relevance. 
This framework is built on the existing literature that mostly drawn from the U.S., which 
enjoys a mature capital market, well-developed tax and accounting regimes and a rich 
financial information disclosure system. In the U.S., the GAAP and tax laws develop 
independently and the systems generate substantially mechanical variation in BTD. 
Further, both systems have sufficient discretion to practise prevalent earnings 
management and tax management. This institutional context and opportunistic practice 
permit hypotheses to be developed with respect to BTD, management manipulations 
and value relevance in the U.S.
Compared to the U.S., China has a transitory economy, an emerging capital 
market with developing tax and accounting systems. This provides a distinct 
institutional context in which to study BTD. This chapter analyses the development and 
features of BTD in China and discusses institutional features of China’s income tax 
laws, financial reporting standards, and capital markets that affect BTD. The chapter 
evaluates whether the Chinese unique institutional arrangements and opportunistic 
background are likely to generate the same predictions as in the U.S. context and 
develop specific BTD hypotheses associated with EM and TM, and the value-relevance 
of BTD in a Chinese setting. In particular, the detailed disclosure requirements of BTD
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for China’s B-shares listed companies provide a rare empirical opportunity to conduct 
an in-depth BTD research that avoids much of the measurement error in BTD as 
shown in some U.S literature (as discussed in Chapter 2).
As indicated in Chapter 1, China’s BTD emerged with the Chinese accounting 
and tax systems changing from a closely aligned (or dependent) system to unaligned 
(or independent) systems since 1985. To better understand the evolution and potential 
meaningfulness of China’s BTD, Section 5.2 reviews the recent development of 
Chinese accounting and tax regimes, and Section 5.3 describes the features of the 
Chinese capital market and financial reporting requirements for the Chinese listed 
companies. This is particularly important because the disclosure requirements reveal 
particular aspects of BTD not readily observable in other settings. Section 5.4 identifies 
the institutional structure of BTD arising from IAS, Chinese GAAP and China’s income 
tax laws. Although China’s BTD has a short history, it has developed in a similar way 
to those in countries with a long history of BTD. To better understand the extent of 
similarities and differences, Section 5.5 compares the U.S. BTD and China’s BTD. The 
final section summarises.
5.2 Relationship between Chinese GAAP and Income Tax Laws
As indicated in Chapter 2, BTD only arises in a non-dependent accounting-tax 
structure where accounting rules are determined independently of tax rules. For 
example, the U.S., Canada, UK and Australia have non-dependent systems, and so 
have exhibited BTD for many years, while Norway, France, Germany and Italy have 
dependent systems, and so have no BTD.
The Chinese accounting and tax systems experienced a transition from a 
dependent system to two distinct independent systems during the past 25 years. BTD
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arose as China established its accounting standards to comply with IAS, and imported 
international tax practice to China’s tax system. This importation and managerial and 
market practice not only brought some mechanical amount of BTD due to the 
divergence of financial accounting principles and tax laws, but also raised 
opportunistic variation in BTD due to managers exercising discretion in financial 
reporting to manage earnings, and managers exercising flexibility in tax rules to 
manage taxable income. This section reviews the structural changes in the Chinese 
accounting and taxation systems in three phases: pre 1978/1979,
1978/1979-1992/1993 and post 1993/1994. Next, this section analyses the possible 
impact of opportunistic factors on the emergent BTD. Section 5.2.1 describes three 
phases in the evolution of accounting system: centrally planned economy, move 
towards a market-oriented economy and internationalisation approach. In section 5.2.2, 
the development of Chinese taxation system is delineated by three phases: “tax-profit 
consistency”, “tax-profit substitution” and “tax-profit separation” as illustrated in Table 
5.1. Section 5.2.3 discusses the weaknesses in the current Chinese accounting and 
taxation systems and the resulting opportunities for management manipulations.
Table 5.1
Three Phases in the development of Chinese Accounting and Taxation Systems
Years Accounting Development Taxation Development
Pre 1978/1979 Centrally Planned Economy “ Tax-Profit Consistency”
1978/1979-1992/1993 Move towards a Market-Oriented Economy “ Tax-Profit Substitution”
Post 1993/1994 Internationalisation Approach “ Tax-Profit Separation”
5.2.1 The Development of the Chinese Accounting System
Accounting systems reflect the economic system they serve. When economic or 
political circumstances change dramatically, a structural change in the accounting
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system is required (Chan et al. 1998). The development of the Chinese accounting 
closely links with China’s social, economic and political environment. In the last 25 
years, the Chinese economy has experienced a series of reforms: the transition from a 
centrally-planned economy to a socialist market economy, the adoption of “open door” 
policy, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and the accession to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). To meet these economic and political requirements, China’s 
accounting rules underwent a rapid development and frequent revision. These changes 
gradually transformed the Chinese accounting from the traditionally uniformed and rigid 
system which was imported from Soviet Union into a predominantly Anglo-Saxon 
approach (Xiang 1998). More importantly, they led to a departure of accounting rules 
and tax rules and generated BTD. To display a clear picture, the evolution of the 
Chinese accounting system is analysed from three different phases: centrally planned 
economy, move towards a market-oriented economy and internationalisation approach.
Phase 1 (pre 1978): Centrally Planned Economy
Since 1949, China’s accounting system was borrowed from the Soviet Union 
model, which was oriented towards a centrally planning economy (Chen and Tran 
1995). At that time, China’s economy was dominated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOE), which produced goods to fulfil the state’s stipulated production quota and sold 
goods to the state at the price determined by the government. All income belonged to 
the government and all of the funds needed by SOE were appropriated from the state 
budget, and the wages of both managers and workers were determined independently 
of surplus (Heady and Bin 1998). The accounting system was uniform and rigid. It was 
a fund-based recording system designed for national economic planning and 
macroeconomic control rather than business purposes, deferring from accounting 
practice typically used in most other countries. It was argued that there was no need to 
know about how accounting information was produced and used by Chinese
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companies due to its less participation and involvement in market (Davidson et al. 
1996).
Phase 2 (1978-1992): Move towards a Market-Oriented Economy
China started its reforms to transform its economic structure from a centrally 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy, and adopted an “open door” policy in 
1978. Since then, large-scale structural changes in accounting system emerged.
(1) SOE was given autonomy and enterprise performance became a concern. 
SOE was converted from production units to profit centres and cost centres where 
managers were supposed to minimise the cost of production. Managers decided 
pricing, material sourcing, marketing and earnings distribution. Accounting became a 
decision-making tool, which focused on performance (cost/volume/profit) analysis.
(2) With the emergence of multiple forms of ownership, such as collectively 
owned enterprises (COE), individually owned enterprises (IOE) and foreign investment 
enterprises (FIE), SOE could not retain their monopolistic roles (Tang and Lau 2000). 
The rigid ownership-specific financial reporting system was no longer compatible with 
the emerging corporate environment.
(3) The establishment of the Chinese Security Markets and Stock Exchanges in 
1990 and 1991 allowed the Chinese enterprises to raise capital beyond banks and the 
government. Thus, enterprises are required to provide accounting reports to inform 
shareholders and creditors of the performance and risk of the enterprises.
(4) The “open door” policy brought huge foreign direct investment (FDI).22 With 
the international transactions increasing rapidly, enterprises were required to 
implement financial reporting practice to meet foreign investors’ requirements and 
international standards.
22 By the end o f 1984, China had absorbed U.SS3 b illion o f FDI. It has been the second largest recipient 
o f FDI in the world since 1993 (World Economic Outlook, 1994).
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Before 1985, the Chinese accounting system was fund-based, rule-based and 
tax-based. It did not reflect the performance of enterprises. Unlike for the western 
accountant, little professional or managerial judgement was permitted. For example, 
the concept of “prudence” was not adopted for the provision for probable losses. The 
method of reporting inventory at the lower of cost and net realisable value was not 
allowed. Moreover, the accounting system was closely linked with taxation system. Tax 
determination and collection were the critical considerations and targets used in 
accounting regulations setting. Rules for measuring accounting profit were the same as 
those for measuring taxable income, so no BTD occurred (e.g. Chan et al. 1998, Tang 
et al. 2000 and Davidson et al. 1996).
To adapt to the new circumstances, the Chinese accounting system underwent a 
big revolution. In 1985, China promulgated the Accounting Law of the People’ Republic 
of China which set up general principles of accounting for all enterprises, including the 
definitions of the nature and role of accounting and basic principles. Meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) promulgated the Accounting Regulations for Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (the 1985 regulation). It was the first time that 
the Western accounting practice was introduced to the corporate operation in China, 
representing a radical departure from the traditional fund-accounting (Chow et al. 1995, 
quoted in Xiang 1998). These regulations identified the concepts of assets, liabilities, 
capital, revenue and expenses similar to those in international accounting practice. 
Balance sheet, income statement and change in financial position information were 
adopted in the Chinese accounting system.
With the establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1990 and 
1991, the MOF issued the Accounting System for Experimental Joint Stock Limited 
Enterprises that took effect on January 1, 1992, which was the first set of rules to 
incorporate international accounting practice into reporting requirements for China’s
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domestic enterprises. Due to the rapid development of the Chinese securities market, 
the Accounting System for Experimental Joint Stock Limited Enterprises was 
subsequently replaced by the Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises 
(JSLE) which aimed to standardise accounting practice and disclosures by listed 
companies.
In 1992, the MOF issued the “Accounting Regulation for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment” to replace the 1985 Regulations, aimed to move towards compatibility with 
international accounting practice in areas such as foreign exchange transactions, 
recognition of possible losses in inventory and accounts receivables.
These accounting pronouncements introduced some significant accounting 
concepts and essential elements of financial statements that were, in many respects, 
based on international practice. Accounting requirements and the function of 
accounting were developed in a similar way to international accounting practice even 
though there was no unified accounting framework that applied to all types of 
enterprises in China (Xiang 1998).
Phase 3 (post 1993): An Internationalisation Approach
Until 1993, no accounting principles and standards were in force. Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) and the General Financial Principles for 
Enterprises (GFPE) took effective on July 1, 1993. These provided a conceptual 
framework that was similar to the formalised conceptual frameworks of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), Canada and the U.S. This signified a move 
towards the Anglo-American approach and brought China’s accounting practice closer 
to the IAS, albeit with a Chinese flavour. Article 11 of ASBE stated that “accounting 
information must be designed to meet the requirements of national macro-economic
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control, the needs of all concerned external users to understand an enterprise’s 
financial position and operating results, and the needs of management of enterprises to 
strengthen their financial management and administration” (Ministry of Finance, 1992 
#1073).
However, the Chinese government remained the main user and regulator of 
financial reporting. The freedom for management to exercise discretion in accounting 
choices remained limited. For example, managers were only permitted to choose 
inventory valuation method and accounting period. More importantly for this study, 
accounting treatment was allowed to differ from the requirements of tax regulations, so 
BTD emerged (Tang et al. 2000). Ministry of Finance (1994) introduced the tax-payable 
and tax-effect accounting methods. Under the tax-effect accounting, an entity 
recognised the aggregate of income tax payable for the current period and the amount 
of income tax effect by timing differences as income tax expenses for the current 
period. The effect on income tax arising from timing differences should be deferred and 
allocated to subsequent periods.
By September 1996, drafts of 30 accounting standards were released. These 
detailed standards provided a practical direction for accounting application and took 
China’s accounting practice closer to IAS and away from the ASBE. They were 
intended to be more flexible in the choice of accounting policies and estimates (Xiang 
1998).23 Meanwhile, to meet the requirements for China’s accession to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the MOF made an effort to support international accounting 
harmonisation and achieve convergence of Chinese GAAP with IAS. A body of 
Chinese Accounting Standards was developed by the MOF from 1997 to 2002 that 
were broadly in line with IAS.
22 For example, under ASBE, the selection o f depreciation methods and the estimation o f useful life were 
administrated by government rules. However, they were not required under the detailed standards.
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In 2001, a new Accounting System for Business Enterprises replaced the 
Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises (JSLE) from January 1, 2001 
and Accounting Regulations for Foreign Investment Enterprises from January 1, 2002. 
The new system contained two features with important implications for this study:
(1) Managers were allowed greater discretion in accounting choices. For example, 
managers could select different depreciation methods, estimate useful lives and net 
residual values of fixed assets, use of historical cost or market value measures, and 
determine the amount of provision for impairment of inventory, fixed and intangible 
assets, short-term and long-term investments, designated loans receivable, bad debt 
receivable, and construction in progress.
(2) Clear definitions for the concepts of “timing differences” and "permanent 
differences” in tax-effect accounting were stated, allowing more consistent 
interpretation of BTD disclosed in financial reports.
With the intention of enabling foreign investors to assess the performance of their 
investments more efficiently, the differences between FIE’s financial statements under 
Chinese GAAP and those prepared in accordance with international accounting 
practice were further reduced.24 Meanwhile, as a result of the IAS offering more 
freedom for management discretion, the divergence of accounting rules and income tax 
rules were widened, increasing the levels of reported BTD at some extent. Appendix 1 
details the emergence and potential increment of BTD with the performing process of 
Chinese Accounting Regulatory Framework of Financial Reporting. This was further 
intensified by changes in the tax system, as described in the next section.
24 Chinese GAAP includes the accounting law, Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises, Chinese 
Accounting standards, Accounting System for Business Enterprises and some regulations for listed 
company disclosures issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
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5.2.2 The Development of Chinese Tax Regime—A Focus on Corporate Income 
Tax
To keep pace with China’s recent social, economic, and regulatory reforms, its 
tax system also underwent three major phases of reforms: pre-1979 “tax-profit 
consistency”, 1979-1993 “tax-profit substitution”, and post-1993 "tax-profit separation” 
as illustrated in Table 5.1.
Phase 1: (pre1979): “Tax-Profit Consistency”
The importance of the taxation system in the Chinese economy was not fully 
recognised until the late 1970s. Under the centrally planned economy, there was no 
income tax on the profits of SOE because all surpluses were remitted to the 
government. At that time, profit was equal to income tax, called “tax-profit consistency”.
Phase 2: (1979-1993): “Tax-Profit Substitution”
The introduction of economic reforms during the 1979 to 1993 period caused 
fundamental changes in Chinese tax system. First, SOE was restructured to be the 
major source of revenue for the government. Before 1983, instead of paying income 
tax, SOE was required to submit a surplus on a profit-contracting basis to the central 
government. In 1983, the first stage of the “tax-profit substitution” system was 
implemented to replace “tax-profit consistency”. Large and medium-sized enterprises 
were required to pay income tax on profit at a rate of 55 percent and small-sized 
enterprises had to pay income tax at a progressive rates ranging from 7 percent to 55 
percent. However, the post-tax profits were shared by the state government and the 
SOE in accordance with the Stated-owned Enterprise Income Regulatory Tax, which 
was introduced in 1984.
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In 1984, the “tax-profit substitution” system entered its second stage. It was 
intended to completely substitute profit delivery with payment of tax. The enterprises 
were allowed to allocate their profit after income tax rather than sharing with the state. 
For the first time, the concept of taxable income was defined under the Chinese tax 
system (Li 1990).
Second, with the enforcement of “open door” policy, China began to design its tax 
system in 1979 to attract foreign investments. The Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture 
Income Tax for Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures was introduced in 1980 and the 
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax for Chinese-foreign co-operative joint ventures, wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises and foreign companies took effect in 1982. Unfortunately, 
these two laws resulted in relatively higher tax rates charged for Chinese-foreign co­
operative joint ventures and foreign capital enterprises, and too wide variance in terms 
of tax preference. To remedy these weaknesses, tax reform in 1991 combined these 
two iaws via the Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Enterprises (known as FEITL). A flat rate of 33% (including 3% local surtax) was 
applied for all FIE to replace the earlier progressive rate. The FEITL included the 
detailed tax provisions for measuring income, deduction of expenses, depreciation or 
amortisation of assets, tax credits and related party transactions (Cho 1998).
In 1993, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) was “upgraded” to report 
directly to the State Council. The SAT was empowered to negotiate tax treaties with 
other countries, determine tax policies, draft tax legislation for approval by the State 
Council and issue tax regulations and be responsible for the interpretation of all tax 
legislation.25 From then on, tax played an important role in developing economy and
25 See SAT (2000) (in Chinese).
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raising government revenue. The proportion of total tax revenue to total government 
revenue increased from 48.75% in 1979 to 83.63% in 1993 (Cho 1998).
Phase 3: (post 1993): “Tax-Profit Separation”
By 1993, the Chinese tax system had become very complicated. There were 
diverse income tax rates applicable to the business organisations located in different 
regions because local governments abused tax preference to attract investment.26 This 
damaged the total governmental tax revenue.
To unify tax laws and strengthen the central government’s macro-economic 
control and administration of tax policies, China changed the tax administration system 
by establishing a tax-sharing system between central and local governments to prevent 
the excessive tax preferential policies. Taxes are classified as (1) tax assigned to the 
central government; (2) tax shared by the central government and local government; (3) 
tax assigned to the local government. In particular, the income tax from local 
enterprises contributes to the tax revenue of the local government. However, the 
income tax from SOEs, local and foreign banks, other financial companies, railway 
departments and headquarters of insurance companies is assigned as tax revenue of 
the central government.
Under this system, local governments were given appropriate tax autonomy to 
collect tax revenue for financing their services and capital investment. However, the 
central government retained the power to formulate tax policies and increase its shares 
of total tax revenue. It was intended to eliminate the discretionary tax treatment 
provided by local governments. However, this endeavour appeared to fail as 
elaborated in Section 4.2.3.
2<s In this study, local governments include provincial and municipal governments.
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Two sets of enterprise income tax laws/regulations were introduced in 1994: (1) 
the FEHL for foreign enterprises; (2) Tentative Regulations for Enterprises Income Tax 
of PRC (REIT) for domestic enterprises. The REIT was applicable to state, collective, 
private and jointly operated enterprises as well as listed companies. Similar to the 
international tax practice, the regulations regarding a worldwide basis tax, depreciation 
rules, and inventory valuation and loss carryforwards methods were enforced. More 
importantly, the 1994 income tax laws clearly regulate that taxpayers must make an 
adjustment on their tax returns when book income is inconsistent with taxable income.
A flat rate of 33% is applied, indicating a significant reduction from the former tax 
rate of 55% for domestic enterprises and a unified tax rate for foreign and domestic 
enterprises. However, the REIT does not grant tax incentives or tax holidays as much 
as the FEITL. The extent of tax incentives is not specified in the law and is decided by 
tax authorities on an individual basis (Tang et at. 2000). This raised potential concerns 
as discussed in next section.
Generally, these tax reforms have made substantial structural changes in the 
Chinese tax system. As with the Western countries, tax has been one of the most 
important tools used by the Chinese government to raise public revenue and achieve 
its macro-economic objectives. The Chinese corporate income tax increased from 0 in 
1978 to 291.95 billion yuan in 2003.27 More importantly, the changes in the role of tax 
played in national economy resulted in the departure of tax rules from accounting rules. 
A further separation of tax and accounting profit was identified, raising a greater 
mechanical BTD.
27 See CSB (2004).
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5.2.3 Remained Issues in the Current Accounting and Taxation Systems
As discussed in Chapter 4, apart from divergence of accounting rules and tax 
rules, opportunistic behaviour due to managers’ opportunistically exploiting the 
discretion in accounting rules and the complexity, ambiguity and flexibility in tax rules 
also contribute to the variation in BTD. When there are more opportunities of 
manipulations in book and tax income, the likelihood of variation in BTD increases. This 
section identifies the impact of the existing opportunistic factors on China’s BTD by 
analysing remained issues in the current Chinese accounting and taxation systems.
Accounting Environment and Supervision Mechanisms
Despite efforts to conform to IAS an overriding objective when formulating the 
new Chinese accounting standards, accounting environment remains problematic. 
Under IAS, management is permitted a significant amount of discretion in financial 
reporting, its implementation requires professional judgement from management and 
auditors. However, the severe shortage of qualified and well-trained accountants and 
auditors and the lack of professional independence in China are the two critical issues 
in the enforcement of standards (Xiang 1998, Lin and Chan 2000). Furthermore, the 
control mechanisms designed to prevent managers from using financial reporting 
discretion in self-interests are inadequate in China (Eccher and Healy 2000). No clear 
legal liability or punishment is defined for accounting manipulation by management. 
The rights of shareholders to sue management for misleading disclosures are not 
regulated. As a result, the progress towards conformity with IAS has dual implications. 
On the one hand, it increases the relevance and comparability of financial reporting in a 
global economy and results in accounting information more faithfully and prudently 
reflecting equity’s value. On the other hand, more discretion in accounting choices
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provides possibilities and opportunities for managerial manipulation, especially when 
monitoring of management’s judgement is insufficient.
Evidence to date suggests that Chinese managers opportunistically use the 
discretion in current accounting standards. Eccher and Healy (2000) report that the 
Chinese managers are more likely to exercise greater discretion in reporting accruals, 
particularly through the write-down of obsolete inventory and accounts receivable 
allowance under IAS. Aharony et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that 
accelerating credit sales is a widely used method for Chinese B-shares companies’ 
earnings management before IPO.
Empirical studies and the increasing accounting scandals (e.g. YingGuangXia, 
Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical and QiongMingYuan) have shown that earnings 
manipulation in Chinese listed firms is rampant (e.g. Chen 1998, Jian and Wong 2003, 
Haw et al. 1998b, Chen et al. 2000). This phenomenon is attributable to the lack of 
effective controls and infrastructure to monitor opportunistic reporting, such as 
sufficient supervision and scrutiny by the Chinese Security Regulatory Committee 
(CSRC), independent auditing (DeFond et al. 2000), legal protection for investors 
(Abdel-khalik et al. 1999, Eccher and Healy 2000, Lin and Chan 2000, Aharony et al. 
2000) .
As with the problems in implementing accounting standards, the new tax system 
in China also generates enforcement difficulties. Some examples of these include: 
uncertainty of tax policies resulting from the multiple-tier tax legislations, arbitrariness 
of tax policies deriving from strong political-economic target, big loopholes because of 
uncertainty and complexity of tax laws and the weak and undeveloped tax 
administration system.
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The Uncertainty of Tax Policies and Multiple-Tier Tax Legislations
In the People’s Republic of China, the taxation system consists of a series of tax 
laws, regulations, rulings and documents formulated by the empowered authorities. 
The tax legislation hierarchy is presented in Figure 5.1.
Under China’s Constitution, only the National People’s Congress (NPC) has the 
power to legislate tax laws and all tax regulations and rules must comply with the laws. 
However, except for the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law (1991), the Individual 
Income Tax Law (1994) and Tax Administration and Collection Law (1992), there is no 
single, overriding tax law or code for governing the taxation of enterprises in China, e.g. 
domestic enterprise income tax, value-added tax. Rather, tax is imposed based on a 
basic law, supplementary implementing regulations, and tax-specific rulings and 
interpretations issued by the Minister of Finance (MOF) or the State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT). The MOF and SAT, as the two main sources of tax policies, are 
empowered to issue rulings to clarify specific issues raised by local tax authorities, 
taxpayers or the court. Local tax authorities are responsible for tax collection and 
interpretation of tax policies. The existence of diverse and unsystematic regulations 
raises the uncertainty and loopholes in tax laws. It provides managers with 
opportunities to engage in tax planning by exploiting these uncertainty and loopholes.
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Figure 5.1
China’s Tax Legislation Hierarchy
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SC (State Council)
Local Government
Individual Income Tax Law
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax law
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Regional NPC (only for 
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Detailed Rulings for Local Tax
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Regulations
e.g. Detailed Regulations for Foreign 
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e g. Tentative Regulations for VAT, 
Business Tax, Income Tax
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The Arbitrariness of Tax Policies and Excessive Tax Preference
Apart from the uncertainty and ambiguity, China’s tax regime is characterised by 
its numerous tax preference deriving from its strong incentives for encouraging exports, 
foreign investment and economic development in specific regions and industries. Lin 
(1999) analyses that the dramatic growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China in 
the past a few decades is attributed to generous tax incentives. As Shalizi and Thirsk 
(1991) point out, the existing tax structures in most developing countries impose 
varying levels of taxation, depending on the form of income, the type of assets, the size 
and legal status of the businesses, and the kind of business activity. Such differential
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treatment distorts the investors’ choices with respect to the form of income, asset 
ownership, business organisation, the sector of investment activity, the time profile of 
investment.
In particular, the tax-sharing system does not reduce the conflicts between 
central and local governments and effectively curb the abuse of tax incentives by local 
governments. It is attributed to the mismatch between revenue powers and expenditure 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. This occurs because the most 
designated local taxes obtain too narrow tax base to sufficiently support the 
expenditures of local governments and the expenditures of local authorities have 
increased dramatically in recent years (Lin 2001). Although the power of local 
authorities to offer discretionary tax treatment is constrained under the tax-sharing 
system, in light of a shortage of tax revenue and self-interests, local governments 
either impose various fee charges to seek additional sources of revenue or offer tax 
exemption/extended tax preference to attract investment into their own jurisdictions (Lin 
2001). For instance, tax refunds are popular and subtle tax preference offered by local 
governments. On the surface, taxpayers are taxed at the regulatory tax rate. Indeed, 
the effective tax rate is reduced by local governments’ refunds. As shown in Table 5.2 
and 5.3, the varying levels in corporate income tax rate for the companies located in 
various geographies and engaged in various industries are remarkable.
In generally, FIE and enterprises established in specific zones have priority in tax 
preference and tax holidays over domestic enterprises and those located in non­
specific zones. Manufacturing firms are subject to more tax-favoured treatment and 
relative longer tax holidays than non-manufacturing. These diverse tax policies raise 
diverse applicable tax rates, e.g. 0%, 10%, 15%, 18%, 24%, 33% (see Tables 5.2 and 
5.3).
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Table 5.2
Corporate Income Tax Incentives and Holidays for Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIE)
Tax holidays and incentives Scope of application
Reduced income tax rate
•  A  re d u c e d  in co m e  tax  ra te  o f  15% •  F IE  in S E Z s*  an d  in P N D Z *
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in p ro d u c tio n  in E T D Z s*
•  F IE  w ith  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t o v e r  U S $ 3 0  
m illio n s
•  A  re d u c e d  in co m e  tax  ra te  o f  2 4 %
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in  in f ra s tru c tu re  d e v e lo p m e n t 
an d  a d v a n c e d  te c h n o lo g y
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in h ig h - te c h  lo c a te d  in  H T ID Z s*
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in  p ro c e s s in g  an d  a s se m b ly  fo r 
e x p o rt in a p p ro v e d  b o n e d  a re a s
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in m a n u fa c tu r in g  in C O E Z s*  o r 
O p e n  c it ie s , o r  in o ld  u rb a n  d is tr ic ts  w h e re  
S E Z s an d  E T D Z s are  lo c a te d
•  F IE  lo c a te d  in N a tio n a l T o u rism  A reas  
d e s ig n e d  b y  th e  S ta te  C o u n c il
Start-up tax holidays and reduction
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r th e  firs t tw o  
p ro f it-m a k in g  y e a rs  an d  a 5 0 %  ta x  re d u c tio n  
fo r th e  fo llo w in g  th re e  y ea rs
•  A  5 0 %  tax  re d u c tio n  fo r an  a d d itio n a l th re e  
y e a rs  a f te r  th e  f iv e -y e a r tax  h o lid ay
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r  th e  firs t fiv e  
p ro f it-m a k in g  y e a rs  an d  a  5 0 %  re d u c tio n  fo r 
th e  fo llo w in g  5 y e a rs
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r  th e  f irs t 
p ro f it-m a k in g  y e a r  an d  a  5 0 %  re d u c tio n  fo r 
th e  fo llo w in g  2 y e a rs
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r 2  y e a rs  an d  
a 5 0 %  re d u c tio n  fo r th e  fo llo w in g  2 y e a rs  
an d  a  15 % -3 0 %  re d u c tio n  fo r an  a d d itio n a l 
lO y rs
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r  th e  firs t 
th re e  y e a rs  fro m  p ro f it-m a k in g  y e a r  an d  a  
5 0 %  re d u c tio n  fo r  th e  fo llo w in g  3 y rs
•  E x e m p tio n  fro m  ta x a tio n  fo r  th e  f irs t tw o  
y rs  fro m  p ro f it-m a k in g  y e a r
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in m a n u fa c tu r in g  fo r a  p e r io d  o f
n o t less  th a n  10 y e a rs
•  F IE  in m a n u fa c tu r in g  e n te rp r ise s  w ith  
a d v a n c e d  te c h n o lo g y
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in e n e rg y , t r a n sp o r t  c o n s tru c tio n , 
in f ra s tru c tu re  w ith  o p e ra t in g  p e r io d s  m o re  th an  
15 y e a rs
•  F IE  lo c a te d  in S E Z s e n g a g e d  in se rv ic e  w ith  
fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t m o re  th an  U S $5  m illio n  an d  
lO yrs o p e ra t in g  p e rio d
•  F IE S  e n g a g e d  in  a g r ic u ltu ra l, fo re s try  an d  
a n im a l h u sb a n d ry  w ith  an  o p e ra t in g  te rm  o f  
m o re  th an  10 y e a rs
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in  H ig h -T e c h  p ro d u c ts  
m a n u fa c tu r in g  an d  lo c a te d  in H T ID Z  o f  
B e ijin g
•  F IE  e n g a g e d  in h ig h - te c h  lo c a te d  in H T ID Z s*  
w ith  an  o p e ra t in g  p e r io d  o f  m o re  th an  1 Oyrs
Incentives for re-investment of profits
•  A  4 0 %  re fu n d  o f  ta x  p a id  on  th e  a m o u n t 
re in v e s te d
•  F o re ig n  in v e s to rs  re in v e s t th e ir  p ro f its  e ith e r  
in th a t F IE  o r  in  a n o th e r  F IE  w ith  an  o p e ra t in g  
p e r io d  o f  m o re  th an  5 y rs
* A  100%  re fu n d  o f  tax  p a id  o n  th e  
a m o u n t re in v e s te d
•  F IE  re in v e s t th e ir  p ro f its  in  an  e x p o r t-o r ie n te d  
o r  te c h n o lo g y  a d v a n c e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  
e n te rp r ise
Exported incentives
•  A re d u c e d  in co m e  tax  ra te  o f  10% •  F IE  in S E Z s an d  E T D Z s o r  F IE s  su b je c t to  
15%  in co m e  ta x  ra te  , an d  e x p o rtin g  a t le a s t 
7 0 %  o f  to ta l p ro d u c tio n
•  A  5 0 %  in co m e  tax  re d u c tio n  fo r  th e  y e a r  o f  
e x p o rt
•  F o re ig n  in v e s to rs  e x p o r t in g  at le a s t 7 0 %  o f  
th e ir  to ta l p ro d u c tio n
Sources:
Tang et al. (2000), National People's Congress (1991a), National People's Congress (1991b).
*SEZs: Special Economic Zones; PNDZ: Pudong New Development Zone; ETDZs: Economic and Technological 
Development Zones; COEZs: Coastal Open Economic Zones. HTIDZs: High-Tech Industry Development Zones.
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Table 5.3
Corporate Income Tax Incentives and Holidays for Domestic Enterprises
Tax holidays and incentives Scope of application
Reduced income tax rate
• A  reduced income tax rate o f 15% • Enterprise engaged in high technology 
located in HTIDZs*
Tax exemptions and tax holidays
• Exemption from taxation for the two 
years from the establishing year
• Exemption from taxation for the two 
years from the establishing year
•  Exemption from taxation for the first 
year from the establishing year and 50% 
reduction for the second year
• Exemption from taxation for the two 
year from the establishing year and a 
50% reduction for the fo llow ing 3 years
•  Exemption or reduction for 3 years
•  Exemption from 1 Oct., 1999 to the 
end o f 2003
•  New established enterprise engaged in 
high and new technology industry.
•  New established enterprises engaged in 
consultancy, information or technology 
service industries
•  New establishing enterprises engaged in
transportation, telecommunications
industries
•  New established enterprises engaged in 
energy, transportation, postal service, 
locating in western districts
•  New established enterprises engaged in 
software production
•  New established enterprises located in 
“ old, young, remote and poor”  districts
•  New established science and research 
institutions
Tax refund
* 18% income tax refund from local
government (i.e. 15% effective tax rate). Be 
abolished from 31 Dec, 2001 but took effect 
t i l l  the end o f 2002.
•  For most o f listed companies
Sources:
EITL; MOF (1994a), MOF (1994b), SAT (2003), Hu (1998). 
*HTIDZ: Hi-Tech Industry Development Zones.
Correspondingly, the average effective tax rate (tax as a percentage of income) 
and the marginal effective tax rate (the tax wedge on the after-tax rate of return) also 
vary substantially across enterprises with different investors and enterprises in different 
regions and industries. These arbitrariness and flexibility of tax policies provide more 
opportunities for tax strategies, especially for tax-induced income shifting.
In conclusion, the weaknesses in institutional settings provide more likelihood of 
earnings management and tax management and so may contribute the opportunistic 
differences to China’s BTD.
99
5.3 China’s Emerging Capital Market
Although China’s capital market only has a short history, it has experienced 
unprecedented growth and has become the eighth largest in the world (Liu and Lu 
2003). As of December 31, 2004, 1377 companies (including A and B-shares firms) 
were listed on two stock exchanges, with a total market capitalisation of over US$ 463 
billion, nearly thirty-five times that in 1992, about 27% of China’s GDP. China’s listed 
companies had issued a total of 715 billion shares in the market, holding more than 72 
million investors.28 The Chinese capital market remains remarkable due to its rapid 
development and characters. To further understand the market and managerial 
practice in China’s capital market, this section discusses the background, features of 
China’s capital market and financial reporting requirements for listed firms.
5. 3.1 Background of China’s Capital Market
The stock exchanges were opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen in November 
1990 and April 1991 respectively. The government organised them as a vehicle to 
convert its socialist planned economy into a market-oriented economy. It was also 
regarded as a vehicle for SOE to raise capital and improve operating performance as 
well as lower their high ratio of debt to asset (Tang et al. 2000).
In the planned economy, the government strictly controlled all channels of 
investments. All investments made by enterprises were either from direct governmental 
grants or bank credits allocated by government. For SOE managers, a firm’s operation 
and manufacturing, profit and loss were not an issue as significant as funding sources. 
This practice resulted in more and more SOE falling into heavy losses and
See http://www.csre.coin.cn
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overburdened debts. The banks were forced to issue excessive amount of currency 
and grant loans.29 The government suffered a large deficit.
To solve these problems, the capital market was established, in which SOE could 
raise money in the ways of selling equity ownership stakes to the public and their 
employees (Su 2003).
5.3.2 Features of China’s Capital Market
There are four features of the Chinese capital market that create a particular 
market context and managerial incentives that have implications for the hypotheses 
development in Chapter 6.
(1) The Chinese capital market is complicated by the multiple categories of 
shares: State-Shares, Legal-Person-Shares, Employee-Shares, Ordinary Domestic 
Individual Shares (i.e. A shares) and Foreign Individual Shares, such as B-shares, H- 
shares and N-shares.30 In the domestic stock exchanges, however, two third of stocks 
are non-tradable (CSRC 2005). Only A-shares and B-shares are publicly tradable 
though all shareholders have the same rights of voting, distribution and obligations. 
The major differences between A- and B-shares lie in the type of investors permitted to 
own and trade them and the currencies used for trading and cash dividends. A-shares 
are traded in Renminbi (RMB) by domestic investors. B-shares are traded in either U.S.
29 A t that time, about US$600 billion bank loans are outstanding, 90 percent o f the loans are given to SOE. 
These loans account for an unusually high proportion o f all financing equivalent to about 70 percent o f 
the GDP (Tang 2000).
30 Government bodies such as state asset management agencies hold state-shares, or institutions 
authorised hold shares on behalf o f the state such as wholly state-owned investment company. Any 
entities or institutions with a legal person status, including SOE or a company controlled by SOE, hold 
legal-person-shares. Both o f them are non-tradable. Employee-shares are issued to employees o f the 
issuing firm and are allowed trading only three years after the IPO i f  the firm can get CSRC’s approval. 
Domestic individual shares (A-shares) can be traded and purchased by private Chinese citizens in 
domestic exchanges. Foreign individual shares can only be purchased and traded by the foreign investors 
in security exchange in China (called B-shares), in Hong Kong (called H-shares) or in New York (called 
N-shares).
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dollars in Shanghai Exchange or Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen Exchange, and held 
by foreign entities and foreign individuals, including overseas Chinese residents in 
Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan (they were opened to domestic investors until early 
2001). Arbitrage among them (inter-flow of capital) is not allowed.31 By the end of 2004, 
110 listed firms issued B-shares on Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Among 
the 110 B-shares companies, 86 also issued A-shares.32
(2) The Chinese government retains a majority ownership in the firms after their 
initial public offerings (IPO). About 73% of A-shares firms’ largest shareholder is State, 
held by government bodies such as state asset management agencies, or institutions 
authorised to hold shares on behalf of the state such as wholly state-owned investment 
company. For B-shares firms, 80 out of 110 B-shares firms’ first shareholder is State 
(CSRC 2005). Government intervention has been a constant. Local governments, 
instead of shareholder committees, appoint most of managers of listed firms.
(3) Being listed is a scarce resource for China’s corporations due to fierce 
competition in IPO. The government controls the growth of the market by setting an 
annual national quota of IPO. The decision to list a company largely relies on the 
government’s balancing the interests among different industries and geographic 
regions in China instead of relying on performance completely.
(4) Investors are more concerned with speculative capital gains than investment 
returns because capital gains from shares trading are not taxable while returns on 
share investment are very low, sometimes lower than the interest rates on term 
deposits (Tang et al. 2000).
31 The separation o f A-and B-shares markets is driven by the central government’s policy o f restricting 
the foreign control o f vital SOE, preventing manipulation o f China’s fledging stock market from abroad 
and the devaluation o f Renminbi from excessive sales (Su, 2003).
32 See http://www.csrs.com.cn or Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Books in 2004.
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5.3.3 Requirements of Financial Reporting Framework for Listed Companies
Listed companies in China are subject to Security Law, Company Law, 
Accounting Law and special accounting and disclosure regulations issued by the MOF 
and CSRC as shown in Figure 5.2. A-shares companies are required to prepare their 
financial reports under Chinese GAAP and be audited by designated Chinese 
accounting firms. A summarised version of the audited annual report is required to be 
published in selected securities newspaper on or before April 30 following the year-end.
Based on the regulations of CSRC, China’s B-shares listed firms must prepare 
Chinese-version financial reports under Chinese GAAP and English-version financial 
reports under IAS. To assure compliance with IAS, all the IAS-based financial 
statements of B-shares companies must be audited by internationally recognised audit 
firms, e.g. Big 4 auditors. These dual reporting and auditing requirements provide more 
information to the market (Sami and Haiyan 2004).
More importantly, the tax-effect BTD is required to release in the notes of English 
financial statements, where BTD is defined as prima facie income tax expense (book 
income multiply applicable tax rate) less income tax payable (see Appendix 2 for a 
detailed items of permanent differences and timing differences). This disclosure 
requirements are particular advantageous because it resolves the problems in 
estimating BTD as in the U.S. literature and provides an empirical possibility to study 
BTD in the Chinese context.
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Figure 5.2
Accounting Regulatory Framework of Financial Reporting for Listed Companies
Chinese GAAP Security Law 1999Company Law 1994
Chinese Listed Firms
/ ---------------- \ (---------------- \
Accounting Accounting
Law 1985 System for
TSlr  1997
v y V J
AS BE 1993 Accounting 
Standards 
1997- 700?
/ ---------------------- N (  >>
New ASBE CSRC
for JSLC Regulations
?nni
V  J v______________ y
Disclosure of Related Party Transaction 
1997
v____________________________________
/  \  
Events Occurring after the Balance Sheet 
Date 1998
V _________________________________________________________________________________________
(-------------------------------------------------------------A
Revenue, Construction Contracts 1999
v_______________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------- \
Contingencies 2000
Cash Flow Statement, Debt Restructuring, 
Investment 2001
V_______________________________________________
Changes on Accounting Policies and 
Estimates, Corrections of Accounting 
error 2001
' ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------J
\
Non-Monetary Transactions, Intangible 
Assets, Borrowing Costs, Lease 2001 
v _______________________________________________
Interim Financial Reporting, Inventories, 
Fixed Assets 2002
v_______________________________________________ y
Source:
httu://vvww.iasplus.com/country/china.htm provided by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu.
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5.4 The Institutional Structure of BTD Based on IAS, Chinese GAAP and 
Chinese Income Tax Laws
China reformed its accounting standards to align with IAS. The increased 
discretion in IAS and China’s GAAP and the limited discretion existed in tax laws raises 
substantial variation in BTD. This section analyses the detailed institutional structure of 
BTD by comparing the different regulations listed in Chinese GAAP, IAS and China’s 
Corporate Income Tax Laws.
In line with the BTD literature conducted in the Western countries, China’s BTD 
can be classified as permanent differences (PD) and timing differences (TD). PD does 
not reverse and it affects current taxable income or current tax-effect taxable income 
rather than forwards. It is caused by four factors:
(1) The revenue recognised by accounting standards is unrecognised as revenue 
in determining taxable income by income tax law, such as interest on national bonds;
(2) The revenue unrecognised by accounting rules is recognised in determining 
taxable income, e.g. use self-products in project construction;
(3) Expense or a loss recognised by accounting standards but is not deductible 
from taxable income, for example, tax penalties and fines;
(4) Expense or a loss unrecognised by accounting standards but is deductible in 
determining taxable income, such as prepaid expenses.
In contrast, TD occurs in one period and reverses in one or more subsequent 
periods, which is mainly caused by the differences in timing of recognition for revenue 
and expenses. For example, a taxable (deductible) TD arises when certain revenue is 
recognised in the current (subsequent) period under accounting requirements, but the 
revenue should be recognised as taxable income in subsequent (current) periods 
under tax rules. It will increase (decrease) taxable income in future periods. In addition,
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a deductible (taxable) TD arises when certain expenses or losses are recognised in the 
current (subsequent) period under accounting requirements, but such expenses or 
losses are only deductible firm taxable income in subsequent (current) periods under 
tax rules. This TD will decrease (increase) taxable income in future periods.
To understand the institutional structure of BTD based on IAS, Chinese GAAP 
and Chinese Income Tax Laws, Table 5.4 presents the detailed items of Chinese- 
GAAP based BTD (based on major differences between Chinese GAAP and Chinese 
income tax laws) and IAS-based BTD (based on major differences between IAS and 
Chinese income tax laws). The specific regulations on an identical transaction 
underlying three sets of systems are detailed for a comprehensive understanding of the 
mechanical causes of China’s BTD.
As shown in Table 5.4, PD, as a major component of BTD, derives from 25 items. 
It is mainly driven by the items of non-deductible expenses and conditionally deductible 
expenses, non-taxable income. The specific regulations such as NOL carryforward, 
consolidation requirement and separate entity’s tax reporting, invoice regulations also 
contribute to PD. Relatively, TD is a minor portion of BTD. The depreciation, 
amortisation of expenses and income recognition are the main causes of TD.
Table 5.4 shows that, before the issuance of CAS in 1997 and new ASBE in 2001, 
Chinese GAAP closely linked with income tax laws in most aspects, such as the 
depreciation method, useful life, residual value, provision for bad debt and cost 
valuation method. After the issuance of CAS and ASBE, these regulations in Chinese 
GAAP are set with more discretion, similar to those in IAS. The close approaching to 
IAS leads to a far departure of Chinese GAAP from income tax regulations and so 
raises a greater BTD (see Figure 5.3). More importantly, more discretion offered by IAS
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and GAAP allows managers to practise prevalent earnings management and tax 
management for different reporting incentives.
Figure 5.3
Relationships between Chinese GAAP, Income tax Laws and IAS
Chinese
GAAP
Income 
Tax Laws
Approaching to IAS, more 
discretion, more prudence
The extended BTD based on IAS and Income Tax Laws
BTD based on GAAP and 
Income tax Laws
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5.5 A Comparison of the U.S. BTD and China’ BTD
As discussed in Chapter 2, most of the existing BTD research is conducted in the 
U.S. where the substantial independence of tax reporting laws from accounting 
principles and sufficient discretion given to managers signifies that BTD can be used to 
test hypotheses about different reporting incentives. To identify the extent to which the 
U.S.-sourced hypotheses may apply to China or to develop specific hypotheses in the 
Chinese context, this section compares the U.S. BTD and China’s BTD in terms of its 
measurement and features in its pattern, direction and composition.
Measurement of BTD
In the U.S. empirical studies, three main measurements of BTD are adopted: 
income-effect BTD, tax-effect BTD and deferred tax expenses (DTE). Income-effect 
BTD is defined as book income less taxable income (as reported on tax return). Tax- 
effect BTD is federal income tax expenses for books (as reported on the tax return 
Schedule M-1) less taxes declared on the tax return (Mills 1998). However, given that 
the tax return is not publicly available and there is limited information contained on the 
tax return (Manzon and Plesko 2002), numerous empirical studies use financial 
statements to infer taxable income or tax payable and then draw BTD. Correspondingly, 
income-effect BTD is book income less the imputed “taxable income” which equals 
current federal tax expense divided by the statutory tax rate. Tax-effect BTD is federal 
income tax expenses for books less income tax payable for books. However, the 
measurement of tax-effect BTD in the U.S. can not identify permanent differences. As a 
result, some studies use DTE as a proxy for BTD (e.g. Phillips et al. 2003, Hanlon 
2005).
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While these measures of BTD are widely used in the U.S. literature, they are not 
adaptable to the Chinese context. First, unlike the U.S., Chinese enterprise’s income 
tax payable is entirely calculated on the basis of separate legal entity reporting. In 
China, different legal entities may apply to different statutory income tax rates due to 
diverse tax incentives as presented in Table 5.2 and 5.3. The income tax payable in a 
consolidated financial statement is equal to the sum of each entity’s income tax 
payable calculated by individual imputed “taxable income” multiplying its applicable tax 
rate. However, the detailed information about each consolidated party’s income tax 
payable and imputed “taxable income” are not readily available. Thus, an estimation of 
taxable income using a ratio of income tax payable to statutory tax rate is biased. This 
bias is serious when multiple tax rates are applied to different subsidiaries in a 
consolidated group.
Second, income-effect BTD only reflects the income consequences due to 
different recognition in income and expenses based on accounting and tax rules, but it 
cannot reflect the tax consequences resulting from tax rate differential. For example, 
when a listed firm shifts income to reduce taxes from a high tax rate subsidiary to a low 
tax rate subsidiary, income-effect BTD cannot capture this tax planning strategy. The 
reason is that tax-induced income-shifting only influences the overall tax payable but 
does not generate book and taxable income gap in a consolidated group. Appendix 3 
further discusses and illustrates how tax-induced income shifting affects the tax-effect 
BTD in a Chinese context.
Third, the U.S. style tax-effect BTD or DTE cannot precisely measure China’s 
BTD since they ignore permanent differences. Unfortunately, permanent differences 
are a main part of China’ BTD as illustrated in Table 5.4. More importantly, this 
omission may lead to the failure in testing of tax-planning hypotheses since many tax 
shelters are asserted to produce permanent differences (Mills et al. 2002). It is
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supposed that the empirical evidence can not be captured in the U.S. literature 
regarding BTD and tax planning is due possibly to the problems with BID 
measurement they used.
Given China’s institutional context, the taxed-effect BTD differing from that in the 
U.S. will be adopted in this study. As indicated in Section 5.3.3, the tax-effect BTD is 
measured by prima facie income tax expense (book income multiply applicable tax rate) 
less income tax payable. It can be collected from the tax notes of B-shares listed firms’ 
English financial statements. More importantly, as discussed in Chapter 4, this 
measure is superior to that usually used in the U.S. BTD literature since it includes both 
permanent differences and timing differences and avoids some of the potential 
measurement error in estimation as argued in Hanlon (2003). This provides an 
empirical possibility to test the theoretical framework of BTD developed in this thesis.
Table 5.4 details the major differences between Chinese income tax laws and 
Chinese GAAP (called Chinese-GAAP-based BTD) and the differences between 
Chinese income tax laws and IAS (called IAS-based BTD). As presented, IAS-based 
BTD is very close to Chinese-GAAP-based BTD. Among 31 major items, only 2 
differences arise between Chinese GAAP and IAS. These are the items of donations 
received (i.e. item 18) and amortisations (i.e. item 27). However, these items do not 
appear to have substantial impact on total BTD due to their small proportions.42 Given 
that Chinese-GAAP-based BTD is unavailable since it is not required to release in B- 
shares firms’ Chinese-version financial reports and A-shares listed firms’ accounting 
reports, this study uses IAS-based BTD as a proxy for Chinese-GAAP-based BTD,
42 Income tax refund (i.e. item 20) hasn’t substantial impact on BTD. On the surface, the regulation of 
income tax refund differs between IAS and Chinese GAAP. The former prescribes that income tax refund 
increases book income but not affects taxable income while the latter prescribes that income tax refund 
reduces tax liability but not affects prima facie book income. Actually, these regulations lead to the same 
amount of BTD in terms o f income-effect and tax-effect BTD.
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assuming the differences between IAS and tax laws approximate to the differences
between Chinese GAAP and tax laws.43
Features of BTD
Three different features of the U.S. and China’s BTD are analysed, including 
pattern, sign and composition of BTD. An growing trend in the U.S. BTD in 1990s was 
reported by the U.S. academic studies (e.g. Manzon and Plesko 2002, Mills et al. 
2002).44 In their studies, a smooth, progressive growth in book income over tax income 
was exhibited, suggesting the growing use of tax shelter activities because a relatively 
small set of institutional and economic variables could be used to explain this increase. 
But so far, no empirical study has been able to support this hypothesis. Plesko (2004) 
extends these studies and reports a dramatic decline and a negative aggregate BTD in 
2001. He interprets the growth in BTD during 1990s as the behaviour of corporation 
approaching to tax planning and the negative aggregate BTD in 2001 as accounting 
conservatism.
Comparatively, the pattern of China’s BTD is more irregular. Using the balanced 
panel data of 76 B-shares listed firms during 1999-2004, Figure 5.4 presents a 
fluctuating pattern in the aggregate BTD (unsealed tax-effect BTD) during the 
observation period.45
43 According to the countries survey provided in GAAP 2001, 62 countries are ranked based on the 
number o f differences between their national GAAP and IAS on 80 accounting measures and disclosure. 
The finding addresses there are only 26 total differences between Chinese GAAP and IAS, implying a 
close conformity to IAS (Street 2002, Huang 2003). Comparatively, the U.S. has 22, Canada has 25 and 
Australia has 28 o f total differences. This study does not assume that Chinese GAAP is completely 
aligned with IAS. It only assumes that Chinese GAAP approximates to IAS in terms o f some regulations 
those distinguish with Chinese income tax laws.
44 They presented that the U.S. aggregate BTD increased from less than $10 billion to over $150 billon 
over the 1991 to 1998 period.
45 The choice o f observation period 1999-2004 is because most B-shares firms did not disclosure their 
English reports before 1998, though the disclosure o f both Chinese and English-version annual financial 
reports on a designated website by April 30 o f the following fiscal year is a requirement set by the CSRC.
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As shown in Figure 5.4, income tax payable (i.e. tax-effect taxable income) 
exhibits a stable growth while prima facie income tax expense (i.e. tax-effect book 
income) shows a fluctuating trend. The amount of income tax payable slightly exceeds 
the amount of prima facie income tax expense in 1999 and 2000. The gap dramatically 
rise in 2001 and 2002 and thereby yielding a large amount of negative BTD. This can 
be attributed to the significant changes in accounting and tax rules. For example, the 
issuance of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) in 2001 provides 
more discretion in accounting choices and hence raises substantial variation in BTD. 
The gap is narrowed remarkably in 2003 and BTD become positive. After 2003, BTD 
turns negative. This may be partly explained by the implementation of the abolishment 
of tax refund policy in 2002 that leads to a reduction in the gap and a large amount of 
tax loss utilised and tax preference occur in 2003 reduce income tax payable as shown 
in Table 5.5.40 However, these institutional factors do not appear to entirely explain the 
fluctuations in BTD. In addition, the economic factors can not justify this variation as 
well because the tax-effect taxable income does not increase (decrease) with the 
growing (depressive) tax-effect book income, suggesting the existence of tax 
management and earnings management.
Figure 5.4
The Aggregate Tax-Effect BTD from 1999-2004 
(With balanced panel data, total 456 firm-year observations)
5.000. 000
4.000. 000
3.000. 000
2.000. 000 
1, 000,000
IS -1,000,000
-c -2,000,000 
-3,000,000
Year
Tax-effect BTD♦ — Prima Facie Income Tax Expense — m — Income Tax Payable
46 As discussed in Chapter 6, the changed regulations may take at least one year to implement and so 
there is a time lag.
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Another critical distinction between the U.S. and China’s BTD is the sign of BTD. 
The U.S. aggregate BTD is generally positive due to the overwhelming effect of rapid 
tax depreciation.47 In contrast, China’s aggregate BTD is generally negative. As shown 
in Figure 5.4, the tax-effect taxable income increases continuously and is mostly higher 
than tax-effect book income, indicating that the Chinese tax laws tend to be more 
creative in terms of the income recognition and more stringent in the expenses 
recognition relative to the Chinese GAAP. For example, an earlier income recognition 
for tax purposes, the amount limitations in salary, advertisement fees, entertainment 
fees, less tax depreciation than book depreciation, more non-deductible items such as 
provision for impairment of assets, expenses without authorised invoice supporting.
Finally, the composition of BTD is quite different from that in the U.S. context. The 
permanent differences are obviously dominated over timing differences. It might be 
explained by more strict restrictions and unreversed policy disparity in China’s income 
tax laws, or more tax sheltering activities. As shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, the pattern 
of BTD is determined by the permanent differences. Detailed items and quantity of 
permanent differences and timing differences are identified as in Table 5.5.
Figure 5.5
The Trend of Aggregate BTD
(With balanced panel data, 456 firm-year observations)
500,000
-500,000
- 1,000,000
\
-1,500,000
-2,000,000
Year
47 Plesko (2004) also reports a negative aggregate U.S. BTD after the event o f 9 .11 in 2001.
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Figure 5.6
The Comparison of Permanent Differences and Timing Differences 
(With balanced panel data, 456 firm-year observations)
Table 5.5 further indicates the quantity of China’s tax-effect BTD and its 
composition from 1999 to 2004. Permanent differences explain about 91% of total BTD 
while timing differences only have a small proportion. Especially, TD only represents 
1.7% of total BTD in 2003. However, in 2004, it contributes to 52.8% of total BTD. 
While there are no specific regulations issued, this growth appears to be doubtful. 
Among permanent differences, the items of “Tax effect of TD not brought to account”, 
“Effect of tax preferential period”, “Non-taxable income and non-deductible expenses” 
have high percentages. Table 5.5 presents that a positive BTD in 2003 mainly due to a 
large amount of tax loss utilised and tax preference (a negative PD). However, the 
fluctuations of other items, such as “the effect of tax rate differential”, “non-deductible 
expenses” and “under-provision in prior year”, remain open.
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5.6 Summary
This chapter analyses the development of China’s BTD in the last 25 years by 
reviewing the structural changes in China’s accounting and tax systems. The 
institutional arrangements as illustrated in Table 5.4 create novel institutional features 
and allow substantial variation in BTD. China’s emerging capital market and unique 
financial reporting requirements provide data availability and empirical opportunity to 
test the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. To identify the extent to which 
U.S.-sourced hypotheses may apply to China, this chapter compares the U.S. and 
China’s BTD in terms of its measurement and features. China’s BTD is more 
complicated than the U.S. BTD. In the U.S., economic and structural factors do not 
adequately explain the excess and smooth growth of positive aggregate BTD. China’s 
aggregate BTD is negative, dominated by permanent differences and with large 
fluctuations during 1999-2004. Accounting and tax reforms in China are partly related 
to these fluctuations. However, possible omitted variables such as those associated 
with management manipulations remain unexplored.
The U.S. literature suggests that pervasive earnings management and tax 
sheltering activities mean that BTD may reflect either aggressive income reporting or 
aggressive tax reporting, additional to any variation in BTD necessarily arising from 
differences in GAAP and tax laws. In China, despite a short history of BTD, unique 
institutional settings produce much greater variation in BTD. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that earnings management is rampant in the emerging capital market (a 
detailed analysis is presented in Chapter 6). Anecdotal evidence indicates tax planning 
is easily undertaken in China, although tax-planning activities have not been 
systematically documented. Indeed, existing problems in China’s current accounting 
and taxation systems, including inadequate monitoring of management discretion, lack
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of independence of accountant and auditors, arbitrariness, complexity and uncertainty 
of tax laws, may provide managers with considerable discretion and opportunities to 
practise prevalent earnings management and tax panning. These circumstances and 
managerial practice may generate enough variation in China’s BTD to test hypotheses 
associated with opportunistic reporting specific to the Chinese context. These are 
developed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER SIX
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Introduction
This chapter develops EM, TM and value relevance hypotheses specific to the 
Chinese context. The theoretical framework in Chapter 4 identifies BTD as a function of 
the divergence between accounting rules and income tax laws, EM and TM. It suggests 
that BTD may be an appropriate measure of EM and TM after controlling for 
accounting-tax misalignment. This information embedded in BTD is expected to be 
useful for investors to assess share values in terms of institutional arrangements and 
earnings quality.
To test this framework, this study first decomposes BTD into normal and 
abnormal components. NBTD refers to the mechanical differences due to accounting- 
tax misalignment while ABTD is a result of managerial manipulations in book and tax 
reporting. This chapter develops some testable hypotheses that firms with strong 
incentives for EM and TM have high levels of ABTD. If these hypotheses are supported, 
it may justifiably conclude that ABTD is indicative of potential EM and TM. 
Correspondingly, the size of ABTD proxy may predict the extent of management 
manipulations. Given that the focus of this study is to test the magnitude (level) of 
manipulations rather than their directions, absolute value of ABTD is applied.48 This
48 Because EM and TM may raise negative or positive book income and taxable income as shown in 
Figure 4 .1, signed ABTD reflects the both directions and size o f manipulations. However, it is hard to 
compare the extent o f manipulations based on signed ABTD. It is argued that using the natural value o f 
ABTD to predict the degree o f management manipulation may be misleading. This is because a firm  with 
positive ABTD does not imply that its extent o f manipulation is larger than that with a negative ABTD. 
For example, firm A inflates its book income 200 yuan and taxable income 100 yuan, leading to 100
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chapter also constitutes the hypothesis that BTD is relevant for equity valuation based 
on market practice in China’s capital markets and the inference in Chapter 4.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 forms tax planning hypotheses 
in terms of the determinants of tax planning. Section 6.3 develops earnings 
management hypotheses based on managerial incentives. Section 6.4 develops the 
value relevance hypothesis of BTD based on an overview of value relevance research 
in China. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Tax Management Hypotheses
To develop the hypotheses with respect to ABTD and tax planning, some specific 
literature is integrated into this section. The U S.-based tax planning literature suggests 
that the significant components affecting tax management include corporate tax rate 
(Klassen and Shackelford 1998, Klassen et at. 1993, Gupta and Mills 2002), non-tax 
costs consideration (Scholes et at. 2002), different tax treatment or jurisdictions 
(Jackson and Milliron 1986, Klassen and Shackelford 1998) and net operating losses 
carryforward (Manzon and Plesko 2002, Erickson et at. 2004). Building on this literature, 
this section develops TM hypotheses with respect to the impact of the determinants of 
tax management on ABTD in a Chinese context.
6.2.1 Tax Burden and Tax-Rate Differences
Higher corporate tax rate (tax burden) implies lower post-tax performance and 
less competitive advantage because income tax negatively affects a firm’s post-tax 
returns and cash inflows. As a result, firms always attempt to achieve tax burden as
ABTD. Firm B reduces its book income 400 yuan and its taxable income 200 yuan, thereby yielding -200 
ABTD. In this case, the degree o f manipulation for firm B is larger than firm A. however, a completely 
different conclusion w ill be drawn when we compare firms’ ABTD based on the number o f 100 and -200.
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low as possible. The U.S.-based studies have demonstrated that firms respond to the 
state corporate income tax (e.g. Petroni and Shackelford 1999, Scholes et al. 2002) 
including the variation in tax regulations, tax bases and deductions (e.g. Klassen and 
Shackelford 1998, Klassen et al. 1993, Gupta and Mills 2002, Hofmann 2002). Firms’ 
responses include the inter-period and inter-firms income shifting, change of 
accounting methods, choice of organisational form and firm location, indicating that 
corporate tax rate is an important determinant of tax planning.
A major feature of China’s corporate income tax is a varying tax burden across 
industries and firms. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the applicable income tax rate 
(ATR) for Chinese listed firms ranges from 0% to 33%, depending on the status of the 
business, the established location and the kind of business activity. This is because 
China’s tax regime provides generous tax incentives to stimulate economic 
development. However, these tax-rate differences also stimulate firms with higher tax 
rates to take an aggressive tax position. Chan and Mo (2000) investigate whether tax- 
rate differentials affect corporate tax avoidance behaviour in China. They find that firms 
with a high tax rate are less compliant, leading to high tax audit adjustments.49 Thus, it 
is hypothesised that a higher applicable tax rate creates incentives for firms to engage 
in tax planning, resulting in a larger ABTD.50
H1: There is a positive association between ABTD and applicable tax rate.
6.2.2 Non-Tax Costs Consideration and Different Tax Treatment
Non-tax costs consideration is a significant factor in tax planning because most 
tax-reducing strategies decrease financial earnings. However, what firms pursue is the
49 Chan and Mo (2000) use tax audit adjustments as a measure o f tax non-compliance without 
differentiating tax avoidance and evasion. Thus, tax planning is partly responsible for high tax audit 
adjustments.
50 The applicable tax rate used in this hypothesis refers to the tax rate applied to listed firms per se rather 
than the tax rate applied to its subsidiaries.
126
maximisation of post-tax return rather than minimisation of tax liability only (Scholes et 
al. 2002).
Based on non-tax costs consideration, a well-designed shelter could well reduce 
taxes but not diminish income reported to investors. To achieve this, a firm might 
choose tax planning strategies such as arranging some types of income, transaction, or 
situations that are tax-exempted, shifting income from consolidated parties with a high 
tax bracket to those with a low tax bracket.
Some studies have demonstrated that, if firms have different tax treatment across 
affiliates, across time, across economic activities, they are more likely to engage in tax 
planning, especially for income shifting tax strategy. For example, Wilson (1995) 
indicates that “tax planning opportunities increase as companies operate in more 
countries, enter new markets, have more cross-state transactions, receive more 
preferential tax treatment, or change legal structures because of mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures, dispositions or restructurings.” Klassen and Shackelford 
(1998) develop an income-shifting model within different jurisdictions based on a 
simple premise, where total tax revenue collected by a state or a province is proposed 
to be a linear function of income tax rates in the absence of income shifting. By 
examining aggregated American state and Canadian provincial data from 1983-1991, 
they find that corporate income tax revenue is a concave function of corporate income 
tax rates, consistent with firms shifting their tax-base income to more favourable taxed 
jurisdictions.
Mills et al. (1998) argue that inter-jurisdictional income shifting can create 
significant tax savings because the variation in tax rates across tax jurisdictions can 
make firms strategically arrange operations, capital and product flows in a manner to
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shift income from a high tax bracket to a low tax bracket. In contrast, firms that operate 
in one tax jurisdiction do not have this opportunity to pursue these potential tax 
strategies. Consistently, Gupta and Mills (2002) find that corporations doing business in 
multiple states (regions) with different tax treatment have more incentives and 
opportunities for tax planning. More importantly, Jacob (1996) documents that large 
differences in tax rates between intra-firms provide greater possibility for transfer 
pricing.
Taken together, non-tax costs consideration makes firms favour the strategies 
those reduce taxes without affecting reported income, such as income-shifting among 
affiliates. More importantly, obtaining diverse tax rates provides an opportunity and 
makes this strategy possible.
In China, the institutional setting provides opportunities and incentives for within- 
jurisdiction income shifting tax strategies. First, Chinese companies with affiliates in 
different regions and industries are commonly subject to multiple tax rates. This makes 
income shifting among subsidiaries easier and cheaper than cross-jurisdiction shifting 
is for multinationals.
Second, Chinese tax laws prescribe a compulsory use of separate legal entity tax 
reporting, in contrast to the consolidated accounting requirements in IAS and Chinese 
GAAP.51 Thus, consolidated groups can reduce their total tax burden by shifting 
income among affiliates without affecting aggregate reported book income. Mantzke 
(2001) finds that the use of separate entity reporting is negatively associated with 
corporate state income taxes, indicating that separate entity reporting can be exploited 
to reduce overall tax burden.
51 See Table 5.4.
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Third, high concentration on ownership makes an income shifting tax strategy 
feasible and less costly. As discussed in Chapter 5, most Chinese listed firms were 
transformed from SOE. The local government remains a majority ownership of the 
Chinese listed firms. The direct control causes the related party transaction in a group 
is easily undertaken in China than elsewhere (Jian and Wong 2003). Using a sample 
of 131 Chinese listed firms in the basic materials industries, Jian and Wong (2003) find 
that firms controlled by a corporate group engage in more related party transactions 
than firms those are not. They report abnormally high levels of related party sales, 
mainly to the controlling shareholders and other member firms in the group.
Therefore, like keiretsu companies in Japan (Grämlich ei al. 2004), China’s listed 
firms have strong incentives to save overall taxes by shifting income from affiliates with 
a high tax rate or tax disincentives to those with a low tax rate or tax incentives, 
presumably by using non-market value transferring prices. This tax planning strategy is 
easily undertaken especially when diverse tax treatment exists in a consolidated group. 
Thus, it is hypothesised that firms with more tax rates are more likely to engage in tax- 
induced income shifting, thereby giving rise to larger ABTD.
H2: There is a positive association between ABTD and number of tax rates.
In China, tax holidays are one of typical tax preference. When a separate entity 
has tax holidays, it is less likely to avoid tax. However, tax-rate differences arising from 
tax holidays will stimulate tax-induced income-shifting within a consolidating group to 
maximise the benefit of tax holidays. Therefore, it is predicted that firms with a 
consolidated affiliate in tax holidays have higher ABTD.
H3: Firms with a consolidated party in tax holidays have larger ABTD than do 
their counterparts.
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6.2.3 Tax Loss Utilised (NOL Carryforward)
Net operating loss (tax loss) and NOL carryforward (tax loss utilised) are two 
different concepts in the countries that allow tax losses to be carried forward. A firm 
with a tax loss means it has negative taxable income (or its total expenses are more 
than total income for taxation purposes).52 A firm with tax loss utilised implies that it has 
a positive taxable income but it can claim tax exemption from prior tax loss reserves.
Tax loss utilised is a benefit offered by government (tax offices) to reduce a firm’s 
investment and operation risks and increase its survival ability. A firm with tax loss 
utilised can gain interests from tax exemption in response to part or entire of authorised 
previous loss, implying that the increasing taxable income in the year of tax loss utilised 
does not raise the parallel growth in income tax payment.53 Some literature suggests 
that tax loss utilised (NOL carryforward) can be used to avoid paying taxes in response 
to the increasing income (Manzon and Plesko 2002, Erickson et al. 2004). In addition, 
tax loss utilised has time value due to the existence of capital cost. The sooner tax loss 
is utilised, the greater return of tax loss recoupment a firm gets.
Consequently, listed firms with tax loss utilised have strong incentive to shift other 
consolidated parties’ income into their account to reduce total tax burden or to shift 
income from the future periods to the current period in order to get a higher return of 
tax loss recoupment.
52 A business can incur a loss for tax purposes but a profit for accounting purposes. Hence, a tax loss is 
distinguished from an accounting loss.
52 Unlike the U.S, Chinese tax laws disallow tax loss be carried back but allow tax loss be carried forward 
in the following five years. The amount o f tax loss utilised depends on the evaluation from tax authorities 
instead o f the net operating loss represented in financial reports. The approved tax loss is not publicly 
available but tax loss utilised is observable. Tax loss utilised indicates the amount o f tax loss carried 
forward in current year based on an approved tax loss reserve.
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H4: Firms with tax loss utilised have larger ABTD than do firms without tax loss 
utilised.
6.3 Earnings Management Hypotheses
Earnings management incentives, such as accounting-based contracts and 
market expectations, typically presented in much of the Western literature, are 
relatively weak in the Chinese context (Aharony et al. 2000, Cai et al. 2003).54 Instead, 
the primary incentives for EM in China are mainly subject to meeting regulatory 
requirements and the interests of local governments and parent-State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE), as elaborated below. This section attempts to develop the earnings 
management hypotheses based on these specific incentives.
6.3.1 Seasoned Equity Offering Incentives
The seasoned equity offering (SEO) research in the developed countries 
demonstrates that SEO-issuing firms report income-increasing discretionary accruals 
around the time of equity offerings (e.g. Teoh et al. 1998, Marquardt and Wiedman 
2004). Similarly, a growing body of literature in China (mostly in Chinese) shows that 
listed firms inflate earnings to meet the threshold for getting the eligibility of SEO. This 
can be explained by Chinese listed firms’ heavy reliance on equity financing (e.g. Yan 
et al. 2001, Huang and Zhang 2001, Liu et al. 2004), insufficient initial public offering 
(IPO) quota offered by government (Aharony et al. 2000) and the high threshold of 
SEO set by the CSRC (Chen 1998, Chen et al. 2000).
Contrary to the pecking order theory in the U.S. where debt financing is superior 
to equity financing, the Chinese listed firms have strong propensity and reliance on
54 See Cai et al. (2003) for a comprehensive discussion.
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equity financing (e.g. Yan et al. 2001, Liu et al. 2004, Huang and Zhang 2001). This 
can be explained by several factors:
(1) Equity financing has relatively lower cost than debt financing in China. For 
instance, the average unit cost of equity financing is about 2.42%. In contrast, the 
annual bank loan interest rate is 5.85% for one year, 5.94% for three years, and 6.03% 
for five years. The annual interest rate of corporate bond is 3.78% for three years and 
4.032% for five years (Huang and Zhang 2001);
(2) Equity financing has less pressure in fixed return time and less risk in 
bankruptcy. The listed firms are allowed more flexibility in capital application as the 
capital raised by debt financing is usually specified;
(3) Debt financing market in China is neither well developed nor efficient. The 
high threshold set by the CSRC, the complicated and opaque approving procedure 
increase its difficulty and constraints (Liu and Lu 2003);
(4) The investors lack interests in bonds due to its poor credibility (Su 2003).
As a result, being listed implies holding a right to access equity financing to raise 
capital at a low cost in China. However, the competition is fierce since the approval of 
listing not only relies on the firm’s performance, but also relies on annual IPO quota 
and the government’s balance of the interests among different industries and 
geographic regions.55 For example, in 1993, the quota for B-shares was 800 million 
shares. There were hundreds of SOE applicants but only 24 B-shares IPO were 
approved (Aharony et al. 2000). Due to many firms competing for the limited IPO quota, 
the local governments usually allocate these shares to as many firms as possible, 
making the quota assigned to each firm too small to meet its capital needs. Thus, firms 
endeavor to issue additional shares by SEO to reach a higher level of capitalization to 
meet their operating requirements after IPO.
55 A major listing requirement by the CSRC for IPO is at least two consecutive years o f operating profit. 
B-shares and H-shares firms are also required to generate enough foreign exchange income for the 
purpose o f dividend payment in the future.
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Yan et at. (2001) examine a sample of 143 A-shares listed firms that satisfy the 
threshold of issue rights from 1998 to 2000. They find that only 10% listed firms forgo 
the application of rights issues, reflecting a strong propensity of equity refinancing. To 
curb the excessive rights offering, the CSRC modifies a strict threshold for SEO (see 
Table 6.1 and 6.2).
Table 6.1
The Regulations on Rights Issuing by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
Date o f Issuance and 
Documents
Profit and ROE Requirements Number Limitation on New 
Shares
Nov. 17,1993 
C S R C  |1993|128
Two year’s profits 30% o f existing shares
Sep. 30, 1994 
C S R C |1994 |131
three-year average ROE >  10%56 No change
Jan. 24,1996  
C S R C | 1996| 17
ROE >  10% in each o f previous three 
years57
30% o f existing shares, 
excluding shares issued as stock 
dividends
M a r . 17,1999 
C S R C l 1999] 12
three-year average ROE> 10%58, and 
ROE >  6% in each o f previous three years
No change
M a r . 15, 2001 
C S R C |2001 |43
three-year average ROE >  6% No change
Source: http://www.csrc.com.cn
Table 6.2
The Regulations on Public Offering by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
Date o f Issuance and Documents Profit and ROE Requirements
Feb. 24,1998 (B-shares) 
C S R C l 1998|5
three-year concessive profits
M a r . 15, 2001 
C S R C |2001 |43
three-year average R O E  > 6 %
Source: http://www.csrc.com.cn
56 I f  establishment is less than three years, it can use the actual fiscal year.
57 For firms in the energy, raw materials, and infrastructure sectors, ROE should not be below 9% in each 
o f the previous years.
58 For firms in the energy, raw materials, and infrastructure, agriculture, and high-tech sectors, the 
average ROE should not be below 9% in each o f the previous years.
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As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, return of equity (ROE) is an important threshold 
set by the CSRC to gain the rights of SEO. To meet this threshold, China’s listed firms 
have strong incentive for managing their earnings. For example, Chen (1998) indicates 
that firms with ROE slightly above 10 percent have unusual increases in accounts 
receivable. By examining the frequency distribution of ROE around the rights offering 
threshold (i.e. 10% ROE), Haw et al. (1998b) and Chen et al. (2000) find that firms with 
ROE in the range of 10 to 11 percent have unusually high discretionary items, such as 
abnormal accruals and non-core profits. Consistently, Jian and Wong (2003) provide 
evidence that China’s listed firms use recurring related party transactions to manage 
operating earnings in order to meet government requirements of new equity offerings.
Thus, it is hypothesised that potential seasoned-equity-offering issuing firms face 
an immediate incentive to improve profitability to get the eligibility of SEO.
H5: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms issuing seasoned equity 
offering in the next year is larger than that for their counterparts.
6.3.2 Avoid Delisting and Trading Restrictions Incentives
While numerous literature has shown that avoiding loss is a strong stimuli for 
earnings management (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), China’s listed firms exhibit 
an even stronger motivation to report positive earnings because of the CSRC’s 
delisting and trading restrictions regulations.
In order to protect minority shareholders and to encourage better corporate 
governance, the CSRC issued the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in 1998, in which 
listed firms with two successive years of loss or with net asset per share less than face 
value of the security would be specially treated on the stock exchanges. The Special
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Treatment means that the stocks are traded with a ± 5% price change limit each day 
versus ±10% for normal stocks. The special treatment firms’ midterm reports must be 
audited. If Special Treatment firms continue to suffer a loss for one more year, they will 
be classified as the “particular transfer” (PT) firms. The price increases in a particular 
transfer firm cannot be more than 5% for any trading days to prevent insider 
manipulation. However, the price of a particular transfer share is allowed to fall without 
limit. The particular transfer shares can only be traded on Fridays. As well, the 
particular transfer firms will be de-listed if they cannot become profitable within one 
year, meaning they will lose the ability to raise capital from the stock market.59 For the 
controlling shareholders and other insiders, being a Particular Transfer firm and being 
de-listed afterwards implies losing private control benefits and future rent-seeking 
opportunities.
As a result, firms are keen to avoid reporting book losses (Chen et al. 2003, Haw 
et al. 1998b and Jian and Wong 2003). Lu (1999) investigates how loss firms 
manipulate earnings and finds that loss firms exhibit substantially increasing 
discretionary accruals before and after the first loss-making year to avoid loss and 
Special Treatment. In contrast, firms report decreasing discretionary accruals in the 
year of first loss, consistent with the literature of taking a big bath.
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that, in attempts to avoid Special Treatment or 
delisting, firms in the first loss year are likely to take a big bath while firms with a 
preceding year loss or with two consecutive losses have strong incentives for boosting 
earnings to avoid consecutive losses, thereby giving rise to larger ABTD. It gives:
59 PT regulation took into effect from 1999 and voided in 2001. New regulation shows that firms with 
consecutive three-year losses should be suspended until it becomes profitable and be delisted i f  it shows a 
loss in the first midterm reports in the fourth year.(see http://www.csrs.com.cn) . After December 2001, 
firms with three concessive losses w ill be delisted directly.
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H6a: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with the first loss at year t 
is larger than that for other firms.
H6b: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with the preceding loss at 
year t-1 is larger than that for other firms.
H6c: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with two consecutive 
losses at year t-2 and t-1 is larger than that for other firms.
6.3.3 Local Government and Parent-Stated-Owned-Enterprise Incentives
A major characteristic of the Chinese capital markets is that share ownership is 
highly concentrated in the hands of the governments. The local governments owned 
about 85% of A-shares listed companies during 1993 to 2000 (Chen et al. 2003). For 
B-shares firms, 80 out of 110 B-shares firms’ first shareholder is State (CSRC 2005). 
As indicated in Chapter 5, essentially most listed firms are transformed from stated- 
owned-enterprises (SOE). SOE still remains a close personnel and economic links with 
listed firms after their IPO. These factors lead to the local government and the parent- 
SOE exert a large extent of control over and intervention in the Chinese listed firms.
From the perspectives of the local government, it desires to attract more 
investment to develop the local economy, increase employment opportunities and 
create much regional revenue. This is because the performance of a local economy 
directly affects the political future of the head of local government. Holding as more 
listed firms as possible in its jurisdiction implies more advantages for economic 
development. Therefore, the local government actively assists listed firms in boosting 
their earnings for meeting the threshold of SEO or avoiding delisting by providing them 
with fiscal transfers (Chen et al. 2003).60 The evidence shows that 21% SEO-issuing
60 Fiscal transfers include fiscal subsidies and tax rebates. See Chen et al. (2003) for a more explanation.
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firms are unqualified before receiving fiscal transfers and 96% firms with slight loss 
become profitable after getting fiscal transfers.
From the perspective of top management, due to most of them being appointed 
by the local government and their parent-SOE rather than shareholder committees, 
their tenure and promotion heavily rely on their performance as perceived by the local 
government. Therefore, managers are keen to satisfy and please the largest 
shareholder, but seldom consider minority shareholders’ interests (DeFond et al. 2000, 
Aharony et al. 2000). By examining firms with the CSRC allegations of accounting 
manipulation during 1994 to 2002, Liu and Du (2003) demonstrate that firms whose 
largest shareholder is State are more likely to manage earnings. It gives:
H7: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms whose largest shareholder 
is State is larger than other firms.
6.4 Value Relevance Hypothesis
Most market-based value-relevance literature is conducted in a mature market, 
such as the U.S. To develop the testable hypothesis concerning the value relevance of 
BTD in a Chinese setting, whether the inference built on the literature in a mature 
market can apply to China’s emerging capital market appears to be an important issue. 
This section reviews the value relevance research in China in terms of the value 
relevance of accounting information and remained concern, followed with a hypothesis 
development.
6.4.1 Overview of Value Relevance Research in China
Despite the young age of the market, an immature accounting environment, 
insufficient supporting infrastructure and the perception that investors are irrational and
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unsophisticated, considerable literature has documented that accounting information is 
value relevant in China’s stock market. Based on a sample of all A-shares listed firms 
in the period from 1990 to 1997, Chen et al. (2001) indicate that both earnings and 
book value based on the Chinese GAAP are value-relevant in the A-shares market 
under the price and return model. Eccher and Healy (2000) find that earnings and 
accruals based on the Chinese GAAP and IAS are highly correlated with stock returns 
for both A-shares and B-shares firms. Further, Bao and Chow (1999) demonstrate that 
earnings and book value reported based on IAS have greater information content than 
those based on the Chinese GAAP. Sami and Haiyan (2004) provide evidence that the 
information in the B-shares market is more value relevant than that in the A-shares 
market due to dual reporting and auditing systems (Chapter 5 presents a detailed 
explanation about dual reporting and auditing systems).
Using a sample of 1516 A-shares firm-years for 1995-1998, Haw et al. (2001) 
investigate the relative and incremental information content of earnings, operating cash 
flows and accruals. They find that earnings have greater persistence and predictability 
than operating cash flows. Accruals have more information content over operating cash 
flows, consistent with the literature as in the mature markets. Though discretionary 
accruals provide incremental information beyond that contained in the nondiscretionary 
accruals and operating cash flows, they are priced similarly. They interpret this finding 
as evidence that Chinese investors being functionally fixate on earnings. Zhao and 
Wang (1999) also find that the market only reacts mechanically to the nominal earnings 
per share, but can not realise the economic implications of permanent earnings in EPS, 
implying that there is a “functional fixation” in China’s stock markets.
Following Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997), Zhou 
(2004) investigates the usefulness of fundamental information in firm valuation and
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future earnings prediction for China’s A-shares listed companies. Building on the notion 
of predictive and valuation links in the U.S literature, he finds that some accounting 
indicators of earnings quality, such as accounting receivable, provision for bad debt 
and operating cash flow have incremental explanatory power to stock returns and 
future earnings, consistent with prior fundamental analysis literature in the U.S.
While the value relevance of accounting information in the Chinese capital 
markets has been evidenced, the reliability and quality of earnings information have 
been questioned due to rampant managerial manipulations (Haw et al. 1998a, Abdel- 
khalik et al. 1999, Aharony et al. 2000, Eccher and Healy 2000, Shen 2001, Chen et al. 
2003) and increasing accounting scandals (e.g. YingGuangXia, Sanjiu Medical & 
Pharmaceutical and QiongMingYuan).
Like the developed capital markets (e.g. the U.S.), the value relevance of 
accounting information has been impaired and weakened by managerial manipulations. 
A recent study by Sami and Haiyan (2004) finds that the value relevance of accounting 
information for B-shares market has decreased since 1998. Comparatively, the level of 
value relevance in the A-shares market decreased from 1996 to 2000. In particular, the 
usefulness of earnings has significantly deteriorated over time. Although accounting 
information has been documented to be relevant for share pricing in China’s capital 
markets, the low quality of accounting information has threatened the implications of 
value relevance research for the market practice.
Taken together, though China’s capital market has a short history and unique 
context, it practises in a similar way to that in the mature markets. In some settings, the 
value relevance literature drawn from the U.S. can apply to the Chinese context.
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6.4.2 Hypothesis Development
As discussed in Chapter 4, BTD is a product of accounting-tax misalignment, tax 
management and earnings management. Building on the prediction and valuation links, 
BTD is expected to be useful for investors to assess share values because it contains 
both policy-related and quality-related information those have implications for the 
market’s estimation of firms’ future performance. The policy-related information in 
NBTD about different income reporting requirements for book and tax purposes may 
identify some transitory earnings components, thereby aiding the prediction of firms’ 
future tax-related cash flows and future earnings. In particular, the quality-related 
information in ABTD about managerial manipulations may address the levels of noise 
in reported earnings and cash flows (e.g. an overstatement or understatement), 
thereby aiding investors and analysts to precisely evaluate firms’ performance and 
estimate future earnings. It is hypothesised that this predictive information embedded in 
BTD is reflected in the contemporaneous stock prices.
H8: BTD is informative for equity valuation because it reflects the information 
about the differences between GAAP and tax laws, earnings management and tax 
management those have implications for the market’s estimation of firms’ future 
performance.
6.5 Summary
To test the theoretical framework established in this thesis, this chapter integrates 
specific literature associated with the determinants of and managerial incentives for tax 
management and earnings management into China’s market practice. By utilising the 
observable tax and earnings management incentives for the Chinese listed firms, this
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chapter develops some testable hypotheses from a Chinese context, in which ABTD is 
predicted to be positively associated with opportunistic reporting incentives and so 
signifies the managerial manipulations. This chapter also constitutes a hypothesis 
about the value relevance of BTD based on the review of value relevance literature in 
China and the inference made in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RESEARCH DESIGN
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research method, model design and variables 
measurement used for testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 6. It specifies the 
data sources and presents the sample selection procedures and data description.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 deals with empirical 
models design and variables measurement. A linear cross-sectional BTD model is 
developed to identify normal and abnormal BTD. NBTD is estimated by regressing 
reported BTD on investment in fixed and intangible assets, changes in revenue and 
changes in tax loss position. It is measured by using the estimated coefficients in the 
fitted equation based on the combination of year and industry portfolios. ABTD is 
estimated as the residual from the model. A naive prediction model is introduced to 
benchmark the performance of the main model.
To examine whether BTD can signal earnings management and tax planning, a 
multiple regression model is formulated, in which the observable incentives for tax 
management and earnings management are used to explain the variation in ABTD. 
This section also discusses the usefulness of the earnings regression model and the 
return model in testing the value relevance of BTD. Section 7.3 identifies data sources, 
sample selection and presents descriptive statistics for the sample.
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7.2 Empirical Design
The cross-sectional and naive models for estimating normal and abnormal BTD 
are described followed with the formulation of a multiple regression model for testing 
the association between ABTD and EM and TM incentives. The one-year-ahead 
earnings regression model and return model are developed to test the value relevance 
of BTD in the Chinese emerging capital market.
7.2.1 Estimation of Abnormal BTD 
A Linear Cross-Sectional Model for Estimating ABTD
As discussed in Chapter 4, NBTD is a product of accounting-tax misalignment 
and may be influenced by four components:
(1) The level of NBTD varies with the changes of economic factors. The increases 
in revenue may result in a negative NBTD arising from of the different recognition in 
expenses. For example, the increasing revenue will raise a large number of bad debts 
deriving from high account receivables. It may also cause more advertisement fees or 
entertainment fees. These expenses can be determined based on managerial 
discretion but are conditionally deductible under the Chinese tax laws (See Table 5.4 
for some detailed regulations).
(2) The levels of investment in fixed and intangible assets will affect NBTD. For 
example, a large amount investment in fixed and intangible assets responds to a high 
deferred tax expense due to the large calculation base of depreciation and amortisation, 
even if financial rules and tax rules are unchanging.61 Also, the magnitude of
61 Manzon and Plesko (2002) provide a comprehensive analysis as to factors affecting BTD. However, 
unlike the U.S., depreciable lives for tax purpose in China are usually longer than those for accounting 
purpose. Thus, taxable income is higher than book income in the early years o f an asset’s life and lower in 
the later years o f an asset’ s life. Assume that in a firm, the depreciable (amortisable) lives for tax purpose 
and accounting purpose are constant, more PPE (intangible assets), more deferred tax expenses occur. 
T his leads to a higher taxable income than book income.
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investment in fixed and intangible assets affects permanent differences because of a 
large calculation base of provisions for impairment of fixed and intangibles assets. The 
permanent differences arise because provision for these items is non-deductible under 
the Chinese tax laws despite it being able to be charged in the account under the 
accounting standard. This gives rise to a higher taxable income compared to book 
income. Therefore, investment in fixed and intangible assets may be negatively 
associated with NBTD.
(3) The changes in GAAP and tax laws from period to period. For example, a new 
issued regulation for deductible expenses in GAAP or/and tax laws in specific year will 
affect NBTD.
(4) Tax loss initiation (or NOL) and tax loss utilisation (or NOL carryforward) will 
raise the variation in NBTD because of different recognition in accounting and tax rules. 
NBTD will be understated when tax loss occurs and overstated when it is utilised.62 To 
avoid the “noise” arising from tax losses, prior studies in tax research usually drop the 
observations with NOL from the sample (e g. Klassen et at. 1993, Wilkie and Limberg 
1993, Gupta and Newberry 1997). However, this removal results in a small sample size 
and limits the generalisability of findings.
Based on above discussion, NBTD varies overtime rather than being constant. It 
is subject to the investment in fixed and intangible assets, changes in revenue, tax loss 
position and policy changes. To estimate NBTD, this study develops a cross-sectional 
expectations model for total BTD to control for the impacts of these factors on NBTD 
(See equation 7.1 below). The ABTD can be determined by deducting the NBTD from 
the total BTD.
62 See Wilkie, P. J. (1992) for a detailed discussion. Also see Appendix 4 for an illustration o f the tax loss 
effects on BTD based on the Chinese tax laws.
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Following the spirit in Jones (1991), the variables of investment and changes in 
revenue are used to control for the effect of changes in the economic circumstances on 
NBTD. The values of tax loss initiation and utilisation are included to control for tax loss 
position effects. To control for the structural changes, the cross-sectional estimation is 
applied. The model is presented as follows:
BTDu = ßQ + ßlINVu+ ß 2AREVu+ß3NOLu+ß4TLUlt+ell (7.1)
Where:
BTDn: Reported BTD for firm i in year t, deflated by total assets;
INVn: The sum of gross property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, proxies 
for investment scale, deflated by total assets;
AREVit : Changes in revenue from year t-1 to year t, proxies for economic growth, 
deflated by total assets;
NOLu: The value of accounting loss, proxies for tax loss, deflated by total assets;63 
TLUlt: Reported tax loss utilised for firm i in year t, deflated by total assets;64 
t : The estimation period;
: The error term in year t for firm i.
All variables are scaled by total assets for year t to control for firm size.65 As 
discussed in this section, a positive relationship between BTD and TLU H and a
negative relationship between BTD and INVft AREVtl and NOLit are predicted.
63 In China, the value o f tax loss is calculated by tax office and reflected in a tax clearance form which is 
not publicly available. It can’t be estimated or measured from the annual reports. Here, NOL can be used 
to proxy for tax loss to capture the effect o f initiation o f tax loss on BTD is because tax laws treat taxable 
income and tax loss asymmetrically. When a firm has a tax loss no matter how much the value is, its 
taxable income is always treated as zero, leading to its tax payable is zero. However, the size o f tax 
expenses is based on the value o f NOL and its applicable tax rate. As a result, the value o f NOL 
determines how much BTD is under-evaluated in the initiation o f tax loss (also see Appendix 4 for a 
detailed illustration).
64 Tax-loss utilised is available in B-shares English financial reports, which indicates the amount o f firms’ 
recoupment o f previous tax loss in the current year. Using variables o f NOL and TLU can reflect the 
impact o f NOL in the year o f initiation and reserve on BTD. For firms without NOL or TLU, this study 
denotes that figure as zero.
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NBTD is defined as the fitted value from equation (7.1):
NBTDU = f t  + ßJNV„ + ß i^ E K , + P3NOLu + ß JL U u (7.2)
Where / is the event period, the firm-specific parameters ofß0,A,  f t . A  and
f t  are estimated separately for the combination of year and industry portfolios. Each
yearly NBTD is obtained from the previous year estimation assuming no ABTD in the 
last period.
Assuming that ABTD is orthogonal to NBTD, it is estimated as the residual from a 
regression of total BTD on factors explaining NBTD. From equation (7.2), ABTD is 
estimated as:
ABTD„ -  BTDU - ( f t  + ßxINVu + ß2AREVit + ß,NOLlt + ß J L U lt) (7.3)
The cross-sectional estimation is more appropriate than time-series estimation in 
this study because:
(1) it avoids the survivorship bias and weak representativeness due to long-period 
data demands of time-series approach, e.g. time-series approach requires at least 10- 
years data (McNichols 2000, Subramanyam 1996);
(2) it avoids the assumption made in time-series estimation that the parameters 
are stable across years and hence avoids model misspecification due to the structural 
changes occurring during a long estimation period;
(3) because the parameters are re-estimated each year, this approach can 
capture the effects of specific-year changes in GAAP and tax laws on expected BTD, 
assuming they take at least one year to implement.
65 Large firms are more likely have large amounts o f investment, less change in revenue and a lesser 
possibility o f the presence o f NOL.
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Because NBTD and ABTD are assumed to be orthogonal, the estimation error in 
one variable will bias the other. By controlling for the factors attributable to NBTD, e.g. 
economic circumstances, investment, tax loss position and changes in accounting and 
tax policies, the noise in ABTD is reduced and the unexplained portion (ABTD) is more 
likely to be explained by discretionary (opportunistic) factors.
A Naive Prediction Model for Estimating ABTD
To benchmark the performance of the cross-sectional regression model, a naive 
difference prediction model is used. ABTD is estimated as the difference between the 
reported BTD in the current year and the reported BTD in the preceding year. All BTD 
variables are scaled by total assets to control for scale effects.
ABTD, = BTD, -  BTD,_X (7.4)
7.2.2 Model for Testing the Association between ABTD and EM and TM 
Incentives
To test the usefulness of ABTD in indicating managerial manipulations, Chapter 6 
develops seven testable hypotheses where firms with strong incentives for TM and EM 
are expected to have high levels of ABTD.
To test H1-7, a multiple regression model is employed where ABTD is regressed 
on a set of variables that proxy for various tax management and earnings management 
incentives. The model is presented as follows:
ABTD = ß0 + ßxATR + ß2Number + ß^TAXH + ß J L U  + ß5SEON + ß6SOE + ßnLOSS 
+ß,LOSS 1 + ß9LOSS2 + ßX0Y2001 + 0, ,72002 + ßnY2003 + s
(7.5)
Where:
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ABTD: Absolute value of ABTD;66
ATR: Applicable tax rate for the sample listed firm;
Number: The number of different applicable tax rates in a consolidated entity;
TAXH: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has a member 
company with a tax holiday, and 0 otherwise;
TLU: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has tax-loss utilised, 
and 0 otherwise;
SEON: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has rights issuing or 
public offering in the next year, and 0 otherwise;
SOE: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity whose largest 
shareholder is the State, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in current year 
t but not in year t-1, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS1: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in year t-1 not 
in year t-2, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS2: Dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has losses in both 
year t-1 and year t-2, and 0 otherwise;
Y2001: Dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2001, and 0 otherwise;
Y2002: Dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2002, and 0 otherwise;
Y2003: Dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2003, and 0 otherwise.
The variables of ATR, Number, TAX and TLU are used to test the hypotheses of
tax management (i.e. H1-4) while the variables of SEON, SOE, LOSS, LOSS1 and 
LOSS2 are used to test the hypotheses about earnings management (i.e. H5-7). As 
discussed in Chapter 6, H1-7 predict significantly positive coefficients on a ,-a 9. The 
year dummies are included to control for time effects on ABTD.
66 See Chapter 6 for a justifieation o f using absolute value o f ABTD.
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7.2.3 Models for Testing the Value Relevance of BTD
Prior literature utilises various methods to test the value relevance of accounting 
variables. Most existing studies use stock price or stock returns as an external 
benchmark to measure value-relevance in accounting variables. Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) demonstrate that the accounting variables’ 
association with stock returns can be explained by their abilities to predict future 
earnings. If a variable is informative for evaluating firms’ performance and estimating 
future earnings and this information can be reflected in stock returns, it is value 
relevant. Following Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997), 
this study investigates the value relevance of BTD by incorporating the prediction and 
valuation links. This chapter firstly tests the predictive link by examining whether BTD is 
informative for future earnings, and then tests the valuation link by investigating the 
association between BTD and stock returns.
The One-Year-Ahead Earnings Regression Model
This study uses the one-year-ahead earnings regression model to examine the 
predictive ability of BTD with respect to the next year’s earnings. The equation is 
designed as follows:
EPS,+l = ß0 + ßxEPS, + ß2BTD, + e,+I (7.6)
Where:
EPSl+]: Earnings per share in year t+1, scaled by stock price on April 30 following the 
end of fiscal year t-1;67
67 The Chinese listed firms are required to release their annual reports by April 30 following the fiscal 
year-end. To assure that the stock price reflects the market reaction to the publication o f the annual 
financial reports, price on April 30 following the fiscal year-end is used.
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EPS':  Earnings per share in year t, scaled by stock price on April 30 following the end 
of fiscal year t-1;
BTDt : Book-tax differences in year t, deflated by total assets.
The current year’s earnings is expected to be positively associated with future 
earnings as in prior literature (e.g. Sloan 1996, Fama and French 2000, Hanlon 2005). 
In addition, if BTD identifies the “transitory component” of current earnings and reflects 
a low earnings quality due to management manipulation, large BTD implies that the 
current earnings are largely transitory and less persistent. One can observe a reversal 
of earnings in the subsequent period. As a result, future earnings are expected to be 
negatively associated with BTD.
The Return Model
Because the return model is subject to less serious heteroscedasticity and fewer 
misspecification problems than the price and differenced-price models (e g. Landsman 
and Magliolo 1988, Kothari and Zimmerman 1995), a return model is used to test the 
valuation link between firm value and BTD.68
Unlike some event studies that examine the stock prices reaction over short 
windows around the announcement date, most value-relevance literature performs 
association studies that investigate whether the accounting numbers of interest explain 
prices or returns over long windows (Holthausen and Watts 2001). This is because the 
accounting system recognises events later than security prices do. A regression of 
returns accumulated over a short window around the announcement of financial reports
f’8 Price models are subject to coefficient bias induced by correlated omitted variables, cross-sectional 
differences in valuation parameters and the size-disparity problems (See Kothari 2001, Kothariand 
Zimmerman 1995). Some researchers advocate that the return model is theoretically superior to the price 
model, especially in the absence o f well-developed theories o f valuation (Gonedes and Dopuch 1974).
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might understate the usefulness of accounting numbers. On the other hand, earnings 
announcements may be largely, but not entirely, pre-empted by the disclosure of other 
information (Ball and Brown 1968, Beaver 1968). Furthermore, private information 
search and prior information disclosure can pre-empt the earnings announcement, this 
leads to less or no market reaction at the announcement date. Hence, this study uses 
an association methodology involving annual returns window to assess the ability of 
BTD to explain relative changes in stock returns over the year as in much of literature.
Following a typical annual return model developed by Easton and Harris (1991), 
the raw return is regressed on the earnings levels, earnings changes and BTD.69 
Market value of equity in year t-1 is used as a deflator for EPS and AEPS to reduce 
heteroscedasticity as it includes the market’s expectations for growth and inflation. 
Total assets are used as a deflating basis to control for the firm size effect on BTD.
RET, = ß0 + ß[EPS, + ß2AEPS, + ß.BTD, + e, (7.7)
Where:
RET, : The return on a share of firm i over the 12-months ending on April 30 following 
the end of fiscal year t.70
EPS, : Earnings per share for firm i in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30
following the end of fiscal year t-1;
AEPS, : The annual change in earnings per share between year t and year t-1, deflated 
by stock price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t-1;
BTD, : Book-tax differences in year t, deflated by total assets.
69 Easton and Harris (1991) demonstrate that earnings level is a relevant explanatory variable for returns. 
Including both earnings level and earnings changes variables can mitigate the measurement error in 
regression estimates o f the coefficients concerning unexpected earnings and unexpected returns.
70 Because Chinese listed firms are required to release their annual reports by April 30 following the fiscal 
year-end. The cumulative stock returns over the four months subsequent to fiscal year-end are 
incorporated to assure that the stock price reflects the market reaction to the publication o f the annual 
financial reports.
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If large BTD is informative for poor future earnings, there appears to be a 
negative association between BTD and stock returns.
Since much of literature employs the unexpected return model to test the value 
relevance (Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, Abarbanell and Bushee 1997), this study also 
uses a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) model as a robustness check to evaluate 
whether BTD is an explanatory variable for unexpected return. The cumulative 
abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the market return from the stock returns 
monthly over the 12 months, ending on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t. The 
CAR model is estimated as follows:
CARt = a 0 + a lEPSl + a 2AEPSt + a2BTDl +e, (7.8)
Where:
CARt : The cumulative abnormal return on a share of firm i, calculated monthly over 
the 12 months, ending on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t;
EPS, : Earnings per share for firm i in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30 
following the end of fiscal year t-1;
AEPSt \ The annual change in earnings per share between year t and year t-1, deflated 
by stock price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t-1;
BTD,: Book-tax differences in year t, deflated by total assets.
To calculate the abnormal return for each firm, three approaches are commonly 
used: mean-adjusted return model, market-adjusted return model and a market model 
(Brown and Warner 1980).
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In a mean-adjusted return model, market-wide factors and risks are not taken into 
account explicitly. The expected return is equal to a constant, estimated by averaging a 
series of returns for the estimation period.
AR„ = Rit -  (7.9)
In a market-adjusted return model, the expected return is equal to the market 
return for that period and constant across securities but not across time.
= (7.10)
In a market model, the expected return is estimated from a linear regression of 
stock returns on market returns for the estimation period. The unexpected return is the 
residual from the market model:
Ru = a l + p lRml+eu (7.11)
ARll(ell) = Ri l - ( a l +ß iRml) (7.12)
Where:
AR„ : The abnormal return on security i for year t;
R„ : The actual return on security i for year t;
Rml: The market return for year t;
Ri : The average actual return on security i for estimation period.
Dyckman et al. (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) compare these three 
models and find that their abilities to detect the abnormal return are similar. Following 
most empirical studies pertaining to the Chinese capital markets (e.g. He and He 2001, 
Han 2004), this study use a market-adjusted return model to estimate unexpected 
return. Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Indices for year t are 
expected as market returns for yeart. Thus, in equation (7.10),
Rml = {Index, -  lndex,_x) / lndex,_x (7.13)
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(7.14)^ i t  ~  i ^ i , t  P i , t - \ )  I  P i , t - \
7.3 Data Collection
This section explains data requirements and describes data sources, sample 
selection criteria and analyses sample characteristics.
7.3.1 Data Sources
The empirical analyses in this study require accounting data and stock market 
data. The BTD and accounting data were primarily hand-collected from China’s B- 
shares listed firms’ English-version financial statements and their tax notes. 71 The 
sources of annual financial reports include the Chinese official websites of 
www.cninfo.com.cn and www.sse.com.cn. which are designated by the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for information disclosure of listed 
companies, and electronic copies or hardcopies provided by the Chinese listed firms 
upon request.
The market data (i.e. stock prices and Stock Exchange Composite Indices) were 
taken from the DataStream Database. The information about rights issues, public 
offering and the largest shareholder used to test earnings management hypotheses 
was hand-collected from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Books or the 
CSRC official websites, such as www.cninfo.com.cn and www.sse.com.cn. The 
information about applicable tax rate, number of tax rates and tax holidays used to test 
tax management hypotheses was abstracted from tax notes in B-shares firms’ both 
Chinese- and English-version financial statements. In the event of difference in 
interpretation between two versions, Chinese version prevails.
71 The information o f BTD is not readily available on any computerized database.
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7.3.2 Sample Selection
Because only B-shares firms are required to disclose the information of BTD in 
their English-version annual financial statements, the population in this study is the 
Chinese B-shares firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
for the period from 1999 to 2004.72
Firm inclusion is determined by the following criteria: (1) it has released BTD 
information in its annual reports; (2) it has a minimum of three consecutive years of 
data; and (3) it is not subject to special accounting and tax rules that apply to the 
agriculture, mining, wholesale & retailer and construction industries.
Table 7.1
Sample Selection Criteria
Selection C rite ria 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Tota l
Tota l number o f  B-shares firm s 108 114 112 111 110 109 664
Less:
M iss ing  data 16 8 4 4 7 13 52
Firm s w ithou t 3 -yr consecutive data 1 1 1 1 1 0 5
Firm s in agriculture, m in ing, 
construction, wholesale &  reta iler 
industries
4 6 6 6 6 5 33
Final Sample 87 99 101 100 96 91 574
The total sample of all B-shares firm-year observations from 1999 to 2004 is 664. 
After applying the above criteria, as shown in Table 7.1, the final firm-year observation 
set is reduced to 574.
72 The short observation period o f 1999-2004 is because the disclosure regulation issued by the CSRC has 
not been implemented efficiently. Although the CSRC requires that B-shares firms must release both 
Chinese and English-version annual financial reports on a designated website by April 30 o f the following 
fiscal year, most B-shares firms did not disclose their English reports before 1998.
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Table 7.2 shows the industry profile of the sample firms in each year. 
Approximately 70% observations are in manufacturing industry. In non-manufacturing 
industry, except for the industries of transport and real estate, the average 
observations in other industries are less than six during observation periods.
Table 7.2
Industry Distribution
Industrial sector Number o f sample companies
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 total %
Manufacturing: 62 69 69 68 66 65 399 69.5
Food, beverage 3 4 4 4 4 3 22 3.8
Textile, clothing, leather, fibre 10 10 10 9 10 10 59 10.3
Paper, printing 3 n 3 3 q 3 18 3.1
Petroleum, Chemical products 4 4 4 4 3 3 22 3.8
Electrical Equipment 13 13 13 13 13 12 78 13.6
Metal, non-metal Mineral
Products
6 7 7 7 7 7 41 7.2
Machinery, Equipment, Meter 20 23 23 23 22 22 133 23.2
Medicine, Biological Products 2 4 4 4 3 3 20 3.5
Other Manufacturing 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1.0
Non-manufacturing: 25 30 32 32 30 26 175 30.5
Transport, Storage 6 8 8 8 7 6 43 7.5
Real estate 6 7 7 7 7 6 40 7.0
Social services (i.e. tourism) 4 5 6 6 6 5 32 5.6
Utilities 4 4 4 4 4 3 23 4.0
Conglomerates 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.9
IT 3 3 4 4 3 3 20 3.5
Transmission &  Culture (i.e. 
media)
1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1.0
Total 87 99 101 100 96 91 574 100.
Table 7.3 reports the industry profile of the omitted sample under the criteria (1) 
and (2). Overall, the percentage distribution in manufacturing and non-manufacturing is 
61.4% versa 38.6%, similar to the sample distribution of 69.5% versa 30.5% as shown
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in Table 7.2. Some specific industries, such as food, textile manufacturing, transport 
and conglomerates in non-manufacturing, are under-represented in the final sample. 
The possible consequences are unknown. Because of the small number of cases in 
most sub-categories, the aggregated manufacturing and non-manufacturing portfolios 
will be used to control for industry effects in the empirical tests. This is elaborated in 
Chapter 8.2.1.
Table 7.3
Industry Distribution of Omitting Data Based on Criteria (1) and (2)
Industrial sector Number o f sample companies
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 total %
Manufacturing 10 4 3 3 6 9 35 61.4
Food, beverage 3 1 1 0 0 2 7 12.3
Textile, clothing, leather, fibre 1 1 1 3 2 2 10 17.5
Paper, printing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum, Chemical products 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.8
Electrical Equipment 1 2 1 0 1 1 6 10.5
Metal, non-metal Mineral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Product
Machinery, Equipment, Meter 2 0 0 0 1 1 4 7.0
Medicine, Biological Products 2 0 0 0 2 2 6 10.5
Other Manufacturing 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.8
Non-manufacturing: 7 5 2 2 2 4 22 38.6
Transport, Storage 2 1 1 1 1 1 7 12.3
Real estate 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 3.5
Social services (i.e. tourism) 2 1 0 0 0 1 4 7.0
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.8
Conglomerates 1 2 1 1 0 0 5 8.8
IT 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 5.2
Transmission &  Culture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(i.e. media)
Total 17 9 5 5 8 13 57 100.
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7.3.3. Data Analysis
Table 7.4 provides descriptive statistics for firm characteristics of the sample. The 
mean (median) of BTD is -8 (-1) million yuan, suggesting that tax-effect book income is 
less than tax-effect tax income on average. There appears a wide dispersion in firm 
size, such as total assets, equity and revenue. The means (medians) of total assets 
and equity are 3006 (2019) and 1284 (877) million yuan, respectively. With a large 
standard deviation of 2654 and a wide range of 26558 million yuan, revenue exhibits a 
high degree of dispersion. This suggests the scale effect (i.e. total assets, equity and 
revenue) may be taken into account in the cross-sectional analysis. Given that the 
variation in BTD is partly affected by size effect, a scaled BTD is applied in later 
empirical tests in Chapters 8 and 9. To determine the appropriate basis for deflating by 
size, Table 7.4 reports basic statistics for three scaled BTD on a basis of total assets, 
equity and revenue, respectively. The bi-variate correlation tests show that BTD scaled 
by total assets is most closely associated with the raw BTD, which is significantly 
correlated at 0.84 as compared with 0.17 and 0.25 for BTD scaled by equity and 
revenue. Therefore, total assets measure is chosen as a deflating basis to control for 
size effect in this study.
Table 7.4
Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median M in im um M axim um Sample
B T D  (m illio n  yuan) -8 67 -1 -1125 667 574
Tota l Assets (m illio n  yuan) 3006 3167 2019 148 24151 574
E qu ity  (m illio n  yuan) 1284 1410 877 -2406 8165 574
Net Income (m illio n  yuan) 76 343 39 -3411 2570 574
Revenue (m illio n  yuan) 1865 2654 915 0 26558 574
ARevenue (m illio n  yuan) 398 1105 130 -3350 12852 573
Earnings Per Share (yuan) 0.10 0.60 0.12 -7.29 3.73 574
Book Value Per Share (yuan) 2.32 1.76 2.16 -7.93 8.40 574
Return o f  Assets (% ) -0.01 0.31 0.02 -3.66 0.99 574
Return o f  Equity (% ) 0.04 1.17 0.06 -7.96 22.29 573
B T D  scaled by total assets (% ) -0.008 0.065 -0.001 -1.19 0.33 574
B T D  scaled by equity (% ) -0.007 0.218 -0.001 -2.42 3.3 574
B T D  scaled by revenue (% ) -0.051 0.586 -0.001 -12.08 0.75 573
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Figure 7.1 depicts the annual frequency histograms of BTD from the 
corresponding observations from 1999-2004. The histograms show that the sample 
data are not normally distributed. The distributions of BTD are negatively skewed in 
1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004 but positively skewed in 2000 and 2003. Year 2002 
appears to be the most skewed and has the highest kurtosis (see statistical data). Such 
skewness in the sample distribution may result in problems with violations of the 
assumptions of the regression model (e.g. homoscedasticity). To remedy the non­
normality, a number of data transformations are suggested, such as taking the square 
root, logarithms, or even the inverse of the variables (Hair et al. 1998).73 However, 
given that BTD variable takes on positive or negative values, the logarithm and square 
root can not be used. As a result, the original form of BTD is used in the subsequent 
regressions.
As shown in Figure 7.1, some extreme variables are responsible for the non­
normality, especially for Year 2002 and 2003. To examine the potential data errors and 
influential impacts of extreme values on OLS, this study also performs an outlier 
analysis before regression running. Because outlying observations may arise from (1) 
errors in measurement and errors in acquisition; and (2) one or several extreme values 
from the population which have a considerable influence on the results of an analysis, 
the handling of outlying observations is an important task in data pre-processing 
(Wooldridge 2003). This study identifies outliers by plotting the distribution of the 
sample as shown in Figure 7.1 and comparing minimums and maximums, and then 
rechecks whether there is a mistake has been made in data entering. The examination 
shows that there appear no errors in measurement and in acquisition.
77 Hair et al. (1998) suggest that data transformations provide the principle means o f correcting non­
normality and heteroscedasticity. Usually negatively skewed distributions are best transformed by 
employing a square root transformation, whereas the logarithm typically works best on positive skewness 
(P77).
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Figure 7.1
Histograms of BTD Distribution in 1999-2004
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The investigated outliers are not the same companies in different years. More 
importantly, the extreme values of these observations provide important information for 
the subsequent empirical analysis. For example, the outliers in 2002, Jinan Qingqi 
Motorcycle Co., Ltd and Wuxi Little Swan Co., Ltd present extreme values of BTD 
because they experience a big jump in their losses from -816 and -17 million yuan in 
2001 to -3412 and -676 million yuan in 2002. However, in 2003, they get a big reverse 
with a profit of 667 and 54 million yuan, respectively. The similar circumstances also 
occur in the outliers of Shenzhen China Bicycle Co., Ltd in 2001 and Hainan Airline Co., 
Ltd (non-manufacturing) in 2003 and Shanghai Kai Kai Industrial Co., Ltd. in 2004. This 
information is meaningful and has implications for testing the opportunistic book and 
tax reporting. Thus, the outliers should be retained to ensure generalisability to the
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entire population.
To further determine whether deleting or retaining these observations in a 
regression analysis, this study also re-estimates the multiple regression by excluding 
the suspected outliers, as suggested by Wooldridge (2003). Using the OLS in equation 
7.1, the removing of these observations does not lead to a substantial influence on the 
initial estimates in terms of coefficient size and significance level. Consequently, no 
outliers are excluded.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ABTD AND EM AND TM
INCENTIVES
8.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of testing the association between ABTD and 
the incentives for managerial manipulations and provides evidence that ABTD is 
indicative of EM and TM. Section 8.2 estimates normal and abnormal components in 
total BTD using both the cross-sectional regressions model and the naive difference 
model. Section 8.3 addresses the empirical findings that ABTD is mostly positively 
associated with the incentives and opportunities for management manipulations. The 
results support the claim that ABTD is a useful proxy for EM and TM and its magnitude 
may indicate the extent of aggressive book and tax reporting. Section 8.4 concludes.
8.2 Estimating Abnormal BTD
This section identifies the estimated normal and abnormal components of 
reported BTD using the cross-sectional BTD regressions (Equation 7.3) and a naive 
difference model (Equation 7.4).
8.2.1 Estimation from the Cross-Sectional BTD Regressions
Table 8.1 reports descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation coefficients 
among variables in the BTD model. The mean (median) of scaled investment in fixed 
and intangible assets is 0.509 (0.456), suggesting that approximate 50% total assets
163
are fixed and intangible assets for the sample. The means of net operating loss and tax 
loss utilised are about 5.3% and 0.1% of total assets. In the firm-year observations, 
approximate 34% of firm-years have net operating loss while about 29% of firm-years 
have tax loss utilised. Panel B reports univariate correlations. BTD has a significantly 
negative association with investment in fixed and intangible assets and net operating 
loss while the correlations between BTD and tax loss utilised are significantly positive, 
consistent with prior prediction in Chapter 7. BTD is positively correlated with Changes 
in revenue. Changes in revenue and investment in fixed and intangible assets are 
negatively correlated at only -0.001, indicating a high investment is not necessarily 
associated with a growth of revenue.
Because the BTD model requires the first-difference data for the changes in 
revenue, the sample size is reduced from 483 to 436 firm-year observations during 
1999 to 2003. As reported in Table 7.2, approximate 70% observations are in the 
manufacturing industry. The average observations in other industries are less than six 
during observation periods except for those in transport and real estate industries. This 
may lead to the bias on estimated coefficients because the statistical tests are 
performed with a small sample in each industrial portfolio or some industries with small 
observations are removed.74 To avoid this potential bias, the sample is split into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing instead of a more detailed classification. The 
regressions are estimated based on each year and the industry portfolios of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing.
74A substantial amount o f estimation error may arise when residual covariance matrices were estimated 
using only three to six observations per parameter (see Lipe 1986, Bernard 1987).
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Table 8.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Variables for BTD model
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
BTD -0.009 -0.001 0.073 -1.194 0.328
Investment 0.509 0.456 0.288 0.018 2.148
Changes in Revenue 0.055 0.062 0.453 -7.744 1.897
Net Operation Loss 0.053 0 0.328 0 3.660
Tax Loss Utilised 0.001 0 0.016 0 0.328
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Book-Tax
Differences
(BTD)
Investment in 
Fixed and 
Intangible Assets 
(IN V)
Changes in 
Revenue 
(AREV)
Net Operation 
Loss 
(NOL)
Investment in Fixed and -0.119
Intangible Assets (0.007)
(INV)
Changes in Revenue 0.057 -0.001
(AREV) (0.006) (0.359)
Net Operation Loss -0.888 0.139 -0.084
(NOL) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Tax Loss Utilised 0.222 0.010 0.022 -0.010
(TLU) (0.000) (0.416) (0.400) (0.416)
Note:
(1) The sample consists o f 436 firm-years for 1999-2003. The figure in parentheses is the p-value using 
one-tailed test.
(2) Variables definitions:
BTD: reported book-tax differences in year t. 1NV: the sum o f gross property, plant and equipment and 
intangible assets in year t, and proxies for investment growth. AREV: changes in revenues from year t-1 
to year t, proxies for economic growth. NOL: the value o f accounting loss, proxies for tax loss. TLU: 
reported tax loss utilised for firm in year t. A ll variables are deflated by total assets.
Table 8.2 shows estimated coefficients and goodness of fit of the cross-sectional 
BTD regressions. The F-statistics and adjusted R2s for yearly regressions suggest that 
the overall model is a good fit and explains most of the variation in BTD. The
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explanatory power of regressions in 2001, 2002 and 2003 is much higher than that in 
1999 and 2000, especially for non-manufacturing regressions. This may be due to (1) 
the data sets in 1999 and 2000 have more missing data (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3). This 
appears to be more remarkable for non-manufacturing sample; and (2) the issuance of 
new Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) in 2001 which creates a 
substantial variation in BTD.75 Assuming the effect of a new issued regulation may last 
one to two years, the apparent drop-off of adjusted R2s in 2003 supports the “change in 
regulation” story. This is also tested by estimating regression for 2004 although it is not 
used in later estimations of NBTD/ABTD. The adjusted R2s in 2004 for manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing regressions are weaker than those in 2003, consistent with that 
it is the trend driven by the diminishing effect of regulation changes.
Collinearity tests, such as the variance-inflation factors and the condition indices 
are applied. This is because multicollinearity is not only determined by inter­
correlations among the independent variables but also by the variance of the 
independent variables, the Pearson correlation coefficient may not validly detect the 
impact of mutlicollinearity (Maddala 1992). The variance-inflation factors are all less 
than 2 and the maximum condition index is 3.9 for the yearly regressions, suggesting 
that the multicollinearity does not influence the statistical results.76
75 As discussed in Chapter 5, ASBE, as one o f the most important accounting standards in China, 
provides more discretion in accounting choices, e.g., depreciation methods, estimate useful lives and net 
residual values o f fixed assets, the use o f historical cost or market value measures, determine the amount 
o f provision for impairment o f inventory, fixed and intangible assets, short-term and long-term 
investments, designated loans receivable, bad debt receivable, construction in progress. It makes Chinese 
GAAP highly align with IAS and leads to high amounts o f BTD.
76 Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that the critical values for severe collinearity for condition 
index is over 30, for V1F is 10. It is generally accepted that condition indices below 15 are consistent with 
little or no multicollinearity.
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Table 8.2
Estimated Coefficients from Cross-Sectional BTD Regressions for Manufacturing and
Non-Manufacturing Portfolios
BTD„ =p„ + A INVU + p2AREV„ + p,NOL„ + p,TLU„ + (Equal|on ? |)
Coefficients 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Intercept ( ß0 ) 
Manufacturing 0.007** -0.003 -0.004 0.029*** -0.013
(0.04) (0.30) (0.37) (0.00) (0.25)
Non-Manufacturing -0.003 0.0001 -0.012* -0.002 -0.008*
(0.32) (0.97) (0.07) (0-13) (0.06)
INV(A)
Manufacturing -0.015*** 0.008 0.009 -0.028** 0.029
Non-manufacturing
(0.00)
0.010
(0.13)
0.001
(0.30)
0.013*
(0.02)
0.004
(0.21)
0.012
(0.18) (0-75) (0.08) (0.27) (0.16)
AREV ( ß2) 
Manufacturing 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.146*** -0.003
(0.82) (0.75) (0.82) (0.00) (0.70)
Non-manufacturing 0.004 -0.010 0.013 -0.002*** -0.0002
(0.90) (0.34) (0.42) (0.00) (0.93)
N O L ( f t )
Manufacturing -0.146*** -0.173*** -0.153*** -0.316*** -0.244***
Non-manufacturing (0.00)-0.179**
(0.00)
-0.245***
(0.00)
-0.110***
(0.00)
-0.169***
(0.00)
-0.271***
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TLU ( A )
Manufacturing 0.375 0.193 0.214 3.392* 0.993***
(0.89) (0.82) (0.89) (0.08) (0.00)
Non-manufacturing 1.175 -2.94 22.84 0.344 0.706
(0.44) (0.76) (0.39) (0.68) (0.17)
Adjusted R2 
Manufacturing 82.89% 80.60% 95.57% 97.55% 89.51%
Non-manufacturing 31.14% 33.25% 92.41% 91.55% 80.62%
F-statistic
Manufacturing 48.46 64.34 367.46 657.77 137.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-manufacturing 2.696 3.989 89.285 84.916 30.11
(0.09) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations:
Manufacturing 41 62 69 67 65
Non-manufacturing 16 25 30 32 29
Note:
*,**, and ***denote the significance of two-tailed tests at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. Figures in 
parentheses denote the p-values for T-statistics and for F-statistics. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
p-values are adjusted by White’s method.
BTD: reported book-tax differences for firm j in year t. INV: the sum of gross property, plant and 
equipment and intangible assets in year t, and proxies for investment growth. AREV: changes in revenue 
from year t-1 to year t, proxies for economic growth. NOL: the value of accounting loss, proxies for tax 
loss. TLU: reported tax loss utilised for firm in year t. All variables are deflated by total assets.
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As shown in Table 8.2, the estimated coefficients for net operating loss are all 
significantly negative, consistent with the expectation that net operating loss reduces 
BTD as discussed in Chapter 7. The coefficients for tax loss utilised are significantly 
positive in 2002 and 2003 for manufacturing industry. The estimated coefficients for 
investment are negative for manufacturing in 1999 and 2002 but positive for non- 
manufacturing in 2001. The coefficients for changes in revenue are significantly 
negative when they are statistically significant.
Some coefficients are not statistically significant in some years possibly because 
a small sample is used in yearly regressions (e.g. 16-32 observations per regression 
for the non-manufacturing sample). To test this potential problem, this study also 
estimates a pooled regression with 436 firm-years, 304 for manufacturing and 132 for 
non-manufacturing (Appendix 5). The result shows that the coefficients for these four 
explanatory variables are significantly different from zero, suggesting that they are all 
contributors of the model fit. The insignificance of the individual coefficients in yearly 
regressions is partly attributed to a small sample.
Table 8.3 reports descriptive statistics for absolute values of ABTD estimated 
from the coefficients using the previous year data for industry portfolios. Table 8.3 
displays the descriptive statistics of ABTD for manufacturing group in Panel A and for 
non-manufacturing group in Panel B. The distributions of ABTD for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing are more skewed in 2003 than other years. Overall, ABTD for 
manufacturing is more varying than that for non-manufacturing. ABTD for the two 
portfolios peaks in 2003 with a mean of 0.033 and 0.025, suggesting that a large 
magnitude of manipulation occurs in that year. This may be partly attributed to the 
abolishment of tax refunds in 2002 which immediately increases firms’ tax burden and 
hence stimulates the tax sheltering activities. Figure 8.1 shows the industry-based
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distributions of ABTD for each year, suggesting year effects should be taken into 
account in any pooled analyses.
Table 8.3
Descriptive Statistics of ABTD Estimated from the Cross-Sectional BTD Regressions 
Panel A: Manufacturing Croup________ ______________________ __________ _______
M ean Std. Dev. M edian M inim um M axim um Sam ple
A B T D 00 0.0064 0 .0070 0.0038 0.0001 0.0363 62
A BTD 01 0.0090 0.0174 0 .0039 0.0001 0.1108 69
A B T D 02 0.0161 0.0787 0 .0038 0.0001 0 .6466 67
A B T D 03 0.0331 0.0965 0.0136 0.0002 0.7753 65
A B T D 04 0.0087 0 .0086 0.0063 0.0001 0.0458 65
A verage 0.0147 0.0416 0.0063 0.0001 0.3229 65
M ean Std. Dev. M edian M inim um M axim um Sam ple
A B T D 00 0.0044 0.0042 0 .0028 0.0000 0.0154 25
A BTD 01 0.0156 0.0538 0.0039 0 .0002 0.2977 30
A B T D 02 0.0146 0.0253 0.0073 0.0003 0.1261 32
A B T D 03 0.0253 0.0800 0.0032 0.0002 0.4299 30
A B T D 04 0.0071 0.0096 0 .0039 0.0003 0.0413 26
A verage 0 .0134 0.0346 0 .0042 0.0002 0.1821 29
Figure 8.1
The Industry-Based Distributions of ABTD Estimated from the Cross-Sectional BTD
Regressions for 2000-2004
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8.2.2 Estimation from a Naive Difference Model
A naive difference model to estimate ABTD is used to benchmark the 
performance of the regression model. Using equation 7.4, ABTD is estimated as the 
differences between the current year’s reported BTD and the previous year’s reported 
BTD. The BTD variables are all scaled by total assets to control for firm size.
Table 8.4 presents descriptive statistics of absolute values of naive ABTD for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups for 2000-2004. Figure 8.2 depicts the 
industry-based distributions of ABTD from a naive prediction model. The distributions 
of ABTD in Figure 8.2 are similar to those from the regression based, except for 
estimated ABTD for non-manufacturing in 2003.
Table 8.4
Descriptive Statistics of ABTD Estimated from the Naive Difference Model 
Panel A: Manufacturing Group________ ____________ _______________________ _____
Mean Std. Dev. M edian M in im um M axim um Sample
A B T D 0 0 0.0079 0.0107 0.0000 0.0025 0.0508 62
A B T D 01 0.0237 0.0821 0.0000 0.0025 0.5393 69
A B T D 0 2 0.0353 0.1502 0.0001 0.0050 1.1155 67
A B T D 0 3 0.0394 0.1949 0.0000 0.0031 1.5216 65
A B T D 0 4 0.0155 0.0457 0.0001 0.0038 0.3259 65
Average 0.0244 0.0967 0.0001 0.0034 0.7106 65
Panel B: Non-Manufacturing Group
Mean Std. Dev. M in im u m M edian M ax im um Sample
A B T D 0 0 0.0068 0.0077 0.0039 0.0002 0.0328 25
A B T D 01 0.0175 0.0454 0.0038 0.0000 0.2401 30
A B T D 0 2 0.0142 0.0285 0.0056 0.0000 0.1349 32
A B T D 0 3 0.0167 0.0308 0.0071 0.0002 0.1288 30
A B T D 0 4 0.0109 0.0191 0.0035 0.0001 0.0827 26
Average 0.0132 0.0263 0.0048 0.0001 0.1239 29
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Figure 8.2
The Industry-Based Distributions of ABTD Estimated from a Naive Difference Model for
2000-2004
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8.3 Testing the Association between ABTD and EM and TM Incentives
This section presents empirical results for the tests of Hypotheses 1-7 developed 
in Chapter 6 where firms with strong incentives for EM and TM are expected to have 
high levels of ABTD.
H1: There is a positive association between ABTD and applicable tax rate.
H2: There is a positive association between ABTD and number of tax rates.
H3: Firms with a consolidated party in tax holidays have larger ABTD than do 
their counterparts.
H4: Firms with tax loss utilised have larger ABTD than do firms without tax loss 
utilised.
H5: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms issuing seasoned equity 
offering in the next year is larger than that for their counterparts.
H6a: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with the first loss at year t 
is larger than that for other firms.
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H6b: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with the preceding loss at 
year t-1 is larger than that for other firms.
H6c: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms with two consecutive 
losses at year t-2 and t-1 is larger than that for other firms.
H7: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of ABTD for firms whose largest shareholder 
is State is larger than other firms.
Overall, the statistical outcomes show that ABTD is positively related to the most 
incentives for managerial manipulations, interpreting this as evidence that ABTD being 
an appropriate proxy for EM and TM. The Hypotheses are supported except for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 (Hypotheses 2 and 5) for manufacturing (non-manufacturing).
8.3.1 Empirical Analysis
Because the values of ABTD were estimated separately for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing companies using different regressions, they have seemingly 
different scales. To avoid the bias due to the different measures, this study runs the 
multiple regressions separately for each group rather than simply pooling them into one 
regression. Panel A of Table 8.5 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the regression analysis for testing Hypotheses 1-7. For 
the manufacturing sample, the mean of applicable tax rate is 19.62%. The minimum 
applicable tax rate is 0% and the maximum is 33%. The mean and the maximum of 
Number of tax rates for sample firms are 2.61 and 10. Comparatively, the non­
manufacturing companies have average 20% applicable tax rate, a minimum 
applicable tax rate of 7.5% and a maximum of 33%. The mean and maximum of 
Number of tax rates for sample firms are 2.42 and 5. Approximately, 55% of 
manufacturing and 46% of non-manufacturing firm-year observations obtain tax
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holiidays, indicating that manufacturing entities obtain more tax preference and different 
tax treatment, leading to their average tax burden is lower than non-manufacturing 
entiities. The percentages of firms with the first loss at year t (Loss) and firms with the 
preceding loss at t-1 (Lossl) (11% and 14%) in non-manufacturing are higher than that 
in manufacturing (7% and 9%). This may be due partly to non-manufacturing industry 
has relative weak profitability or a less extent of earnings management than 
mainufacturing industry. Overall, there are 44 observations with tax loss utilised. About 
97%d of firm-years are controlled by stated-owned enterprises (SOE). But only 3% firm- 
years made a seasoned equity offering in next year. The mean of ABTD is 2% of total 
assets for manufacturing and 1% of total assets for non-manufacturing firms, 
suggesting that manufacturing industry may have more managerial manipulations than 
non-manufacturing industry. The two-tailed p-value for paired-sample t-test is 0.008, 
indiicating there is a significant difference in ABTD between these two sub-samples.
Panel B of Table 8.5 reports correlations between variables. The variables of 
applicable tax rate, tax loss utilised and LOSS2 are significantly positively correlated 
with ABTD while variables of number of tax rates and tax holidays are significantly 
negatively correlated with ABTD in manufacturing sample. Overall, low correlations 
among the independent variables are reported, except for the high correlation 
coefficients of 0.58 and 0.62 between tax holidays and Number of tax rates for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sample, respectively. This may be interpreted as 
a group with more tax rates (i.e. more subsidiaries in a group) being likely to have a 
subsidiary with a tax holiday. Because tax holidays are dichotomous, this correlation is 
not expected to cause multicollinearity in linear regressions.
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Table 8.5
Descriptive Statistics for ABTD Regression
Panel A: Description of Variables
Manufacturing Sample (N=263 firm-year observations):
M ean Std. Dev. M inim um M edian M axim um
A B T D 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.78
A T R 19.62 8.33 0.00 15.00 33 .00
N U M B E R 2.61 1.41 1.00 2.00 10.00
T A X H 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
TLU 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
SEO N 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00
SO E 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 1.00
LO SS 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00
LOSS1 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
LO SS2 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00
Non-manufacturing Sample (N=l 16 firm-year observations):
M ean Std. Dev. M inim um M edian M axim um
A B T D 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.30
A T R 20.00 8.52 7.50 15.00 33 .00
N U M B E R 2.42 1.09 1.00 2.00 5.00
T A X H 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
TLU 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
SEO N 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00
SOE 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 1.00
LO SS 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
LOSS1 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00
LO SS2 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Manufacturing Sample (N=263 firm-year observations):
A B T D A T R N um ber TA X H TLU SEO N SO E LO SS LOSS1
A T R
0.16
(0 .01)
N U M B E R
-0.09
(0 .07)
-0 .16
(0 .01)
TA X H
-0.11
(0 .04)
-0.1
(0 .05)
0.58
(0 .00)
TLU
0.13
(0 .01)
-0.07
(0 .14)
0.07
(0 .13)
-0.07
(0 .12)
SEO N
-0.01
(0 .43)
-0.03
(0 .30)
0.21
(0 .00)
0.07
(0 .13)
0.07
(0 .12)
SOE
0.03
(0 .29)
-0.02
(0 .38)
-0.04
(0 .27)
-0.06
(0 .15)
-0.03
(0 .34)
-0.06
(0 .16)
LOSS
-0.03
(0 .31)
0.04
(0 .28)
-0.04
(0 .27)
-0.01
(0 .41)
-0.01
(0 .43)
-0.05
(0 .21)
0 .06
(0 .15)
LOSS1
0.00
(0 .47)
0.04
(0 .24)
-0.02
(0 .35)
-0.01
(0 .46)
-0.03
(0 .29)
-0.06
(0 .18)
0.01
(0 .43)
-0.04
(0 .27)
LO SS2
0.32
(0 .00)
0.04
(0 .25)
0.03
(0 .32)
0.03
(0 .33)
0.16
(0 .00)
-0.05
(0 .21)
0.07
(0 .15)
-0.08
(0 .10)
-0 .09
(0 .07)
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Table 8.5 (Continued)
Non-Manufacturing Sample (N=l 16 firm-year observations):
ABTD ATR Number TAXH TLU SEON SOE LOSS LOSS1
ATR
-0.01
(0.44)
NUMBER
0.02
(0.40)
-0.29
(0.00)
TAXH
0.03
(0.36)
-0.20
(0.01)
0.62
(0.00)
TLU
0.05
(0.31)
0.02
(0.40)
-0.04
(0.34)
-0.05
(0.29)
SEON
-0.04
(0.35)
-0.10
(0.15)
-0.01
(0.44)
-0.04
(0.33)
-0.06
(0.27)
SOE
0.06
(0.27)
0.14
(0.07)
-0.14
(0.06)
-0.11 
(0.12)
0.07
(0.24)
0.03
(0.37)
LOSS
0.20
(0.01)
0.02
(0.40)
-0.04
(0.34)
-0.11
(0.13)
-0.13
(0.09)
-0.06
(0.27)
-0.08
(0.19)
LOSS1
0.01
(0.44)
-0.02
(0.40)
0.05
(0.29)
0.13
(0.07)
0.10
(0.15)
-0.07
(0.24)
0.08
(0.21)
-0.14
(0.06)
LOSS2
-0.03
(0.38)
0.06
(0.27)
-0.04
(0.32)
-0.11
(0.11)
0.23
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.32)
0.05
(0.29)
-0.10
(0.15)
-0.11
(0.12)
Note:
(1) P-value is presented in parentheses using one-tailed test.
(2) Variables definitions:
ABTD = absolute value o f abnormal BTD;
ATR = applicable tax rate;
Number = the number o f different applicable tax rates in a consolidated entity;
TAXH = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has a member company with a tax 
holiday, and 0 otherwise;
TLU = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has tax-loss utilised, and 0 otherwise; 
SEON = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has rights issuing or public offering in 
next year, and 0 otherwise;
SOE = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity whose largest shareholder is the State, 
and 0 otherwise;
LOSS = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in current year t but not in t-1, 
and 0 otherwise;
LOSSl= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in year t-1 not in t-2, and 0 
otherwise;
LOSS2= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has losses in both t-1 and t-2, and 0 
otherwise.
Table 8.6 presents the estimation of equation 7.5, where ABTD (estimated from 
equation 7.3) is regressed on the various incentives of tax management and earnings 
management for manufacturing and non-manufacturing portfolios.
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Table 8.6
Results of GLS Regression with the Regression-Based ABTD
A B T D  -  a n + a A T R  + a N u m b e r  + a T A X H  + a T L U  + a S E O N  + a S O E
0 1 2  3 4 5 6
+ a 1 L oss  + a ^ Los s  1 + a Lo s s  2 + a ]0Y 2 0 0 1 + a  n T 2 0 0 2 + a |2K 2 0 0 3  + e
(Equation 7.5)
Predicted
Sign
Incentives fo r  
EM  or TM
( 0
Manufacturing
(2)
Non-manufacturing
Intercept ? -0.0021 -0.0044
(-2.86)*** (-3.36)***
ATR + TM 0.0003 0.0001
(14.72)*** (5.31)***
Number + TM -0.0012 -0.0002
(-10.50)*** (-1.34)*
TAXH + TM -0.0018 0.0011
(-9.55)*** (2.36)***
'FLU + TM 0.0133 0.0040
(45.77)*** (3.13)***
SEON + EM 0.0026 -0.0013
(6.90)*** (-2.65)***
SOE + EM 0.0053 0.0065
(8.40)*** (8.97)***
LOSS + EM 0.0016 0.0124
(5.04)*** (11.80)***
LOSS 1 + EM -0.0001 0.0007
(-0.15) (0.73)
LOSS2 + EM 0.0203 -0.0011
(3.28)*** (-1.57)*
Y2001 ? -0.0022 0.0005
(-10.89)*** (0.24)
Y2002 9 -0.0016 0.0019
(-6.76)*** (4.89)***
Y2003 ? 0.0119 -0.0005
(35.56)*** (-1.03)
Adj. R1 2 75.54% 39.44%
F-statistic 68.42 7.24
P-value (0.000) (0.000)
Sample 263 116
(1) *, ** and *** denotes the significance of one-tailed t-test at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. Figures in parentheses 
denote t-statistics based on the heteroscedasticity-consislent covariance matrix (White, 1980).
(2) Variables definitions:
ABTD = absolute value of abnormal B I D;
ATR = applicable tax rate;
Number = the number of different applicable tax rates obtained in a consolidated entity;
TAXH= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has a member company with a tax holiday, and 0 
otherwise;
'FLU = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has tax-loss utilised, and 0 otherwise;
SEON = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has rights issuing or public offering in next year, 
and 0 otherwise;
SOE = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity whose largest shareholder is the State, and 0 
otherwise;
LOSS = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in current year t but not in t-1, and 0 
otherwise;
LOSSl= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in year t-1 not in t-2, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS2= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has losses in both t-1 and t-2, and 0 otherwise;
Y2001=dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2001 and 0 otherwise;
Y2002= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2002 and 0 otherwise;
Y2003= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2003 and 0 otherwise.
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Manufacturing Regression
For manufacturing, all estimated coefficients, except for Lossl, are significant at 
the 0.01 level using one-tailed test. The F-statistic (68.42) and adjusted R2 (75.54%) 
suggest that the model is a good fit and explains most of the variation in ABTD. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts that a higher applicable tax rate creates 
incentives for tax planning, resulting in a larger ABTD, applicable tax rate is positively 
associated with ABTD. Holding others variables constant, the coefficient on applicable 
tax rate suggests that, on average, one percent increase in applicable tax rate 
contributes 3 percent increase in absolute value of scaled ABTD.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a positive association between Number of tax rates 
and ABTD because more different tax rates provide more opportunities for firms to 
engage in tax planning. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on Number of tax 
rates is significant but negative, suggesting that firms with access to more tax rates in 
the group have less likelihood of TM. This is inconsistent with the U.S. literature that 
suggests more different tax rates provide more opportunities for tax avoidance. 
However, this finding supports the anecdotal stories and some Chinese scholars’ 
conjectures: establishing good relationships with tax authorities to seek much more tax 
preference is the most popular, easiest and direct methods of tax planning in China.77 
The basic statistics in Table 8.5 show that 55% of firm-years observations have tax 
holidays and 78% of observations have two or more different tax rates. The mean of 
ATR is 20%, far below the statutory rate of 33%. These data suggest that: (1) Chinese 
government provides generous tax concessions to listed firms, resulting in multiple tax 
treatment within a consolidated entity being common; and (2) Chinese listed firms 
reduce their overall tax burden by pursuing tax preference or tax holidays, implying
771 appreciate valuable suggestions from Professor Xiao Chen, at Tsinghua University and Professor 
Liyan Wang, at Beijing University on this issue.
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obtaining more number of tax rates itself is a kind of tax planning. While this low-risk 
and low-cost tax planning strategy can be accomplished easily, it reduces listed firms’ 
likelihood to undertake other tax strategies that may be reflected in ABTD, such as 
exploiting managerial choices in tax reporting or tax-induced income shifting.
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, the coefficient on tax holidays is significantly 
negative, indicating that firms with tax holidays are less likely to avoid tax than those 
without tax holidays. This is consistent with the findings in Chan and Mo (2000), where 
they document that firms are most compliant while in a tax holiday.78
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms with tax loss utilised will have larger ABTD due to 
income-shifting tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient on tax loss 
utilised indicates that, ceteris paribus, firms with tax loss utilised have larger ABTD than 
that without tax loss utilised.
Consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 7 predicting that firms issuing seasoned equity 
offering in the next year and firms whose largest shareholder is State will have larger 
ABTD due to their strong incentives for EM, the estimated coefficients on both dummy 
variables are significantly positive. On average, the magnitude of scaled ABTD for firms 
with a seasoned equity offering in the next year and SOE are larger than that for non- 
SEON and non-SOE firms.
Hypotheses 6a, 6b and 6c suppose that loss firms are more likely to engage in
earnings management to avoid subsequent loss, delisting or trading restrictions. The
empirical results in Table 8.6 provide support for Hypotheses 6a and 6c. The
coefficients on Loss2 and Loss are significantly positive, in particular, the coefficient on
78 Chan and Mo (2000) investigate the tax holiday effects on a company itself rather than on a 
consolidated group.
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Loss2 suggests that ABTD for Loss2 firms is larger than Loss and Lossl firms, 
consistent with the prediction that firms with two successive years of loss have a 
pressing incentive for EM to avoid delisting or trading restrictions. Firms in the first loss 
year (a 1 =0.0016) also have larger ABTD than Lossl firms, but its size is less than
Loss2 (a9 =0.0203). However, the coefficient on Lossl is insignificant, which does not
support Hypothesis 6b. Possible reasons for this include the following: (1) when a firm 
has a loss in previous year, it should firstly try to improve the operating performance 
instead of manipulating earnings. After all, the major objective of business is making a 
real profit; and (2) if firms have taken a big bath in its first loss year, the next year’s 
earnings may be improved even in the absence of earnings management due to the 
reversal effect. These may lead to a less extent of earnings management for firms with 
a preceding year loss. However, the paired-samples t-test shows there are no 
significant differences in ABTD between the sub-samples of Loss and Lossl.79 So, 
these are merely speculative and further research would be needed to ascertain their 
applicability.
Non-Manufacturing Regressions
For non-manufacturing group, the regression results, to some extent, are similar 
to those for manufacturing. Table 8.6 shows that all estimated coefficients, except for 
Lossl, are significant at the 10% level using one-tailed test. Overall, the F-statistic 
(7.24) at 0.01 level and the adjusted R2 (39.44%) are much weaker than that in 
manufacturing regression. This is possibly because non-manufacturing sample is in 
small size and combines observations in seven different industries, such as transport, 
IT, real estate, services, and utilities. The explanatory power may be weakened by the 
mixed industry effects.
79 Two-tailed /7-value for paired-samples test is 0.97 for Loss and Lossl sub-samples.
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There are three important differences in the tested variables, with different signs 
for tax holidays, seasoned equity offerings and two-year losses. The coefficient on tax 
holidays for non-manufacturing is significantly positive, suggesting that firms with tax 
holidays are more likely to engage in tax management, leading to larger ABTD. This 
may be attributed to the different application of tax holidays in different industries. As 
shown in Table 5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5, the manufacturing-oriented entities are easier 
to get a long tax holiday (e.g. a two-year exemption and three-year reduction). In 
contrast, tax holidays for non-manufacturing-oriented entities are short (i.e. one-year 
exemption and two-year reduction) and only available for few entities (e.g. IT and new 
established service firms). Thus, non-manufacturing entities have more incentives for 
saving taxes by exploiting tax holidays than manufacturing companies.
The coefficients on SEON and Loss2 for non-manufacturing are negative, 
indicating that firms with seasoned equity offerings in the next year and firms with 
successive two-year losses have a less extent of earnings manipulation. This may be 
caused by manufacturing entities being easier to manage earnings because they have 
more discretion in accounting choices (e.g. choices in depreciation, cost allocation and 
asset valuation) and more channels to manage earnings by real transactions (e.g. 
arrangements in manufacturing chains and products flow). This is consistent with the 
descriptive evidence that non-manufacturing firm-years have lower ABTD than 
manufacturing and the paired-samples t-test result that ABTD is significantly different in 
these two sub-samples (as reported in Table 8.5).
Overall, ABTD is positively associated with the incentives for EM and TM. Firms 
with more incentives and opportunities for tax management (e.g. firms with a high tax 
rate, tax loss utilised) and earnings management (e.g. loss firms, SOE firms) are likely 
to have larger ABTD. The different results for two portfolios in terms of tax holidays,
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seasoned equity offerings and two-year losses suggest that industry characteristics 
may affect the behaviour and extent of firms’ earnings management and tax 
management. With larger data sets, finer industry controls may potentially enrich these 
results.
To examine the potential impact of multicollinearity on the regression results, 
some diagnostic tests such as variances-inflation factors and the condition indices are 
applied. All variances-inflation factors are below 1.7 and the maximum condition index 
is less than 15. Therefore, multicollinearity is not expected to affect the inferences 
drawn from the results. The potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation were 
tested by using residual analysis and Durbin-Watson statistic. To correct for the 
detected heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, White (1980)’s method and 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) are applied. It seems unlikely that the results are the 
consequences of these statistical problems. Model robustness tests are reported in 
next section.
8.3.2 Sensitivity Tests
The robustness of the regression results is firstly tested by re-estimating the 
regression with ABTD estimated from the naive difference model as elaborated in 
Section 8.2.2. The results in Table 8.7 are substantially similar to those in Table 8.6, 
suggesting the regression results in Table 8.6 are robust to alternative measurement.80 
Overall, the F-statistics and adjusted R2s are 2.41 and 6.08% for manufacturing 
regression and 6.14 and 34.91% for non-manufacturing regression, much weaker than 
that from regression-based estimation of ABTD.
80 One major difference is that the coefficients on Lossl in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
regressions are significantly positive.
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Table 8.7
Results of GLS Regression with the Naive ABTD
A B T D -  a  + a A TR + a N u  m her  + a T A X H + a T L U  + a ^ S E O N  + a  S O E
0  1 2  3 4 5 o
+ a  7 Lo s s  + a  ^Loss  1 + a  Lo s s  2 + a  |oT 2 0 0  1 + a  UY 2 0 0 2  + ct i2y 2 0 0 3  + e
(Equation 1.5)
Predicted
Sign
Incentives for  
EM or TM
(l)
Manufacturing
(2)
Non-manufacturing
Intercept ? 0.0025 -0.0043
(4.64)*** (-3.87)***
ATR + TM 0.0002 0.0003
(9.73)*** (8.33)***
Number + TM -0.0010 -0.0009
(-7.04)*** (-5.04)***
TAXH + TM -0.0008 0.0043
(-3.46)*** (8.58)***
TLU + TM 0.0013 -0.0028
(1.41)* (-3.23)***
SEON + EM 0.0014 0.0003
(3.95)*** (0.43)
SOE + EM 0.0011 0.0061
(3.15)*** (11.82)***
LOSS + EM 0.0077 0.0147
(15.58)*** (9.74)***
LOSS1 + EM 0.0076 0.0146
(19.25)*** (7.77)***
LOSS2 + EM 0.0587 0.0153
(3.40)*** (3.65)***
Y2001 ? -0.0006 0.0002
(-2.02)** (0.50)
Y2002 ? 0.0006 -0.0008
(1.78)** (-1.68)**
Y2003 ? -0.0002 -0.0014
(-0.70) (-3.12)***
Adj. R1 2 6.08% 34.91%
F-statistic 2.41 6.14
P-value (0.0056) (0.000)
Sample 263 116
(1) *, ** and *** denotes the significance of one-tailed t-test at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. Figures in parentheses 
denote t-statistics based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White, 1980).
(2) Variables definitions:
ABTD = absolute value of abnormal BTD;
ATR = applicable tax rate;
Number = the number of different applicable tax rates obtained in a consolidated entity;
TAXH= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has a member company with a tax holiday, and 0 
otherwise;
TLU = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has tax-loss utilised, and 0 otherwise;
SEON = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has rights issuing or public offering in the next 
year, and 0 otherwise;
SOE = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity whose largest shareholder is the State, and 0 
otherwise;
LOSS = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in the current year t but not in t-1, and 0 
otherwise;
LOSSl= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in year t-1 not in t-2, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS2= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has losses in both t-1 and t-2, and 0 otherwise;
Y2001=dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2001 and 0 otherwise;
Y2002= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2002 and 0 otherwise;
Y2003= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2003 and 0 otherwise.
182
Further to the measurement of the dependent variable, the results are also tested 
for sensitivity to (1) nonlinearity specification for number of tax rates; (2) the effect of 
tax holidays on the number of tax rates; (3) the effect of loss on tax management; and 
(4) the effect of firm size.
Previous research has found that economies of scale exists for tax planning 
(Gupta and Mills 2002, Rego 2003). In addition, given the other non-tax consideration, 
ABTD and number of tax rates may not be linearly related even though firms with more 
number of tax rates may have more opportunities to take aggressive tax position. To 
test whether the linearity specification suggested by the model is appropriate, this study 
includes a quadratic of Number of tax rates (Number2) to capture the non-linear 
effects.81 The results are reported in Appendix 6. Number of tax rates has an 
increasing (diminishing) marginal effect on ABTD for manufacturing (non­
manufacturing). For manufacturing, the coefficient on Number of tax rates is 
significantly negative ( a 2 =-0.0055) and the coefficient on Number2 is significantly
positive (a 3=0.0005), indicating that ABTD first decreases and then increases with the
number of tax rates at the turning point of 5.5. However, only six of the 263 firm-years 
have more than five different tax rates, about 2.28% of the sample. For non­
manufacturing, the coefficient on Number of tax rates is significantly positive 
(a 2 =0.0036) and the coefficient on Number2 is significantly negative (a 3 =-0.0006),
indicating that ABTD first increases and then decreases with the number of tax rates at 
the turning point of 3. About 21% of the firm-years in the sample have more than three 
different tax rates. However, the inclusion of the quadratic term remarkably reduces the 
model fit for non-manufacturing regression (the adjusted R2 is reduced from 39.4% in
81 There are several functions introduced by econometrics to capture non-linear effects, e.g. quadratic, 
natural logarithm, exponential functions and differential calculus. Wooldridge (2004) suggests that 
quadratic model is simple but one o f the most significant non-linear functions. Following prior literature 
(e.g. Rego 2003, Gupta and M ills 2002) in the field o f tax planning, this study chooses quadratic model to 
capture non-linear relation.
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Table 8.6 to 6.9%). The inclusion of a quadratic function does not substantively alter 
other results reported in Table 8.6.
Second, the regression is re-estimated with the interaction term of TAXH*Number 
to control for the effect of tax holidays on “Number of tax rates” (Appendix 7) and by 
restricting number of tax rates only for profitable consolidated entities because the tax 
rates of loss entities are less likely to provide incentives for tax management (Appendix 
8). Both produce weaker results and the inclusion of the interaction terms of 
TAXH*Number and Number*Profit does not significantly change the sign and 
significance level of estimated coefficients.
The tax planning literature has demonstrated a significant relationship between 
tax planning and firm size, although whether this association is positive or negative, 
linear or nonlinear appears controversial. For example, the political cost theory 
suggests that larger firms have less incentives for TM because of more risks of political 
intervention (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Zimmerman (1983) and Mills et at. (1998) 
provide support that the largest firms have the highest ETR and larger firms spend less 
on tax planning than small firms. In contrast, Siegfried (1972) argues that larger firms 
have greater resources to influence the political process in their favour, to engage in 
tax planning, and to organise their activities to achieve optimal tax savings and thus 
face lower ETR. Porcano (1986) provides evidence that the largest firms tend to have 
the lowest ETRs, due mainly to heavier use of accelerated depreciation allowances 
and foreign tax credits by the larger firms. Other studies, such as Gupta and Milis 
(2002), find a concave relationship between tax burden and firm size.
Although ABTD is already scaled by total assets, the regression is re-estimated 
with a size control variable—the logarithm of total assets at year-end (Appendix 9). The
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coefficient on Size is positively (negatively) related to ABTD for manufacturing (non­
manufacturing) sample at 0.01 level, indicating that size effect on tax management 
behaviour varies across the industries. The results for other variables are largely 
unchanged and the model is generally a weaker fit, suggesting that the relationship 
between ABTD and the incentives for EM and TM is not size dependent.
Overall, results reported in Table 8.6 are robust to alternative measurement and 
not sensitive to (1) nonlinearity specification for number of tax rates; (2) the effect of tax 
holidays on the number of tax rates; (3) the effect of loss on tax management; and (4) 
the effect of firm size.
8.4 Summary
To test the usefulness of BTD in indicating aggressive earnings and tax reporting, 
this study identifies norma! and abnormal components in total BTD using a cross- 
sectional regressions model. These two unobservable components are estimated by 
regressing BTD on factors associated with normal BTD. When the resultant model is 
used to forecast normal BTD, the unpredicted BTD is abnormal (ABTD).
Next, ABTD is regressed on a set of variables that proxy for various incentives of 
EM and TM based on manufacturing and non-manufacturing portfolios. The evidence 
shows that the incentives for EM and TM explain a large portion of the estimated ABTD. 
The magnitude of ABTD appears to indicate the existence and level of management 
manipulations, suggesting that it is a useful proxy for EM and TM. A naive proxy for 
ABTD is also used to evaluate the robustness of the conceptual design, with similar but 
slightly weaker results. The conceptual development is supported that BTD not only 
can reflect the nonconformity of accounting and tax reporting, but also reflect the
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managerial manipulations. BTD is a useful indicator of the combined EM/TM after 
controlling for accounting-tax misalignment.
The informativeness of BTD demonstrated in this chapter justifies its potential 
value relevance for the capital markets. The empirical tests in this regard are presented 
in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE HYPOTHESIS OF VALUE RELEVANCE
9.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates whether the information embedded in BTD which 
relates to the differences between GAAP and tax laws, earnings management and tax 
management, is sufficient to make BTD value relevant. To test the value relevance of 
BTD, this study examines the predictability of BTD to future earnings and stock returns. 
The one-year-ahead earnings regression modei and the return modei are applied. The 
empirical results are discussed in two sections. Section 9.2 provides evidence that BTD 
and its components can inform investors of future earnings. The negative association 
between NBTD (ABTD) and future earnings suggests that the larger NBTD (ABTD) 
signifies that the current earnings are largely transitory (less persistent), thereby 
informing on poor performance in future years.
Section 9.3 shows that BTD and its components are significantly negatively 
associated stock returns, indicating that the predictive information of BTD has been 
reflected in contemporaneous share returns. The value relevance of BTD is attributed 
to the information about the differences between GAAP and tax laws, earnings 
management and tax management. Hypothesis 8 is supported. The negative 
association between NBTD (ABTD) and stock returns suggests that a large NBTD 
(ABTD) is a bad news for the capital market, thereby giving rise to a weak price 
reaction.
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Further, BTD is incrementally informative for future earnings and 
contemporaneous stock returns. On average, BTD adds approximately 44% to the 
explanatory power of earnings levels and earnings changes with respect to 
contemporaneous stock returns during 2000-2004.
9.2 Testing the Predictive Link
This section tests whether the information embedded in BTD is useful for 
investors to predict future earnings by using the one-year-ahead earnings regression 
model.
8.2.1 Results from the One-Year-Ahead Earnings Regression Model
Because the model requires one-year-ahead data for EPS, the sample is reduced 
to 365 firm-year observations. Table 8.8 displays the descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlation coefficients for this reduced sample. Panel A of Table 9.1 shows that EPS,+l
has higher cross-sectional variation than EPS, with standard deviation of 0.295 versus 
0.180. The average BTD, ABTD and NBTD are all negative with means of -0.01, -0.002 
and -0.008. Panel B of Table 8.8 indicates that EPS,+1 is significantly positively
correlated with EPS,, consistent with the prior literature. As argued in Section 7.2.3, 
BTD is negatively correlated with EPS,+1.
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Table 9.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables for the Earnings Regression Model 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N=365 firm-year observations)
Mean Std. Dev. M edian M in im um M axim um
EPSlti 0.029 0.295 0.025 -3.541 1.783
EPS, 0.038 0.180 0.026 -1.154 1.469
BTD, -0.010 0.079 -0.001 -1.194 0.328
NBTD, -0.008 0.085 0.000 -0.625 1.103
ABTD, -0.002 0.058 -0.001 -0.775 0.298
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
EPS,« EPS, NBTD,
EPS,
0.26
(0.00)
BTD,
-0.05
(0.167)
0.59
(0.00)
NBTD,
-0.02
(0.36)
0.61
(0.00)
ABTD,
-0.04
(0.21)
-0.09
(0.04)
-0.44
(0.00)
Note:
(1) The sample consists of 365 firm-year observations for 2000-2003.
(2)  EPSl+l: earnings per share in year t+1, deflating by stock price on April 30 following the end o f
fiscal year t; EPS,: earnings per share in year t, deflating by stock price on April 30 following the end o f
fiscal year t. BTD: book-tax differences in year t; ABTD: abnormal BTD in year t; NBTD: normal BTD 
in year t, all deflating by total assets.
(3) P-value is presented in parentheses using one-tailed test.________________________________________
To test whether the information of BTD is useful for investors to predict future 
earnings and provides incremental explanatory power over current EPS, this study runs 
a univariate benchmark model as Model 1 and one-year-ahead earnings per share 
(EPS) is regressed on current EPS and BTD as Model 2 (Equation 7.6). To further 
determine whether the predictability of BTD for future earnings is attributed to NBTD 
and/or ABTD, Model 3 replaces total BTD with NBTD and ABTD.
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Table 9.2 shows the results of the three pooled regressions. The first row reports 
that contemporaneous EPS Is significantly related to future earnings at the 0.05 level in 
the univariate model. The second row shows the results of the regression of future 
earnings on contemporaneous earnings and BTD. As expected, BTD is negatively 
significant at the 0.01 level. For a given level of accounting earnings, higher BTD 
implies lower future earnings, indicating that the information in BTD appears to be 
useful in interpreting the information in current earnings. This is consistent with the 
inference in Chapter 4 that higher (lower) BTD reflects more (less) transitory 
components of earnings and less (more) persistent of earnings, thereby informing on 
poorer (better) performance in future years. After including the variable of BTD, the 
coefficient on EPS is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. The Adjusted R2 
in Model 2 is 13.1%, larger than 6.6% in the benchmark model. The partial F-statisiic 
(27.08) is significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that BTD is incrementally informative 
for future earnings beyond current-year earnings.
The last row in Table 9.2 shows that, the coefficients on NBTD (-4.45) and ABTD
(-5.64) are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, indicating that both of them
are informative for future earnings. The negative association between ABTD and future
earnings suggests that a large ABTD is an indicator of lower earnings quality,
consistent with Hanlon (2005)’s findings.82 The negative association between NBTD
and future earnings supports the inference that the policy-related information may
identify some transitory components in earnings. The uncertainty and possible reversal
effects of these transitory components lead to a less persistence of current earnings.
The adjusted R2 and F-statistic are 13.8% and 19.30, higher than those in Model 2. The
partial F-statistics, as reported, are significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the
separate investigation has incremental explanatory power over total BTD.
82 Hanlon (2005) demonstrates that firms with large BTD have less persistent earnings than firms with 
small BTD. The result in this study directly shows that ABTD is negatively associated with future 
earnings.
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As a result, BTD and its components are informative for future earnings and 
significantly improve the predictability of current earnings to future earnings.
9.2.2 Sensitivity Tests
This study performs some sensitivity tests to determine the strength of the main 
regression results of Models 2 and 3 as reported in Table 9.2. Specifically, it tests 
whether the results are sensitive to (1) auto-correlated errors and year-by-year 
regressions; (2) different deflator of BTD; and (3) the inclusion of industry control 
variable.
Because the earnings regression model includes a lagged dependent variable, it 
may be easier to raise auto-correlated errors that will cause the usual OLS statistics to 
be invalid for testing purpose. In this case, Durbin-Watson statistic may be invalid even 
in larger samples. As suggested by Wooldridge (2003), this study uses a AR(1) model 
to test for the possibility of serial correlation in the pooled regression. In the AR(1) 
model, the null hypothesis is that errors are serially uncorrelated. The t-tests for AR(1) 
serial correlation in Models 2 and 3 yield p = 0.04, t = 0.68, p-value = 0.49 and p = 
0.03, t = 0.82, and p-value=0.41, respectively. Therefore, there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation in the errors, which means the t-statistics for the coefficients obtained 
from Table 9.2 is valid for inference.
However, one might argue that AR test is flawed in a short time-series application. 
In particular, the samples in this study only have four-year data set in which AR model 
may not address the serial correlation. To remedy the potential weakness, this study 
also estimates Model 2 and Model 3 on a year-by-year basis. As shown in Appendix 10, 
the results of yearly regressions are similar to those in Table 9.2. Thus, it is concluded
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that correlated error does not account for the statistical significance of the results. 
Consistently, BTD and NBTD are significantly negatively associated with future 
earnings in all years. ABTD is also significantly negative at the 0.01 level in year 2002 
and 2003 but insignificant in year 2000 and 2001.
Second, a different deflator is applied in the main model (Model 2), where BTD 
deflated by total assets is replaced with BTD per share deflated by price at year t-1. 
The results in Appendix 11 show that there appear no substantial changes in prior 
results. The alternative deflator of BTD remarkably reduces model fit for the yearly 
regressions.
Finally, the regressions are re-estimated with an industry variable in both Modei 2 
and Model 3 to control for the industry impact on future earnings. As shown in 
Appendix 12, the industry effect is not significant and all F-statistics in pooled and 
yearly regressions are lower than those reported in Table 9.2. This inclusion does not 
substantially change prior outcomes.
Overall, BTD and its components are demonstrated to be informative about future 
earnings. Tests of auto-correlated errors and year-by-year regressions, different scaler 
and industry control indicate that the results are robust to these controls.83
9.3 Testing the Valuation Link
While the information embedded in BTD is demonstrated to be predictive for 
future earnings, this section tests whether this predictive information in BTD can be
83 There appears no multicollinearity problem in these regressions. The highest condition index is 2.88 
and the highest variance inflation factor is 2.18, below the benchmarks o f multicollinearity. The study 
also calculated V1F for each yearly regression. In no case was the factor above 2 in any o f regressions.
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reflected in contemporaneous share returns by examining the association of BTD and 
its components with stock returns.
9.3.1 Results from the Return Model
This section examines whether BTD and its components are correlated with 
contemporaneous stock returns.
Table 9.3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables for the Return Model 
Panel A: Description of Variables (N= 468 firm-year observations)
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median M in im um M axim um
RET' 0.504 1.650 -0.161 -0.727 9.476
EPS, 0.035 0.172 0.027 -1.154 1.469
A EPS' 0.018 0.214 0.002 -1.065 2.823
BTD, -0.009 0.072 -0.001 -1.194 0.328
A BTD' -0.002 0.052 0.000 -0.775 0.298
NBTD' -0.007 0.076 -0.001 -0.624 1.103
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Variables RET, EPS, AEPS, NBTD,
EPS,
0.19
(0.00)
AEPS, 0.10 0.47
(0.01) (0.00)
BTD'
0.06 0.59 0.38
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
NBTD,
0.04
(0.18)
0.60
(0.00)
0.60
(0.00)
A BTD'
0.02 -0.07 -0.36 -0.43
(0.34) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
( l )  RET, : the return over the 12-months ending on A pril 30 following the end o f fiscal year t; EPS' : 
earnings per share in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30 following the end o f fiscal year t-1; 
A EPS' : annual difference changes in earnings per share for period t deflated by stock price on April 30
following the end o f fiscal year t-1; BTD' : book-tax differences in year t; ABTDt : abnormal BTD in
year t; NBTDt : normal BTD in year t, all deflated by total assets.
(2) P-value is presented in parentheses using one-tail test.
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Table 9.3 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for variables. The 
sample is reduced to 468 because of some missing data on stock prices. As with many 
prior studies (e.g. Easton and Harris 1991, Chen et at. 2001), EPS, and A EPS,
variables are strongly correlated with stock returns. BTD, exhibits higher correlations 
with EPSt and A EPS, than with RET, , suggesting BTDt might be associated with 
stock returns by affecting earnings levels and earnings changes. In particular, NBTD, 
are highly correlated with the variables of EPS, and A EPS, at 0.60.
Panel A of Table 9.4 summarises the results of multiple regressions of return on 
deflated earnings, earnings changes and BTD for the pooled and yearly samples 
(Model 1). In the pooled regression, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimates 
and White’s method are used to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems. EPS, is significantly associated with return at the 0.01 level, with a t-statistic
of 7.93. However, AEPS, is insignificant at the conventional level. As expected, the 
coefficient for BTD, ( ß3 =-3.23, t=-2.62) is significantly negative at the 0.01 level, 
consistent with BTD being value relevant in the Chinese capital markets.
Panel A of Table 9.4 also reports the year-by-year regression results, where 
EPS, is positively significant at the 0.01 level in 3 of the 5 years, and A EPS, is 
significant at the 0.05 level or better in 3 of the 5 years but one of them is negative. The 
coefficients for BTD, are significantly negative in 4 out of 5 years.
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Table 9.4
Results for Regression of Return on EPS, AEPS and BTD
Panel A: RET. = ß0 + ßxEPSi + ß 2AEPSi + ß,BTD. + e. (Model 1)
Year N. intercept EPS
j
A EPS.I BTDl Adj.R1 2 Adj.R2' PartialF-stat.b
ALL 468 0.07*
(1.93)
2.80***
(7.93)
-0.17
(-0.50)
-3.23***
(-2.62)
0.083 0.031 24.90***
2000 84 3.70***
(18.29)
-1.49
(-1.66)
3.31**
(2.48)
19.27
(1.35)
0.044 0.034 0.83
2001 99 -0 29*** 
(-13.22)
-0.24
(-1.37)
1 10*** 
(4.28)
-1.60**
(-2.49)
0.146 0.057 8.97***
2002 99 -0.20***
(-12.94)
j 4 1*** 
(3.95)
0.03
(0.28)
-0.77**
(-2.59)
0.447 0.355 13.55***
2003 95 -0.09***
(-3.18)
2.55***
(6.92)
-0.23**
(-2.06)
-5.16***
(-4.94)
0.437 0.273 20.53***
2004 91 -0.39***
(-9.86)
2.39***
(5.69)
-0.08
(-0.31)
-7.83***
(-3.16)
0.323 0.254 8.05***
Mean c (2.71)*** (0.93) (-2.37)**
Panel B: RET. = a 0+ axEPS, + a 2AEPS, + a iABTDi + a 4NBTDi +e. (Model 2)
Y ea r N . Intercept EPS. AEPS
i
ABTD
I
NBTD
l
Adj. R 2
A L L 4 6 8 0 .0 6 *
(1 -8 6 )
2 .8 9 * * *
(7 -7 6 )
0 .0 2
( 0 .0 5 )
-1 .5 1 *
( - 1 .6 5 )
- 3 .7 0 * * *
( -4 -3 7 )
0 .0 8 3
2 0 0 0 84 3 .7 2 * * *
( 1 8 . 7 2 )
-1 .7 3 * * *
( -3 .1 7 )
3 .6 1 * *
( 2 .4 9 )
7 .8 5
( 0 .3 0 )
2 6 . 9 6
( 1 .6 4 )
0 .0 3 7
2 0 0 1 9 9 -0 .2 9 * * *
( - 1 3 . 2 8 )
- 0 .1 8
( - 1 1 3 )
1 .14***
( 5 .7 1 )
-1 .1 1
( - 1 .6 0 )
- 1 .6 9 * *
( - 2 .4 2 )
0 .1 5 2
2 0 0 2 9 9 - 0 .2 0 * * *
( - 1 2 . 6 1 )
1 .41***
( 3 .8 5 )
0 .0 3
( 0 .2 9 )
-0 .8 0 * * *
( - 2 .8 6 )
-0 .7 4 * *
( - 1 .9 9 )
0 .4 4 1
2 0 0 3 95 - 0 .0 9 * * *
( - 3 .1 5 )
2 .4 9 * * *
( 6 .6 9 )
- 5 .4 4
( - 1 .2 9 )
- 4 .3 0 * * *
( - 3 .4 3 )
-4 .9 3 * * *
( - 4 .4 5 )
0 .4 4 1
2 0 0 4 91 - 0 .4 1 * * *
( - 8 .9 6 )
2 .5 3 * *
(2 -4 6 )
0 .1 5
(0 -1 7 )
- 5 .4 4
( - 1 .3 0 )
- 9 .8 9 *
( -1 -6 9 )
0 . 3 2 7
M e a n  c (1 .7 4 )* ( 1 .4 7 ) ( -1 .7 8 ) * ( - 1 .7 8 ) *
(1) *, ** and *** denotes the significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. Figures in 
parentheses denote t-statistics. In yearly regressions, t-statistics are based on the heteroscedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) in presence of heteroscedasticity or HAC-consistent 
covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) in presence of auto-correlation. In pooled regression, GLS and 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix are applied.
(2) Variables definitions:
RET( : the return over the 12-months ending on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t; EPSl : 
earnings per share in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t-1; 
AEPSt : annual difference changes in earnings per share for period t deflated by stock price on April 30
following the end of fiscal year t-1; BTDt : book-tax differences in year t; ABTDt : abnormal BTD in 
year t; NBTD/ : normal BTD in year t, all deflated by total assets.
a These are the adjusted R2s of benchmark model, where return is regressed on earnings levels and 
earnings changes.
b The partial F-statistics are used to test whether Model 1 has incremental explanatory power over the 
benchmark model.
c This is the mean of the yearly coefficients, estimated to test for the effect of cross-sectional correlation 
in the error terms.
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Rayburn (1986) argues that the t-statistics from cross-sectional yearly regression 
may be seriously understated in some or all years due to cross-sectional correlation. 
Thus, she does not rely heavily on inferential statistics calculated in cross-section. She 
suggests an unbiased significance test by using the mean and standard errors of the 
coefficients obtained from the annual regressions. If the mean is statistically different 
from zero, then the significance levels of the coefficients are unlikely to be a result of 
cross-sectional correlation. Bernard (1987) further addresses the seriousness of 
inferential bias that arises in stock-return-based studies in such a context. He 
concludes that, for market-based accounting research involving cross-sectional 
regressions of quarterly or annual stock return metrics against firm-specific variables, 
the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may frequently lead to misstatement of 
significance level due to cross-sectional correlation. The magnitude of this bias may be 
most serious, and large enough to influence conclusions in the studies based on 
annual data. These issues indicate that statistical results in such a context should be 
interpreted cautiously.
As suggested in this literature, an across-years mean test is used to assess the 
bias in significance level of annual coefficients.84 The result in the last row of Panel A 
shows that the means of the coefficients for EPS and BTD are significant different from 
zero (except for AEPS), indicating the significance levels of coefficients in yearly 
regressions are not affected by standard error bias from cross-sectional correlation.
Table 9.4 also presents a comparison of the adjusted R2s for Model 1 and the 
benchmark model where stock return is regressed on earnings levels and earnings 
changes. The result indicates that BTD is incrementally value relevant over earnings 
levels and earnings changes in pooled regression. The adjusted R2 in Model 1 is 8.3%
84 The 5 estimated slope coefficients from the yearly regressions are used to obtain an across-years mean, 
standard error, and t-statistic for each variable.
197
as compared to 3.1% in the benchmark model. The partial F-statistics are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level in pooled regression and in 4 of the 5 yearly regressions. 
On average, BTD adds approximately 44% to the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of 
earnings levels and earnings changes with respect to stock returns during 2000-2004.
To determine whether the value relevance of BTD is attributed to NBTD or ABTD 
or both, total BTD is replaced with NBTD and ABTD in the regression (Model 2). Panel 
B of Table 9.4 reports that both NBTD and ABTD are significantly associated with stock 
returns at the conventional level in pooled regression. The across-year means of the 
coefficients for NBTD and ABTD are also significantly correlated with stock returns. 
Hypothesis 8 is supported.
9.3.2 Additional Analyses
The reliability and rigor of statistical outcomes in the return model are tested 
using an alternative estimation of return, a different deflator, an industry control and for 
multicollinearity.
First, the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return is used to replace the raw 
return as a dependent variable to test the association between BTD and stock returns, 
as in much prior literature. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated by subtracting 
the market return from the stock return monthly over the 12 months, ending on April 30 
following the end of fiscal yeart (Equation 7.10).
As shown in Table 9.5, BTD is significantly correlated with abnormal stock returns 
at the 0.10 level in pooled regression. The yearly regressions show that BTD is
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significantly negative in 4 out of the 5 years. The results for other variables are largely 
unchanged and the model fit is much weaker than that in Table 9.4.
Table 9.5
Regressions Result of Market-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Return Model
CAR = a Q+ a^EPS' + a 2AEPS. + a JBTDi + e. (Equation 7.8)
Year N
« 0 a, a 2 « 3 Adj.R2 F-statistics
A LL 468 0.06
(0.80)
1.75*
0-75)
0.76
(0.81)
-3.24*
( -1.68)
0.002 1.27
2000 84 2.81***
(3.01)
-7.57*
(-1.82)
15.90**
(2-59)
71.34
(1.08)
0.057 2 .68*
2001 99 2.70***
(3.72)
-25.63***
(-3.38)
51.50***
(3.40)
-62.72***
(-3.52)
0.144 6.49***
2002 99 -0.34**
(-2.77)
8.41***
(4-45)
-0.64
(-1.24)
_4 99* * *
(-3.07)
0.320 16.38***
2003 95 -2 19*** 
(-7.28)
26.14***
(8-17)
-5.83***
(-5.22)
-38.93***
(-3.69)
0.446 26.19***
2004 91 - 1.42* * *  
(-3.86)
17.03***
(4.46)
-2.14
(-0.92)
-41.07*
(-1.82)
0.211 9 04***
Mean a (2.38)** (-0.28) (-2 .20)**
(1) *, **  and * * *  denotes the significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. Figures 
in parentheses denote t-statistics. In yearly regressions, t-statistics are based on the heteroscedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) in presence o f heteroscedasticity or HAC-consistent 
covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) in presence o f auto-correlation. In pooled regression, GLS and 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix are applied.
(2) Variables definitions:
CAR: the cumulative abnormal return, calculated monthly over the 12 months, ending April 30 following 
the end o f fiscal year t. EPS: earnings per share in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30 following the 
end o f fiscal year t-1; AEPS: annual difference changes in earnings per share for period t deflated by stock 
price on April 30 follow ing the end o f fiscal year t-1; BTD: book-tax differences in year t, deflating by 
total assets.
aThis is the mean o f the yearly coefficients, estimated to test for the effect o f cross-sectional correlation 
in the error terms.
Second, the regression is re-estimated with BTD per share deflated by price in 
year t-1 instead of BTD deflated by total assets. As shown in Appendix 13, the previous 
results have no substantial changes in terms of the coefficient size and their 
significance levels.
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Third, the regression is replicated with an industry control variable to account for 
industry effect. As reported in Appendix 14, the industry effect is not significant and this 
inclusion does not substantially change the previous results.
The prospect of multicollinearity is raised above where a larger bi-variate 
correlations of 0.60 between A EPS and BTD , EPS and BTD are observed in Table
I  I 1 I  I
9.1. The variance inflation factors and condition indices are calculated as suggested by 
Greene (2000). The result shows that the highest condition index is 2.91 and the 
highest VIF is 2.30, far below the benchmarks of multicollinearity.85 Therefore, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a material problem in the estimation of the 
model.
Overall, the regression outcomes as reported in Table 9.4 appear robust to these 
testes above. BTD and its components remains significantly negative association with 
stock returns.
9.4 Summary
This chapter provides support for the Hypothesis 8 which predicts that BTD is 
informative for equity valuation because it reflects the information about the differences 
between GAAP and tax laws, earnings management and tax management those have 
implications for the market’s estimation of firms’ future performance.
To test the value relevance of BTD, this study investigates the predictive abilities 
of BTD and its components for future earnings and their explanatory power for stock 
returns. Based on the significant association between BTD and future earnings, there
X5 For the yearly regression, no VIFs were above 3.
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appears to be an economic justification that the information impounded in BTD is useful 
for investors to assess firms’ future performance. A large NBTD informs the investors 
of a weak future performance because a large difference in tax and book reporting 
requirements may contribute a largely transitory component to current earnings. On the 
other hand, a large ABTD also bodes a poor performance in future years since it is 
indicative of less persistent earnings (i.e. a low earnings quality) resulting from a high 
degree of managerial manipulations. This information reflected by BTD improves the 
predictability of current earnings to future earnings in terms of institutional settings and 
earnings quality.
More importantly, this predictive information of BTD has been reflected in 
contemporaneous stock returns in the Chinese capital markets, consistent with the 
notion of predictive and valuation links in fundamental analysis research. BTD and its 
components are of incremental value relevance to investors. On average, BTD adds 
approximately 44% to the explanatory power of earnings levels and earnings changes 
with respect to stock returns during 2000-2004.
An overall conclusion as to this research will be fully discussed in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
10.1 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis provides an in-depth study of BTD by examining the potential for BTD 
in indicating the extent of accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management and tax 
management, and predicting firms’ future earnings and stock returns in China.
Motivated by the potential but largely overlooked usefulness of BTD in proxying 
unobservable earnings management and tax management and earnings quality, and 
the research gaps in the BTD, earnings management, tax management and value 
relevance literature, this thesis attempts to advance existing literature by thoroughly 
exploring the informativeness and implications of BTD from a theoretical perspective 
and demonstrating the usefulness of BTD from an empirical perspective. It seeks to 
answer the following research questions: (1) Can observable BTD proxy earnings 
management and tax management after controlling for accounting-tax misalignment? 
(2) To what extent is variation in BTD associated with earnings management and tax 
management incentives? (3) Is the information embedded in BTD sufficient to make 
BTD value relevant?
To date, the pervasive earnings manipulations, tax shelters and accounting 
scandals have induced researchers to embark on comprehensive studies of the factors 
behind the BTD (e.g. McGill and Outslay 2004, Department of the Treasury 1999, 
Plesko 2004). While lower earnings quality and the resultant impairment of the value
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relevance of accounting information have captured the attention of the financial 
analysts, investors, government regulators and legislators, the questions of how to 
detect management manipulations and to assess the reliability of financial variables 
have been empirical issues. If BTD can be indicative of the existence and degree of 
EM and TM, it should be a good indicator of earnings quality and incrementally 
informative for stock prices.
However, as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, most relevant BTD studies have 
some limitations due to measurement error in BTD and inadequate understanding of 
the information impounded in BTD. Most of these studies assume that BTD is a result 
of either institutional arrangements or opportunistic behaviours, but not both. This 
drawback leads to empirical bias and leaves their conclusions open to further 
investigation. To remedy the weaknesses in existing theoretical and empirical work, 
this thesis incorporates both mechanical and opportunistic differences and constructs a 
theoretical framework in Chapter 4, in which BTD is interpreted as a function of 
accounting-tax misalignment, earnings management and tax management. 
Consequently, BTD is argued to be an appropriate measure of EM and TM after 
controlling for the effect of accounting-tax misalignment and so may signify the 
earnings quality. The information embedded in BTD is predicted to be potentially value 
relevant because it may inform the market about some transitory effects of current 
earnings in terms of institutional settings and earnings quality, aiding investors to 
precisely evaluate and forecast firms’ future performance and hence affecting share 
returns.
The framework decomposes total BTD into normal and abnormal components. 
NBTD is defined as the mechanical differences due to the divergent reporting rules for 
book and tax purposes, proxying the gap of accounting and tax reporting. ABTD is
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defined as the opportunistic differences due to the managerial choices in accounting 
and tax reporting, thus proxying EM and TM.
Because both NBTD and ABTD are not observed directly, this thesis develops a 
linear cross-sectional regression model to identify these two indicator measures in 
Chapter 7. NBTD is estimated by regressing reported BTD on investment in fixed and 
intangible assets, changes in revenues and changes in tax loss position. It is measured 
by using the estimated coefficients in the fitted equation based on the successive year 
and manufacturing and non-manufacturing portfolios. ABTD is estimated as the 
residual from the expectation model. Assuming NBTD and ABTD are reliably measured, 
the estimated ABTD may be used to proxy the extent of EM and TM and to signify the 
levels of noise in reported financial information (i.e. earnings quality).
This framework is empirically tested by examining the association of ABTD with 
proxies for EM and TM incentives, and the association of BTD (NBTD and ABTD) with 
future earnings and stock returns in the Chinese context. Building on the detailed 
analysis of China’s BTD in terms of institutional settings and opportunistic context in 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 of this thesis develops some testable hypotheses that firms with 
strong incentives for EM and TM have high levels of ABTD in the Chinese context. The 
empirical results in Chapter 8 show that the estimated ABTD is positively associated 
with most of variables of incentives for EM and TM, interpreting this as evidence that 
ABTD being indicative of EM and TM. A naive proxy for ABTD is also used to evaluate 
the robustness of the conceptual design, with similar but slightly weaker results.
The evidence in Chapter 9 also supports the conceptual development that BTD 
and its components are value relevant as they provide additional information to the 
market that have implications for performance forecast and equity valuation. The
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negative association between ABTD and future earnings and stock returns is 
consistent with lower (higher) earnings quality having poorer (better) future earnings 
and stock returns. BTD exhibits incremental explanatory power over current earnings to 
future earnings and it is incrementally informative for stock prices beyond earnings 
levels and earnings changes.
The findings in this thesis enrich the knowledge of BTD and extend its 
implications for the future EM, TM and value relevance research. They contribute to the 
existing literature by introducing a new measure of EM and TM and a potential indicator 
of earnings quality. The remainder of this chapter summarises the detailed research 
results and their implications for theory and practice, followed with the discussion about 
limitations and future research in Section 10.3.
10.2 Summary of Findings and Implications
This dissertation is believed to be one of the first studies in examining the ability 
of BTD in proxying both EM and TM. It is also believed to be one of the first studies to 
examine the value relevance of BTD in terms of its information about institutional 
arrangements and earnings quality.
This section summarises the research findings and their implications for theory 
and practice in two parts. The first is related to ABTD and managerial manipulations. 
The second pertains to the association of BTD with performance measurement and 
share valuation.
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10.2.1 ABTD, an Indicator of Earnings Management and Tax Management
The conceptual framework argues that ABTD is an appropriate indictor of 
potential EM and TM. If it is correct, there should be a significant association between 
ABTD and the incentives and opportunities for EM and TM. Using the data obtained 
from Chinese B-shares listed firms’ English-version financial statements, Chapter 8 
examines the association between ABTD and the incentives for managerial 
manipulations based on manufacturing and non-manufacturing portfolios. As expected, 
the result indicates that ABTD is positively related to most of the incentives for EM and 
TM. Firms with more incentives and likelihood for TM (e.g. firms with a high tax rate, 
tax loss utilised) and EM (e.g. loss firms, SOE firms) present a larger level of ABTD. 
This finding extends prior literature by providing evidence of the opportunistic causes of 
BTD, and to what extent these causes contribute to BTD. More importantly, unlike prior 
BTD studies that investigate EM (TM) conditional on the absence of TM (EM), this 
study incorporates both of EM and TM together and provides evidence that ABTD is a 
useful proxy for combined EM and TM.
The results also indicate that the industry characteristics affect the magnitude of 
firms’ EM and TM behaviour (as proxied by ABTD). For example, manufacturing firms 
with tax holidays exhibit less tax planning than non-manufacturing firms with tax 
holidays, perhaps because of the relative difficulty for non-manufacturing to obtain tax 
preference. Manufacturing firms have a larger extent of earnings manipulation than 
non-manufacturing when making seasoned equity offerings or successive book losses. 
This may be due to manufacturers finding it easier to manage earnings because they 
have more discretion in accounting choices (e.g. choices in depreciation, cost 
allocation and asset valuation) and more channels to manage earnings by real 
transactions (e.g. arrangements in manufacturing chains and products flow).
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The size effect on managerial manipulations, as proxied by ABTD, also varies 
across manufacturers and non-manufacturers. Large firms as measured by total assets 
have a larger (less) extent of tax planning for manufacturing (non-manufacturing). This 
finding adds to prior literature pertaining to the association between firm size and 
management manipulations.
These results may provide researchers and regulators with more insights into EM 
and TM behaviour. In response, tax authorities and audit firms may perform an efficient 
and effective auditing by focusing on firms with larger ABTD.
10.2.2 The Value Relevance of BTD
Based on the predictive and valuation links in the fundamental analysis research, 
this thesis demonstrates that BTD and its components are informative for stock returns 
in the Chinese capital markets. The possible value relevance of BTD lies in its 
usefulness in forming expectations regarding future performance. The results from one- 
year-ahead earnings regression model suggest that the information impounded in BTD 
is useful for the analysts and investors to evaluate firms’ future performance. BTD has 
incremental explanatory power to future earnings over current earnings. A large NBTD 
informs the investors of a weak future performance because a large difference in tax 
and book reporting requirements may contribute a largely transitory component to 
current earnings. On the other hand, a large ABTD also bodes a poor performance in 
future years since it is indicative of less persistent earnings (i.e. a low earnings quality) 
resulting from a high degree of managerial manipulations. This is consistent with the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4.
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The evidence from both the raw return model and CAR model shows that BTD
and its components are negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns. 
BTD provides incremental explanatory power to stock returns over earnings levels and 
earnings changes in the Chinese capital markets. These findings extend the prior 
literature by providing direct evidence of the value relevance of BTD in terms of its 
information about institutional arrangements and earnings quality.
Numerous studies argue that managerial manipulations reduce the quality of 
financial variables and weakens their value relevance as reflected in share prices (e.g. 
Barth et al. 1996, Christensen et al. 1999, Marquardt and Wiedman 2004). The value 
relevance of ABTD indicates that ABTD, as a proxy for EM and TM, informs the market 
of some additional information about managerial manipulations, suggesting that it is a 
signal of earnings quality. A Large ABTD is interpreted as a “red flag” of low earnings 
quality, thereby reducing the investors’ expectation of future performance and leading 
to a low share return. Therefore, the analysts and investors should search for BTD 
information other than current earnings while assessing the firm value.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the findings in this thesis regarding the 
informativeness and usefulness of BTD may contribute to the current debate about 
accounting-tax misalignment issue in countries without BTD and accounting-tax 
alignment issues in countries with BTD.
10.3 Limitations and Future Research
This section addresses some limitations in this thesis and discusses future 
research in terms of the generalisation and application of conceptual and empirical 
results which relate to an extended study in countries with different institutional settings
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and managerial practice, a broad application of BTD in the EM/TM research, the 
refinement of research design by using a large sample size and a finer industry 
distribution and improving model specification, a deep examination as to the interaction 
and trade-offs of EM and TM, and a further investigation of NBTD.
10.3.1 The Generalisation and Application of Conceptual and Empirical Results
This thesis constructs the theoretical framework of BTD built on a broad-based 
review of literature in the fields of BTD, earnings management, tax management and 
value relevance studies. Most of these studies are conducted in the developed 
countries, such as the U.S., UK, Canada and Australia. As a result, the conceptual 
framework and design should be adaptable and generalised to these countries. These 
generalisation and application will provide various research avenues. For example, 
how to use BTD proxy to detect the potential EM and TM and measure earnings quality? 
How does BTD proxy relate to discretional accruals estimates of EM and effective tax 
rate estimates of TM? Is BTD proxy more powerful? Whether may the application of 
BTD enhance the detection of unobservable but pervasive management manipulations 
and deepen the studies in EM/TM? How to further separate BTD into that reflecting 
earnings management versus tax aggressiveness?
The evidence drawn from China supports the conceptual development that BTD 
is a useful measure of potential EM and TM. The representativeness of empirical 
results, however, may be subject to some unique institutional settings and opportunistic 
incentives in a Chinese context. This is unavoidable because accounting and tax rules 
and market practice differ from each country. As a result, the further research would be 
to replicate the study in countries which may provide different jurisdictional background,
209
managerial discretion, incentives and opportunities for EM and TM. This should enrich 
and supplement this work.
10.3.2 The Potential Effects of Sample Size and Industry Distribution
As shown in Chapter 7, this study uses a sample of all Chinese B-shares firms 
listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 1999 to 
2004. After applying the selection criteria, the final firm-year observation set is 574. 
This relatively small sample size and short observation period raise the potential impact 
on normality distribution of samples (Section 7.3) and mixed industry effects (Section 
8.3). Although this limitation is inevitable, an extended sample size and observation 
period should diminish the detrimental effects of non-normality and provide more 
opportunities to investigate firms’ behaviour. Given that broad industry differences have 
been found, richer results will be obtained if it is possible to control for industry effect in 
a finer industry basis.
10.3.3 The Observability Problems and Measurement Issues
One limitation in BTD proxy is that BTD can not reflect one of the EM/TM 
strategies in which earnings and taxable income (taxes) are managed in a same 
direction and in a same amount (see Footnote 17 in Chapter 4). This is because this 
strategy does not raise the variation in BTD.
In addition, this study employs a cross-sectional OLS model to estimate 
unobservable NBTD and ABTD. NBTD is estimated by regressing BTD on factors 
associated with NBTD and ABTD is estimated as the residual. Although a naive proxy 
for ABTD is used to benchmark this conceptual design and shows a similar result to
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regression-based ABTD, the problem of model misspecifications as shown in Jones’ 
model may also exist in this design and so may affect the measurement of ABTD. As a 
result, future research is needed to refine the model by controlling for the factors those 
may contribute to NBTD so as to purify the ABTD measure as possible as it can.
10.3.4 The Interaction and Trade-Offs of EM and TM
As argued in Chapter 4, ABTD is a result of EM and TM strategies and their 
interaction. This study tests this proposition by using the orthogonal indicator variables 
of incentives for EM and TM to explain the variation in ABTD. The unexplained portion 
(residual) may be attributed to the interaction of EM and TM. Another avenue for future 
research is to investigate the interaction of EM and TM behaviour and how their trade­
offs affect management opportunistic strategies.
10.3.5 A Further Investigation of NBTD
The nonconformity between accounting and tax reporting rules is not a new issue 
in the Western developed countries. However, how to evaluate the extent of 
accounting-tax misalignment among different countries is vague. Prior international 
accounting research, such as Alford et al. (1993) and Ali and Hwang (2000) use the 
items of different requirements in accounting and tax rules in a specific country as a 
proxy for its level of misalignment. This study provides a definition and approach to 
identify NBTD and ABTD. The estimated NBTD allows researchers to directly compare 
the extent of accounting-tax misalignment in different countries and to analyse the 
changes in accounting-tax nonconformity in a particular country across time. Given the 
research questions addressed in Chapter 1, this study focuses on ABTD and poses a 
limited analysis of NBTD. A further investigation on NBTD may provide additional
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insights into accounting role and standard settings, especially for international 
accounting research.
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APPENDIX 2
The Tax-Effect BTD Calculated from the Reconciliation of Prima Facie Income 
Tax Expense and Income Tax Payable in China’s B-shares Listed Firms’ English-
Version Financial Reports
Prima Facie Income Tax Expense = pre-tax accounting profit x applicable tax rate 
(ATR)
+Tax effect of permanent difference (i.e. permanent differences x ATR) 
e.g. +Tax rate differential
+ Share of taxation of associated companies 
+ Non-deductible expenses 
+ Under-provision in previous years
+Tax effect of timing difference not brought to account (e.g. tax loss not 
recognised as deferred tax expense)
+ Overseas profit tax 
+ Others
- Effect of tax preferential period (eg. Tax holidays)
- Tax loss utilised
- Non-taxable income
- Over-provision in previous years
- Tax refund
= Income tax expense charged in profit and loss account 
+ Tax effect of timing differences brought to account (i.e. timing difference x ATR)
= Income Tax Payable (or the Provision for PRC Income Tax)
= Estimated taxable income x ATR
Taxed-effect BTD = Prima Facie Income Tax Expense -  Income Tax Payable
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APPENDIX 3
An Illustration of How Tax-Induced Income Shifting Affects Tax-Effect BTD
This Appendix explains that how consolidated and separate entity income 
reporting raise the variation of tax-effect BTD and illustrates that how tax-induced 
income shifting strategy affects the variation of tax-effect BTD.
Under the Chinese income tax law, income tax should be calculated on an 
independent legal entity base despite the consolidating requirements in accounting 
standards. This institutional distinction raises tax-effect BTD (normal BTD). Assume 
that a consolidated entity A has $600 pre-tax income for itself and $2000 consolidated 
pre-tax income in year t, and it has 3 subsidiaries called B, C and D. Their pre-tax 
income and applicable tax rates are $400, $500 and $500, 24%, 33% and 10%, 
respectively. The applicable tax rate for the consolidated entity is 15%. Assume no 
other adjusted items, A’s income tax payable is calculated as follows:
Prima Facie Income Tax Expense. 2000*15% = 300 
Plus: tax rate differential: 36+90-25 = 101 
A company: 600*(15%-15%) = 0 
B company: 400*(24%-15%) = 36 
C company. 500*(33%-15%) = 90 
D company: 5Q0*(10%-15%) = -25 
Income Tax Expense = 401 
income Tax Payable = 401
Tax-based BTD = 300-401 =-101 (NBTD =-101, ABTD = 0)
Holding others constant, if A shifts the pre-tax profit from B and C to D as follows, 
A’s total income tax payable is reduced though the consolidated pre-tax profit is 
unchanged:
Prima Facie Income Tax Expense. 2000*15% = 300 
Plus: tax rate differential: 18+18-60 = -24 
A company: 600*(15%-15%) = 0 
B company: 200*(24%-15%) = 18 
C company: 100*(33%-15%) = 18 
D company: 1200*(10%-15%) = -60 
Income tax expense = 276
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Income tax payable = 276
Tax-effect BTD = 300-291 = 24 (NBTD = -101, ABTD = 125)
As a result, listed firms can exploit the different reporting methods (i.e. 
consolidated reporting and separate entity reporting) to save tax. When the institutional 
distinction is constant, i.e. NBTD is unchanged, income-shifting tax strategy in a 
consolidated group can reduce tax burden without affecting total reported income. This 
behaviour can be reflected in the tax-effect BTD (i.e. ABTD).
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APPENDIX 4
An Illustration of Tax Loss Effects on BTD
A tax loss incurs when deductible expenses exceed taxable revenue. Under the 
Chinese income tax laws, a firm with a tax loss can get a tax benefit in form of 
carryforward which reduces tax payment in the following profitable year.1 The tax loss 
carryforward is an exception to the general income tax rules that the taxable income is 
determined on the basis of the current year's events. When tax loss is utilised, a 
company can offset the preceding year's tax losses against the current year's taxable 
income and hence results in a higher BTD. However, when a tax loss occurs, taxable 
income is recognised as zero despite its real value and hence leads to a lower BTD.
Assume that a firm has pre-tax income of $300, -$200, $150, and $800 in years 1, 
2, 3, and 4, respectively, its “taxable” income in each of the four year is $100, -$400, - 
$50, and $600, respectively.2 If the income-effect BTD is $200 in each year, permanent 
difference is $50 and timing difference is $150, and the tax rate is 40%, then tax-effect 
of BTD is $80 with the tax-effect of the permanent and timing differences being $20 
and $60 respectively. Assume all NOL can be carried forward.
If tax loss is brought to account as a deferred tax asset or future income tax 
benefit:
Tax expense = Accounting income x Tax rate -  Tax effect of permanent differences 
Deferred tax expense = Tax effect of regular timing differences -  Future income tax 
benefit from tax losses recognised as an asset
Tax payable = Taxable income x Tax rate (or Tax expense -  Deferred tax expense) 
Tax-effect BTD = Tax effect of regular BTD -  Future income tax benefit recognised as 
an asset
Year 1:
Tax expense = $300 x 40% -20 = 100 
Deferred tax expense = 60 
Tax payable = 100 x 40% = 40 
Tax-effect BTD = 80-0 = 80
1 The Chinese Income Tax Law only permits N O L to be carried forward in the following five years 
commencing from the first profitable year.
2 Here, taxable income is the number reported by taxpayers in financial reports instead o f on tax returns.
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Year 2
Tax expense= -200 x 40% -  20 = -100 
Deferred tax expense = 60 -  400 x 40% = -100 
Tax payable = 0 x 40% = 0 or -100 -  (-100) = 0 
Tax-effect BTD = 8 0 -  160 = -80
Thus, the tax-effect BTD (hence BTD) decreases when tax loss occurs (BTD is - 
80 instead of the regular +80). This happens because tax laws treat taxable income 
and tax loss asymmetrically.
Year 3:
Tax expense =150 x 40% -  20 = 40 
Deferred tax expense = 60-50 x 40% = 40 
Tax payable = 0 x 40% = 0 or 40-40 = 0 
Tax-effect BTD = 80 -  20 = 60
Year 4:
Tax expense = 800 x 40% -  20 = 300 
Deferred tax expense = 60+450 x 40% = 240 
Tax payable = (600-400-50) x 40% = 60 or 300-240 = 60 
Tax-effect BTD = 80+180 = 260
Thus, tax-effect BTD increases when tax loss is utilised (BTD is 260 instead of 
the regular 80). This happens because tax loss utilised reduces current year’s taxable 
income.
If tax loss is NOT brought to account as a deferred tax asset or FITB:
The tax effect of the tax loss is not recognised as a timing difference, so it becomes a 
permanent difference. Thus:
Tax expense = Accounting income x Tax rate -  Tax effect of permanent differences 
(the regular one and the additional from tax losses)
Deferred tax expense = tax effect of regular timing difference 
Tax payable = Taxable income x Tax rate (or Tax expense -  Deferred tax expense) 
Tax-effect BTD = Tax effect of regular BTD + Tax effect of additional permanent 
difference due to tax losses
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Year 1:
Tax expense = $300 x 40% -20 =100 
Deferred tax expense = 60 
Tax payable = 100 x 40% = 40 or 100-60 = 40 
Tax-effect BTD = 80-0 = 80
Year 2:
Tax expense = -200 x 40% -  20 -  (-400 x 40%) = 60 
Deferred tax expense = 60 
Tax payable= 0 x 40% = 0 or 60 -  60 = 0 
Tax-effect BTD = 80 -  160 = -80
Year 3:
Tax expense=150 x 40% -  20 -  (-50 x 40%) = 60 
Deferred tax expense=60 
Tax payable= 0 x 40% = 0 or 60 - 60 = 0 
Tax-effect BTD = 80 -  20 = 60
Year 4:
Tax expense=800 x 40% -  20 -  (450 x 40%) = 120 
Deferred tax expense=60
Tax payable= (600-400-50) x 40%= 60 or 120 -  60 = 60 
Tax-effect BTD = 80+180 = 260
Again, the tax-effect BTD decreases when NOL occurs. It increases when NOL is 
utilised in future periods.
Thus, tax loss affects the distribution of the tax-effect BTD even though the 
aggregate tax-effect BTD for four years is unchanged (i.e. 320). The current tax-effect 
BTD is reduced when the tax loss occurs (e.g. in year 2 and year 3) and is increased 
when tax loss is utilised (i.e. in year 4).3
3 I acknowledge Dr Alfred Tran for his comments on this issue.
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APPEDIX 5
Result for Pooled BTD Regression
BTD„ = f t  + f t /J V ft  +  ß2AREV„ + f t  A m ,,  + ßJLU „  + e,
(Equation 7.1)
Coefficients M anufacturing Non-M anufacturing
Intercept (ß0) 0.000 -0.002
(0.788) (0.00)
lN V ( f t ) 0.001** 0.002***
(0.02) (0.000)
A R E V ( ft) -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.00) (0.00)
N O L ( f t ) -0.186*** -0.136***
(0.00) (0.00)
T L U ( f t ) 0.799*** 0.869***
(0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.84
F-statistic 154.08 174.51
(0.00) (0.00)
Sample 304 132
Note:
(1) * ,** , and ***denote the significance o f two-tailed tests at the level o f 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. 
Figures in parentheses denote the p-values for T-statistics and for F-statistics based on the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White, 1980) and GLS.
(2) The sample includes 304 firm-years for manufacturing and 132 firm-years for non­
manufacturing for 1999-2003.
(3) Variables Definitions
BTD: reported book-tax differences for firm j  in year t. INV: the sum o f gross property, plant 
and equipment and intangible assets in year t, and proxies for investment growth. AREV: 
changes in revenue from year t-1 to year t, proxies for economic growth. NOL: the value o f 
accounting loss, proxies for tax loss. TLU: reported tax loss utilised for firm in year t. A ll 
variables are deflated by total assets.
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APPENDIX 6
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EM and TM Model with the Quadratic Function
ABTD = a 0 + a ]ATR + a 2Number + a^Number2 4 a 4TAXH + a 5TLU + a 6SEON + a 1SOE 
+a^Loss + a 9Loss\ + a ]0Loss2 + a uY2001 + a nY2002 + a nT2003 + e
P r e d ic te d
S ig n
I n c e n t iv e s  fo r  
E M  o r  T M
(1 )
M a n u fa c tu r in g
(2 )
N o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g
Intercept ? 0.0046 -0.0073
(5.35)*** (-3.53)***
ATR 4- TM 0.0003 0.0001
(15.91)*** (3.79)***
Number 4 TM -0.0055 0.0036
(-20.71)*** (3.30)***
Number2 TM 0.0005 -0.0006
(13.18)*** (-3.26)***
TAXH 4 TM -0.0005 0.0003
(-2.52)*** (0.64)
TLU + TM 0.0126 0.0029
(68.80)*** (2.21)***
SEON + EM 0.0033 -0.0016
(5.38)*** (-2.68)***
SOE + EM 0.0035 0.0059
(4.80)*** (6.97)***
LOSS + EM 0.0031 0.0083
(11.24)*** (5.02)***
LOSS1 4 EM 0.0010 0.0005
(2.52)*** (0.38)
LOSS2 4 EM 0.0211 -0.0008
(3.45)*** (-0.99)
Y2001 ? -0.0024 -0.0004
(-10.80*** (-0.78)
Y2002 ? -0.0017 0.0017
(.6.74)*** (3.60)***
Y2003 ? 0.0127 -0.0008
(41.11)*** (-1.62)*
Adj. R2 79.59% 6.94%
F-statistic 79.61 1.66
(0.000) (0.081)
Sample 263 116
Note:
(1) *,** and *** denotes the significance of one-tailed t-tests at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance 
matrix (White, 1980) and GLS.
(2) Variables definitions:
ABTD = absolute value of abnormal BTD;
ATR = applicable tax rate;
Number = the number of different applicable tax rates in a consolidated entity;
Number2 = the squared term of Number;
TAXH= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has a member company with 
a tax holiday, and 0 otherwise;
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TLU = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has tax-loss utilised, and 0 
otherwise;
SEON = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has rights issuing or public 
offering in the next year, and 0 otherwise;
SOE = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity whose largest shareholder is 
the State, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in the current year t but 
not in t-1, and 0 otherwise;
LOSSl= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is loss in year t-1 not in t-2, 
and 0 otherwise;
LOSS2= dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity has losses in both t-1 and t-2, 
and 0 otherwise;
Y2001=rdummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2001 and 0 otherwise;
Y2002= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2002 and 0 otherwise;
Y2003= dummy variable that takes 1 when it is in the year 2003 and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX 7
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EM and TM Model with TAXH*Number
ABTD = a 0+ a{ATR + a 2Number+ a }Number*TAXH + a 4TAXH + a^TLU + a 6SEON 
+a7SOE + a %Loss + a 9Loss\ + a ]0Loss2 + a nT2001 + anY2002 + a l3F2003 + £
P red ic ted
S ign
In cen tiv es  
fo r  E M  or  
T M
(1)
M a n u fa c tu r in g
(2)
N o n ­
m a n u fa c tu r in g
Intercept ? -0.0024 -0.0034
(-3.63)*** (-2.37)***
ATR + TM 0.0003 0.0001
(11.28)*** (3.60)***
Number + TM -0.0020 -0.0007
(-7.28)*** (-2.51)***
TAXH*Number ? TM 0.0012 0.0013
(3.73)*** (3.53)***
TAXH + TM -0.0035 -0.0023
(-4.23)*** (-2.06)**
TLU + TM 0.0093 0.0040
(23.55)*** (3.10)***
SEON + EM 0.0033 -0.0011
(5.56)*** (-2.31)**
SOE + EM 0.0077 0.0068
(13.85)*** (9.05)***
LOSS + EM 0.0007 0.0118
(2.34)*** (10.16)***
LOSS I + EM -0.0002 0.0009
(-0.41) (0.95)
LOSS2 + EM 0.0210 -0.0009
(3.54)*** (-1.30)*
Y2001 ? -0.0009 0.0004
(-3.59)*** (0.93)
Y2002 9 -0.0008 0.0022
(-2.61)*** (5.20)***
Y2003 ? 0.0120 -0.0002
(30.29)*** (-0.49)
Adj. R2 51.07% 32.35%
F-statistic 22.04 5.23
(0.000) (0.000)
Sample 263 116
(See Appendix 6 for variables definitions)
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APPENDIX 8
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EM and TM Model with Number*Profit
ABED = a 0 + a fiT R  + a 2Number + a^Number * Profit + a  ^ Profit + a5TAXH + a 6TLU 
+a7SEON + a &SOE + a 9Loss + a wLoss 1 + a uLoss2 + a 12T 2001 + a ]3T2002 + a ]4T2003 + e
P r e d ic te d
S ig n
I n c e n t iv e s  
fo r  E M  o r  
T M
(1 )
M a n u fa c tu r in g
(2 )
N o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g
Intercept 9 0.003 -0.0017
(0.801) (-0.58)
ATR + TM 0.0003 0.0001
(20.46)*** (3.89)***
Number + TM -0.0038 0.0005
(-2.99)*** (0.39)
Profit + TM -0.013 -0.0013
(-3.13)*** (-0.57)
Number* Profit + TM 0.0035 -0.0004
(2.74)*** (-0.34)
TAXH + TM 0.0001 0.0007
(0.61) (1.76)*
TLU TM 0.0129 0.0043
(25.82)*** (3.48)***
SEON + EM 0.0015 -0.0018
(3.36)*** (-3.90)***
SOE + EM 0.0087 0.0055
(23.77)*** (8.39)***
LOSS + EM -0.0039 0.0052
(-1.99)** (2.93)***
LOSS1 + EM -0.0003 0.0001
(-0.80) (0.18)
LOSS2 + EM 0.0192 -0.0018
(2.72)*** (-2.87)***
Y2001 ? 0.0001 0.0001
(0.27) (0.26)
Y2002 ? -0.0011 0.0020
(-5.59)*** (4.37)***
Y2003 ? 0.0112 -0.0005
(37.63)*** (-1.10)
Adj. R2 54.63% 7.55%
F-statistic 23.53 1.67
(0.000) (0.074)
Sample 263 116
Note:
Profit = dummy variable that equals 1 when a consolidated entity is profitable in year t, and 0 
otherwise;
See Appendix 6 for other variables definitions.
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APPENDIX 9
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EM and TM Model with Size Variable
ABTD = a 0 + a xATR + a 2Number + a^TAXH + a 4TLU + a 5SEON + a 6SOE 
+a7Loss + a^Loss\ + a 9Loss 2 + a ]0Size + a nF2001 + a n Y2002 + a 13F2003 + e
P r e d ic te d
S ig n
I n c e n t iv e s  
fo r  E M  o r  
T M
(1 )
M a n u fa c tu r in g
(2 )
N o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g
Intercept 7 -0.0207 0.0463
(-11.79)*** (5.71)***
ATR + TM 0.0003 0.0001
(14.52)*** (2.59)***
Number + TM -0.0018 0.0007
(-13.08)*** (3.52)***
TAXH + TM -0.0009 0.0010
(-3.92)*** (2.07)**
TLU + TM 0.0136 0.0055
(43.45)*** (3.47)***
SEON + EM 0.0026 -0.0007
(6.71)*** (-1.51)*
SOE -f. EM 0.0050 0.0008
(7.77)*** (1.07)
LOSS + EM 0.0011 0.0081
(3.44)*** (8.31)***
LOSS1 + EM -0.0004 0.0009
(-0.86) (0.85)
LOSS2 + EM 0.0209 -0.0045
(3.35)*** (-5.99)***
Size ? TM 0.0032 -0.0072
(11.44)*** (-6.28)***
Y2001 ? -0.0018 0.0013
(-9.27)*** (2.24)**
Y2002 ? -0.0012 0.0022
(-5.12)*** (4 64)***
Y2003 ? 0.0115 0.0002
(35.18)*** (0.30)
Adj. R2 71.79% 24.59%
F-statistic 52.29 3.88
(0.000) (0.000)
Sample 263 116
Note:
Size = the logarithm of total assets.
(See Appendix 6 for other variables definitions)
247
APPENDIX 10
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EPS Model—Yearly Regressions 
Panel A: EPSt+] = ß 0 + ßxEPSt + ß2BTDt + e, (Model 2)
Year Sample A> A f t Adj. R2 F-statistic
2000 84 -0.15
(-2.38)**
1.23
(4.77)***
-15.70
(-4.08)***
0.233 13.64***
2001 97 0.001
(0-12)
0.46
(3.35)***
-0.53
(-1.69)*
0.166 10.58***
2002 94 0.02
(2.34)**
0.75
(4.89)***
-0.94
(-7.88)***
0.538 53.60***
2003 90 -0.001
(-0.10)
1.04
(2.76)***
-3.13
(-2.83)***
0.299 20.02***
Panel B: EPSl+] = a 0 + a ]EPSl -\-a2ABTDt -\-a3NBTD, +el+l (Model 3)
Y ea r Obs.
« 0 a , a 2 « 3
A d j. R2 Partial 
F -s ta t.a
20 00 84 -0 .17
( - 2 .6 8 ) * * *
1.36
( 5 .1 2 ) * * *
-4 .1 4
(-0 .6 1 )
-21 .01
( -4 .5 8 ) * * *
0 .2 62 4 .1 6 * * *
2001 97 -0.001
(-0 .1 3 )
0 .54
( 3 .8 3 ) * * *
0 .02
(0 .0 4 )
-0 .5 9
( -1 .9 0 ) * *
0 .189 3 .6 9 * * *
20 0 2 94 0.02
(2 .3 0 ) * *
0 .74
( 4 .6 4 ) * * *
-1 .01
( -1 0 .0 6 ) * * *
-0 .85
( - 4 .2 3 ) * * *
0 .527 0 .39
2003 90 -0 .00 2
(-0 .1 0 )
1.03
( 2 .7 7 ) * * *
-2 .52
( -2 .7 4 ) * * *
-2 .1  A
( - 2 .8 4 ) * * *
0 .2 99 0 .89
Note:
(1) * denotes the significance at the level o f 10% using a two-tailed test; * *  denotes the 
significance at the level o f 5% using a two-tailed test; * * *  denotes the significance at the level 
o f 1% using o f a two-tailed test. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics based on the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) i f  heteroscedasticity is detected or 
HAC-consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) i f  serial correlation is detected.
(2) Variables definitions:
EPSl+]: earnings per share in year t+1, deflating by stock price on April 30 following the end o f
fiscal year t; EPS,: earnings per share in year t, deflating by stock price on April 30 following
the end o f fiscal year t. BTD: book-tax differences in year t; ABTD: abnormal BTD in year t; 
NBTD: normal BTD in year t, all deflated by total assets.
a The partial F-statistics are used to test whether Model 3 has incremental explanatory power 
over Model 2.
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APPENDIX 11
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EPS Model with an Alternative Deflator
EPSltl = f t  + ßtEPS, + ß2BTDt+£,
Year Sample f t A f t Adj. R2 F-statistic
A L L 365 -0.09
(-1.30)
0.79
(3.81)***
-2.99
(-4.01)***
0.132 12.08***
2000 84 -0.10
(-1.45)
0.87
(3.37)***
-3.38
(-1.68)*
0.107 5.98***
2001 97 0.01
(1.48)
0.20
(0.68)
0.38
(0.15)
0.142 8.97***
2002 94 0.01
(1.29)
0.79
(4.34)***
-3.42
(-4.30)***
0.450 39.52***
2003 90 0.001
(0.01)
0.99
(2.85)***
-2.85
(-2.92)***
0.267 17.40***
(1) * denotes the significance at the level o f 10% using a two-tailed test; * *  denotes the 
significance at the level o f 5% using a two-tailed test; * * *  denotes the significance at the level 
o f 1% using o f a two-tailed test. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics based on the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) i f  heteroscedasticity is detected or 
H AC-consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) i f  serial correlation is detected.
(2) Variables definitions:
EPSt+j : earnings per share in year t+1, deflating by stock price on April 30 following the end o f
fiscal year t. EPSt: earnings per share in year t, deflating by stock price on April 30 following
the end o f fiscal year t. BTD: book-tax differences per share in year t, deflating by stock price 
on April 30 following the end o f fiscal year t.
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APPENDIX 12
Results of Sensitivity Tests for EPS Model with Industry Dummy 
Panel A: EPSI+X = ß0 + ßxEPSt + ß2BTDt + ß2INDt + e,+1 (Model 2)
Year Obs. f t A f t f t Adj.R1 2 3 F-statistic
ALL 365 -0.09
(-10.6)
0.76***
(3.09)
j jg***
(-3.85)
0.02
(0.63)
0.129 10.03***
2000 84 -0.21**
(-2.06)
1.22***
(4.69)
-15.54***
(-4.02)
0.09
(0.77)
0.229 9 24***
2001 97 0.001
(0.41)
0.46***
(3.34)
-0.53*
(-1.69)
-0.01
(-0.42)
0.159 7.05***
2002 94 -0.01
(-0.46)
0.75***
(5.22)
-0.92***
(-8.28)
0.04**
(2.48)
0.558 40.14***
2003 90 0.02
(0.62)
1.05***
(2.80)
-3.10***
(-2.76)
-0.03
(-1.13)
0.302 13.82***
Panel B: EPSl+l = ß0 + ßxEPSt + ß2ABTDt + ß2NBTDt + ßJNDt +st+l (Model 3)
Y ear O bs
« 0 «1 a 2 « 3 « 4
A dj. R2 F-stat.
A LL 365 -0.09 0.83*** -0.83*** -1.37*** 0.02 0.136 9 24***
(-1 .14) (3 .19) (-5 .53) (-4 .41 ) (0 .66)
2000 84 -0.20* 1.35*** -4.49 -20.72*** 0.05 0 .254 8.09***
(-1 .98) (5 .10) (-0 .65) (-4 .45) (0 .44)
2001 97 0.001 0.54*** 0.01 -0.59** -0.01 0.181 6.30***
(0 .09) (3 .80) (0 .02) (-1 .89) (-0 .20)
2002 94 -0.01 0.74*** -0.99*** -0.84*** 0.04** 0.555 29.96***
(-0 .10) (4 .95) (-9 .76) (-4 .28) (2 .45)
2003 90 0.02 1.04*** -2.32*** -2.59*** -0.04 0.303 10.70***
(0 .75) (2 .81) (-2 .31) (-2 .56 ) (-1 .31)
Note:
(1) * denotes the significance at the level of 10% using a two-tailed test; ** denotes the 
significance at the level of 5% using a two-tailed test; *** denotes the significance at the level 
of 1% using of a two-tailed test. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics based on the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) if heteroscedasticity is detected or 
HAC-consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) if serial correlation is detected.
(2) The pooled regression result is based on a year dummy.
(3) Variables definitions:
EPSl+l: earnings per share in year t+1, deflating by stock price on April 30 following the end of
fiscal year t; EPSt : earnings per share in year t, deflating by stock price on April 30 following
the end of fiscal year t. BTD: book-tax differences in year t; ABTD: abnormal BTD in year t; 
NBTD: normal BTD in year t, all deflating by total assets. IND: dummy variable the equals 1 
when a listed firm is in the manufacturing, 0 otherwise.
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APEEDIX 13
Results of Additional Tests for Return Model with a Different Deflator
RET' = ßQ + ß\EPSt + ß2AEPSi + ß^BTDj + £.
Year Ob. Intercept EPSJ AEPS, BTD. Adj.R1 2 F-statistic
ALL 468 0.02 3.08*** 0.34 -10.54*** 0.096 17.46***
(0.55) (8.44) (0.94) (-2.26)
2000 84 3.63*** -0.83 2.42* 0.51 0.022 1.62
(18.89) (-1.28) (1.76) (0.08)
2001 99 -0.29*** -0.34 0.96*** -3.17** 0.096 1.46**
(-12.49) (-1.19) (3.01) (-2.28)
2002 99 -0.22*** 1.58*** 0.06 -3.60** 0.480 31.16***
(-14.52) (3.76) (0.55) (-2.37)
2003 95 -0.10*** 2.42*** 0.14 -7.78*** 0.431 24.72***
(-3.02) (7.05) (1.07) (-5.46)
2004 91 -0.40*** 2.57** -0.02 -6.20* 0.354 17.47***
(-9.69) (2.38) (-0.10) (-1.76)
Mean3 (2.14)** (1.26) (-2.36)**
(1) *, ** and *** denotes the significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. Figures in 
parentheses denote t-statistics. In yearly regressions, t-statistics are based on the heteroscedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) if heteroscedasticity is detected or HAC-consistent covariance 
matrix (Newey and West 1987) if auto-correlation is detected. In pooled regression, GLS and 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix are applied.
(2) Variables definitions:
RET,: the return over the 12-months ending on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t; EPSt : 
earnings per share in year t, deflated by stock price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t-1; 
AEPSt : annual difference changes in earnings per share for period t deflated by stock price on April 30
following the end of fiscal year t-1; BTDt : book-tax differences per share in year t, deflated by stock 
price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t-1;
a This is the mean of the yearly coefficients, estimated to test for the effect of cross-sectional correlation 
in the error terms.
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APPENDIX 14
Results of Additional Tests for Return Model with Industry Dummy
RET, = ß0 + ß.EPS, + ß2AEPS, + ß,BTD, + ßJNDt + s,
N Intercept EPS, AEPS, ABTD, IND, Adj.R1 F-stat.
ALL 468 0.02
(0.21)
2 79*** 
(7.86)
-0.17
(-0.49)
-3 19*** 
(-2.61)
0.06
(1.11)
0.080 11.22***
2000 84 3 i9***
(9.75)
-1.56*
(-1.76)
3.09**
(2.36)
19.44
(1.38)
0.74*
(1.95)
0.076 2.71*
2001 99 -0.26***
(-8.89)
-0.23
(-1.27)
1.09***
(4.03)
-1.60**
(-2.56)
-0.05
(-1.62)
0.160 5.66**
2002 99 -0.23***
(-10.93)
1.40***
(4.03)
0.03
(0.29)
-0.76**
(-2.59)
0.03
(1.33)
0.448 20.92***
2003 95 -0.10**
(-2.07)
2.54***
(7.38)
-0.22*
(-1.91)
_5 i9***
(-6.07)
0.02
(0.28)
0.431 18.80***
2004 91 -0.37***
(-4.98)
2.38**
(2.43)
-0.10
(-0.48)
-7.70
(-1.58)
-0.04
(-0.48)
0.317 11.45***
Mean (2.16)* (0.86) (-2.28)*
Note-,____________________________________________________________________________
(1) * denotes the significance at the level of 10% using a two-tailed test; ** denotes the 
significance at the level of 5% using a two-tailed test; *** denotes the significance at the level 
of 1% using of a two-tailed test. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics. In yearly regressions, 
t-statistics are based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1980) if 
heteroscedasticity is detected or HAC-consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West 1987) if 
auto-correlation is detected. In pooled regression, GLS and heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix are applied.
(2) Variables definitions:
RET: the return over the 12-months ending on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t. EPS: 
earnings per share for period t deflated by stock price on April 30 following the end of fiscal 
year t. AEPS: annual difference changes in earnings per share for period t deflated by stock 
price on April 30 following the end of fiscal year t. BTD: book-tax differences for period t 
deflated by total assets. IND: dummy variable that equals to 1 when a listed firm is in 
manufacturing, 0 otherwise.
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